# Settler Colonialism K––K Lab

**Note**

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### 1NC SHELL

#### Settler Colonialism is the grounding force of the international – the understanding as colonialism as a domestic matter forgoes the way that Settler Colonialism was a project of domination in the name of civilizing the savage

**Davis 20** (Making a settler colonial IR: Imagining the ‘international’ in early Australian International Relations, Alexander E. Davis is a postdoctoral research fellow at La Trobe University's Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy, Australia. Review of International Studies (2020), <https://research-repository.uwa.edu.au/en/publications/59daafa6-b580-4b7f-8c24-f4599ccaf5f5>) // JLHS AA

Sitting alongside themes of imperialism, internationalism, and realism in the study of Australian IR, was a stream of thought on race and empire that focused on settlement. For the history of international thought, this is significant. The control of territory by settlers is the foundational concern of the Australian state. **This was therefore foundational to its international thought and its politics**. **The blurring of the international and the domestic, structured around racial categories and seeking to maintain and advance white supremacy, was a constitutive element of the founding of IR** in Australia. This lines up closely with Vitalis’s findings in the US.105 Australia’s Others under IR’s gaze were primarily its nearest neighbours, its colonial projects, and those within: its own settlement, its immigration policy and its Indigenous population. Although dominated by a white man’s view of the world, there were contributions made by women throughout this period. Prior to Coral Bell’s taking up of a realist framework, though, these contributions were sometimes confined to subjects stereotyped as feminine. The settlement of the Northern Territory and the rest of Australia remained parts of Australian IR through the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin’s time as its primary publication outlet. The study of imperial affairs, based on the development of societies, was slowly shifting into the study of international affairs. At this moment in Australian IR, the two sat alongside one another: with articles on events in China and Japan placed next to discussion of the colonial development of Northern Australia and New Guinea. Imperialism and racial development politics sat alongside analysis of great power conflict in East Asia. The Second World War led to another reshaping of Australia’s international thought. The first IR department in the country was placed within Pacific Studies, which was intended to focus on both East Asia and Australia’s colonial projects. Still, **race as an explicit subject of IR** in Australia **shifted, and the explicit maintenance of racial hierarchies moved into racialised psychological and cultural explanations of the irrationality of the postcolonial societies**. **This erasure made it more difficult to analyse race and racism, allowing them to continue unchecked.** In terms of our disciplinary historiography, it led to the exclusion of empire and settlement as insufficiently international to be analysed. We might be tempted to think that, because settlement and land tenure are not viewed as ‘international’ today, we can simply erase them from our disciplinary memory. To do so is anachronistic. Colonial settlement was thought of as international affairs. It was a common topic, discussed thoroughly and regularly. Forgetting this effectively produces the excision of Australia’s settler colonial history from its international affairs. **The connection between land, sovereignty, and settlement remains foundational to the international system**. That a series of colonial questions of settlement sat alongside Australia’s early studies of its relationship with East Asia reflects the transition from a broadly colonial system to an international system. This transition was not simple or straightforward. It is not even complete. Australia has not decolonised. Neglecting this transition closes our eyes to the contemporary politics of race and hierarchy that postcolonial scholars of IR have repeatedly and forcefully emphasised. Australia’s contemporary international affairs, questions about its defence, Australia’s positioning inside or outside Asia, its relationship with Pacific island neighbours, its strategic culture, fears about foreign ownership of land, all look very different if we place them in this context. If we accept that settler colonial ideologies were a key element of the founding of Australian IR, a claim for which there is ample evidence, IR in Australia needs urgent critical reflection. Australian **settlement means the dehumanisation and the genocide of existing populations.** This continues today. Settler colonial Australian IR justified and argued for this, presenting it as natural and desirable. As Vitalis put it in the US context, ‘the history of ideas, institutions, and practices has a constitutive role in their present forms and functions’. 106 While Australian IR forgets its settler history, policies of dispossession and intervention, and **the ‘civilising mission’, continue at home and abroad**.107 Australian foreign policy, often wrapped in liberal idealism, normalises and affirms settler colonialism. **We would need to engage deeply with Indigenous perspectives** about Australia and the world **to understand this in the present**. Sadly, few, if any, such voices are in dialogue with IR in Australia. I can only conclude that the rot is particularly deep. Forgetting this history cleanses our thought of colonial violence and the settlement of Australia, making it impossible to reckon with. **Addressing these issues requires more than a mild and unthreatening ‘diversification’ of the discipline’s voices, but a thorough and conscious effort to decolonise, which challenges our foundational assumptions.**

#### Settler violence threatens the entire planet with endless racist violence

Mishra 18, MA @ Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (Pankaj, “The Religion of Whiteness Becomes a Suicide Cult,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/opinion/race-politics-whiteness.html)//BB> (bless)

In the years that followed, politicians and pundits in Britain and its settler colonies of Australia, Canada and the United States would jointly forge an identity geopolitics of the “higher races.” Today it has reached its final and most desperate phase, with existential fears about endangered white power feverishly circulating once again between the core and periphery of the greatest modern empire. “The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive,” President Trump said last year in a speech hailed by the British journalist Douglas Murray, the Canadian columnist Mark Steyn and the American editor Rich Lowry. More recently, Mr. Trump tweeted (falsely) about “large-scale killing” of white farmers in South Africa — a preoccupation, deepened by Rupert Murdoch’s media, of white supremacists around the world. To understand the rapid mainstreaming of white supremacism in English-speaking liberal democracies today, we must examine the experience of unprecedented global migration and racial mixing in the Anglosphere in the late 19th century: countries such as the United States and Australia where, as Roosevelt wrote admiringly in 1897, “democracy, with the clear instinct of race selfishness, saw the race foe, and kept out the dangerous alien.” It is in the motherlands of democracy rather than in fascist Europe that racial hierarchies first defined the modern world. It is also where a last-ditch and potentially calamitous battle to preserve them is being fought today. This “race selfishness” was sharpened in the late 19th century, as the elites of the “higher races” struggled to contain mass disaffection generated by the traumatic change of globalization: loss of jobs and livelihoods amid rapid economic growth and intensified movements of capital, goods and labor. For fearful ruling classes, political order depended on their ability to forge an alliance between, as Hannah Arendt wrote, “capital and mob,” between rich and powerful whites and those rendered superfluous by industrial capitalism. Exclusion or degradation of nonwhite peoples seemed one way of securing dignity for those marginalized by economic and technological shifts. The political climate was prepared by intellectuals with clear-cut racial theories, such as Brooks Adams, a Boston Brahmin friend of Roosevelt, and Charles B. Davenport, the leading American exponent of eugenics. In Australia, Pearson’s social Darwinism was amplified by media barons like Keith Murdoch (father of Rupert and a stalwart of the eugenics movement) and institutionalized in a “White Australia” policy that restricted “colored” migration for most of the 20th century. Anti-minority passions in the United States peaked with the 1924 immigration law (much admired by Hitler and, more recently, by Jeff Sessions), which impeded Jewish immigrants and barred Asians entirely. By the early 20th century, violence against indigenous peoples, immigrants and African-Americans reached a new ferocity, and nativist and racist demagogues entrenched a politics of dispossession, segregation and disenfranchisement. Seeking to maintain white power globally, Roosevelt helped transform the United States into a major imperialist power. Woodrow Wilson, too, worked to preserve, as he put it, “white civilization and its domination of the planet” even as he patented the emollient rhetoric of liberal internationalism that many in the American political and media establishment still parrot. At the post-World War I Paris Peace Conference, which Wilson supervised, the leaders of Britain, the United States, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and Canada not only humiliated the many Asians and Africans demanding self-determination; they also jointly defeated an attempt by Japan, their wartime ally, to have a racial equality clause included in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The exposure of Nazi crimes, followed by decolonization and civil rights movements, generally discredited quasi-scientific racism and stigmatized overt expressions of white supremacism. In our own time, global capitalism has promised to build a colorblind world through economic integration. But as revolts erupt against globalization in its latest, more disruptive phase, politicians and pundits in the Anglosphere are again scrambling to rebuild political communities around what W. E.B. Du Bois in 1910 identified as “the new religion of whiteness.” The intellectual white web originally woven in late-19th-century Australia vibrates once more with what the historians Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds termed “racial knowledge and technologies that animated white men’s countries and their strategies of exclusion, deportation and segregation.” Mr. Trump, for instance, has chosen Australia’s brutal but popular immigration policies as a model: “That is a good idea. We should do that too,” he said in January 2017 to Malcolm Turnbull, Australia’s prime minister at the time, as he explained his tactic of locking up refugees on remote islands. “You are worse than I am,” Mr. Trump told Mr. Turnbull. If right-wing Australian politicians were among the first to mainstream a belligerent white nationalism, the periodicals and television channels of Rupert Murdoch have worked overtime to preserve the alliance between capital and mob in the Anglosphere. Indulged by Mr. Murdoch’s newspapers, writers like Bernard Lewis, Niall Ferguson, David Frum, Andrew Sullivan and Andrew Roberts repeatedly urged American neoconservatives after the Sept. 11 attacks to take up the aging white man’s burden and quell mutinous natives. A broad range of figures in the Anglosphere’s establishment, including some of Mr. Trump’s most ostentatious critics today, contributed manure to the soil in which Trumpism flourishes. Cheered on by the Murdoch press, Tony Blair tried to deepen Britain and America’s “special relationship” in Iraq. Leaders of Australia and Canada also eagerly helped with the torture, rendition and extermination of black and brown brutes. Not surprisingly, these chieftains of white settler colonies are fierce cultural warriors; they are all affiliated with private donors who build platforms where political correctness, Islam and feminism are excoriated, the facts of injustice and inequality denied, chests thumped about a superior but sadly imperiled Western civilization, and fraternal sympathy extended to Israel, the world’s last active settler-colonialist project. Emotional incontinence rather than style or wit marks such gilded networks of white power. For the Anglosphere originally forged and united by the slave trade and colonialism is in terminal crisis today. Whiteness denoted, as Du Bois wrote, “the ownership of the earth forever and ever.” But many descendants of the landlords of the earth find themselves besieged both at home and abroad, their authority as overlords, policemen and interpreters of the globe increasingly challenged. Mr. Trump appears to some of these powerful but insecure men as an able-bodied defender of the “higher races.” The Muslim-baiting British Conservative politician Boris Johnson says that he is “increasingly admiring of Donald Trump.” Mr. Murray, the British journalist, thinks Mr. Trump is “reminding the West of what is great about ourselves.” The Canadian YouTube personality Jordan Peterson claims that his loathing of “identity politics” would have driven him to vote for Mr. Trump. Other panicky white bros not only virulently denounce identity politics and political correctness — code for historically scorned peoples’ daring to propose norms about how they are treated; they also proclaim ever more rowdily that the (white) West was, and is, best. “It is time to make the case for colonialism again,” Bruce Gilley, a Canadian academic, recently asserted and promptly shot to martyrdom in the far-right constellation as a victim of politically correct criticism. Such busy recyclers of Western supremacism, many of whom uphold a disgraced racial pseudoscience, remind us that history often repeats itself as intellectual farce. The low comedy of charlatanry, however, should not distract us from the lethal dangers of a wounded and swaggering identity geopolitics. The war on terror reactivated the 19th century’s imperial archive of racial knowledge, according to which the swarthy enemy was subhuman, inviting extreme and lawless violence. The rapid contraction of suffrage rights witnessed in early-20th-century America is now mimicked by Republican attempts to disenfranchise nonwhite voters. The Australian lawmaker who recently urged a “final solution” for Muslim immigrants was only slightly out of tune with public debate about immigration in Australia. Hate crimes continue to rise across the United States, Britain and Canada. More ominously, demographic, economic and political decline, and the loss of intellectual hegemony, have plunged many long-term winners of history into a vengeful despair. A century ago, the mere suspicion of being thrust aside by black and yellow peoples sparked apocalyptic visions of “race suicide.” Today, the “preponderance of China” that Pearson predicted is becoming a reality, and the religion of whiteness increasingly resembles a suicide cult. Mr. Trump’s trade wars, sanctions, border walls, deportations, denaturalizations and other 11th-hour battles seem to push us all closer to the “terrible probability” James Baldwin once outlined: that the rulers of the “higher races,” “struggling to hold on to what they have stolen from their captives, and unable to look into their mirror, will precipitate a chaos throughout the world which, if it does not bring life on this planet to an end, will bring about a racial war such as the world has never seen.”

#### Thus we endorse diversality – an orientation that recognizes the hybridity of alternative epistemologies that focuses on building mutual connections to build new forms of international relations centered around recognition and not dominance

**Taylor 12** (Decolonizing International Relations: Perspectives from Latin America, Lucy Taylor, International Studies Review, September 2012, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 386-400 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23280307>) // JLHS AA

So far, I have focused on politicizing binaries and exposing the colonial wound. This is an important step but it imagines the debate to take place in terms of the colonizer and colonized; **what is missing is an appreciation of mixed-ness or mestizaje, a social fact which is integral to theorizing the coloniality of power in the Americas**. **Here, we return to the colonial difference but emphasize the lived experiences of ‘‘transculturation’’ and ‘‘border thinking.’’** Particularly in Latin America, the colonial wound has generated significant indigenous organizations right across the region, which assert their dignity and political capacity (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Quijano 2008). In doing so, they reveal the existence of the ‘‘colonial difference,’’ marking it as a space of political contestation, but this disjucture is not experienced in the same way by the colonizer and the colonized. While the colonizer, installed in a dominant position, views it as a gap of miscomprehension and disdain, which ‘‘he’’ is not obliged to cross, the colonized must operate in a world dominated by Occidental institutions, languages, and rationales (Mignolo 2000: 64–84). **The colonized must incessantly negotiate the colonial difference and reconcile the demands of a colonized reality with cultural meanings embedded in an indigenous worldview.** Politicizing this mestizaje is key to decolonial politics, and Gloria Anzaldu´a’s notion of ‘‘border thinking,’’ a Latin American response to hybridity, offers significant insights (Mignolo 2000: 49–90; Anzaldu´a 2007). Anzaldu´a’s vision of hybridity is rooted not in the intricacies of intellectual debate or psychoanalysis but draws on her real-life experiences of living between the labels which attach to the binaries so essential to Occidental thinking. Anzaldu´a grew up and lived on the US–Mexico border: she was a Chicana feminist daughter of share-croppers, a Marxist indı´gena mestiza and seventh generation lesbian citizen of the United States (Keating 2009: 1–15). Living at the intersection of so many boundaries (geographical, sexual, political, linguistic, racial) did not leave her feeling incomplete or dismembered, though; her response was to say: ‘‘They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label. You say my name is ambivalence?... Who me, confused? Ambivalent? Not so. Only your labels split me’’ (Anzaldu´a 1984; quoted in Keating 2009: 17). By asserting her completeness, she demonstrates the fallacy of the labels. Anzaldu´a borrowed a Nahuatl word to express the space that she inhabited between these tagged categories: nepantla or (roughly) the place at the broken edges. She explained the technique of border thinking in one poem: ‘‘Because I, a mestiza, continually walk out of one culture, and into another, because I am in all cultures at the same time, alma entre dos mundos, tres, cuatro,...’’ (Anzaldu´a 2007: 99) This vision of human agency derived from inhabiting border lands serves to disempower the idea of the border as a stopping point controlled by the state. That the state which she traversed in real life was the US–Mexico border only heightens the powerfulness of her critique and the subversive potential of her work for both IR and the Americas. Equally important, though, is the concept of transculturation, which indicates that processes of hybridity have not only shaped the lives of subaltern groups, but have also conditioned Whiteness and the Western epistemological project in (Latin) American society (Pratt 2008). The concept of transculturation was devised by Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortı´z in 1940 to understand how Cuban society was constituted. He focused on the relationship between slaves and slave owners, understanding that both had shifted from their native soil and that each was intimately influenced by the cultural heritage of the other and the experience of colonialism: ‘‘Each immigrant was uprooted from his native land in a double movement of adjustment and readjustment, of deculturation or exculturation and of acculturation or inculturation, and ultimately transculturation’’ (Ortı´z 1940: 255, italics in original, my translation). He was clear that this relationship of mutual influence was not equal or power-free––how could it be––but asserted that both the African and the European communities were full cultural agents, even though they were locked into a brutal and exploitative relationship (Millington 2007). By imagining cultural exchange to be a two-way street (albeit on a steep hill), Ortı´z highlights hybridity as a social experience of both the subaltern and the dominant. He urges us to consider transculturation as part and parcel of society-making, nation-building projects, and look beyond domination and appropriation to ask how Native American thinking, experiences, and practices have molded ‘‘the USA’’ as a global actor. **Following this thinking, resistance to the coloniality of power therefore involves not only fighting against the colonizing logic, but also seeking to shake that logic from within by revealing the hybridity and diversity within what seems to be a unified and settled settler society.** Border thinking, then, might elicit insights not only at the ‘‘periphery’’ or border but also at the ‘‘core’’ of global power, if we are willing to destabilize its foundations. A useful strategy which might help to unsettle ‘‘core’’ thinking has been proposed by Martinican Edouard Glissant in his Poetics of Relation (1997). He sets out an intellectual politics of diversality (rather than universality) inspired by Caribbean Creole consciousness**. Diversality takes the idea of transculturation a step further by theorizing cultural interchange as not only a social fact but also a political strategy**. Diversality assumes the existence of profound difference, but Glissant argues that ‘‘thought of the Other is sterile without the other of Thought’’ (1997: 154); that is, **merely accepting that differences exist is not enough to generate deep change in our thinking. Rather, he calls for an ‘‘aesthetics of turbulence,’’ which breaks assumptions and allows one’s thoughts to be ‘‘prised open’’ in order to develop new imaginaries and fresh linkages between peoples**. The ‘‘other of Thought’’ is thus created by confluences in which ‘‘each is changed by and changes the other’’ (1997: 154–5). **Diversality involves not only being prepared to recognize difference on an equal footing but also a willingness to open one’s thoughts to ‘‘turbulence’’ which will destroy assumptions and rebuild hybrid modes of thinking in its wake.** The Americas occupies a privileged role in this theorizing because, as Anzaldu´a, Ortı´z, and Glissant assert, social (and sexual) mixing is not a ‘‘new’’ process but rather it is deeply embedded in the Americas––in 500 years of colonial encounter and its resulting hybrid identities. **A ‘‘mestizo Americas’’ approach could therefore play a crucial role in developing decolonial political struggle, not only by denouncing the injustice of colonialism but by prising open, shifting, and hybridizing conventional ways of understanding international relationships––and International Relations.** The issue of how this might occur requires more time and space to explore, but I begin a discussion here by identifying three questions that a decolonial politics might ask of IR. 1. What other ways are there to understand the world? (And how might this influence our thinking about the international?) This question invites IR to acknowledge diversality. It assumes the completeness, complexity, and sophistication of non-western ontologies and epistemologies in a move which should be humbling**. It opens up our minds to new ways of imagining human existence;** to imagine time as being circular (King 1993), **or that land does not belong to people but people to the land** (Silko 2006), or that boundaries are delineated by walking ⁄ presence (Larsen 2006), or that the world is configured not through dualities but threes (Kusch 2010), or that colonialism is an illness (Momaday 1989; Burman 2009). This work has already started; Marshall Beier’s incisive critique of conventional IR conveys the immensities of the colonial difference in his discussion of Lakota life-ways which he contrasts to the ‘‘hegemonologue’’ of mainstream IR (2005**). These differences might influence understandings of the international, not so much by adding new ideas but by destabilizing our mode of thinking––our aesthetics of thought,** as Glissant might suggest. Encountering fundamental disjunctures of human experience should convey a sensation of difference experienced as a visceral confusion and disorientation. **A decolonial IR project must, then, be prepared to approach non-occidental worldviews with a mind that is willing to be made uncomfortable, that is ready not to comprehend, and that is prepared to feel out of control**. This is not just an exercise in submission though, because we can use the sensation of disorientation to heighten our awareness of the Occidental project and the contemporary coloniality of power. It helps us to map out the narrow limits of the Western imaginary and to perceive its contours, its regime of knowledge, and worldview more profoundly**. An awareness of diversality shows the limits and fallacies of universal thinking, and by unsettling our certainties, it generates space for new thought**. 2. What does IR not know? (And what has this got to do with the coloniality of power?) This question highlights the hidden side of knowledge––ignorance. It suggests that the chasm of colonial difference is far too deep and wide to be bridged, which means that **single-vision understandings of world history or IR cannot possibly comprehend the experiences and worldviews of ‘‘others’’**. Glissant reflects on the academic project and concludes that ‘‘no matter how many studies and references we accumulate, we will never reach the end...; knowing this in advances makes it possible for us to dwell there. Not knowing this totality [of experiences] is not a weakness. Not wanting to know it certainly is’’ (1997: 154). Perhaps counter-intuitively, then, this ignorance brings a number of intellectual benefits. Firstly, being aware of profound difference might act as a brake on drawing easy parallels without listening and thinking very hard first, promoting critical and complex thinking. Secondly, gaining a sense of just how different difference can be helps us to perceive the realm of possibilities because it is an orientation point in a vast galaxy of difference. However, the purpose of identifying deep difference is not to label or pin down with words ideas which are outside the realm of European imagination. Rather, it is to accept that the chasm cannot be closed––that such ideas are simply untranslatable into European languages and regimes of knowledge (Mignolo and Schiwy 2003). That is, a decolonial IR must accept its ignorance and learn what it can about the world not only by studying what is knowable but also by reflecting on what is beyond comprehension. The caveat reminds us, though, that this realm of thinking about the international takes place not on a level playing field of competing worldviews but on a pitch riven with geohierarchies conditioned by the coloniality of power. **A decolonial IR project must foreground the colonial nature of this difference to expose the injustices that conventional approaches enact in the name of universalism**. 3. How might conventional IR be ‘‘prised open’’ by difference? (And how is this linked to the USA?) This question asks what would happen if IR were to move beyond simply acknowledging diversality to generate an aesthetics of thinking Other-wise (Glissant 1997). This involves recognizing that the chasm of colonial difference is far from absolute, indeed that it is spanned, everyday and often, through processes of mestizaje. Thus, difference should be viewed as a border zone which acts as a space where new ideas and cosmologies might be imagined, emerging from transcultural meetings. One key way in which conventional IR might be opened up by difference is by refocusing attention on ordinary people’s experience of the international, as Te´treault and Lipschutz propose. **This takes on a decolonizing role if the coloniality of power is highlighted, a move which not only creates awareness of difference but promotes border thinking––thinking inbetween categories and based on everyday lived experiences of negotiating coloniality ⁄ modernity**. Such strategies complement attempts by Inayatullah and Blaney and many more to destabilize IR’s traditional building blocks such as nation-states, sovereignty, and the binary of war⁄peace**. The USA as global actor, as Western beacon, and as home of the discipline is intimately entangled with IR**. **This is why border thinking at the binaried intersection of the Americas is particularly acute in its capacity to destabilize conventional thinking because it is a geographical metaphor for many of the boundaries which set out global hierarchies and help to structure IR**. Not least of these is the First World ⁄Third World binary embodied at the US–Mexico border and its attendants, Whiteness⁄Blackness, and civilization⁄ barbarism. Shifting from thinking about the border itself to embrace border thinking invites us to step beyond the fence and its checkpoints to consider the USA as a profoundly hybrid place. **We move beyond US hybridity as immigrant melting pot, to focus on mestizaje––a complex amalgam of settler, Native and African slave descendants whose relationships are vividly marked by the coloniality of power and the logics of modernity**. A decolonial IR writing from a ‘‘prised open’’ USA not only looks for radical, destabilizing difference, such as Native American thinking but also recognizes hybridized connections which generate openings for dialogues. We should not assume that the USA, like the Cuban slave masters described by Ortı´z, is not profoundly conditioned by the colonial encounter. However, such interactions do not occur in a power-free zone. For this reason, **a decolonial analysis of hybridity in the international must vigilantly foreground the presence of inequality, injustice, and the potential for violence in cultural interchanges conditioned by the coloniality of power**. Border thinking in this broad sense, inclusive of IR perspectives, offers a realm of imagination, connection and intellectual opportunity from which to rethink and challenge dominant economic, racial and epistemological modes. The role of mainstream IR in such re-imaginings of intergroup relationships is crucial, not least because, as critical scholars like those cited in this article attest, conventional IR is a central mainstay of the unequal global order.

## FW

### FW––Education Balls Out Fr

#### Re-orienting the way we engage with settler colonial institutions is a prior and necessary project of decolonization

**Cordes and Sabzalian 20** (Cordes, A., & Sabzalian, L. (2020). The Urgent Need for Anticolonial Media Literacy. *International Journal of Multicultural Education*, *22*(2), 182–201. <https://doi.org/10.18251/ijme.v22i2.2443>) // JLHS AA

\*\*edited for violent reference to indians and indigenous populations

The hypervisible display of settler superiority, racism, and Indigenous erasure at the Superbowl illustrates one of many ways Native peoples are dehumanized in media. **The overt racism that Native peoples experience “is not confined to hate groups but is visible in everyday discourse and throughout the media**” (Robertson, 2015, p. 114). Robertson refers to this dynamic as legitimized racism: Racism against American Indians has been normalized and institutionally legitimized, thereby rendering it invisible. To legitimize is to make legitimate, that is, to justify, reason, or rationalize in accordance with established or accepted patterns and standards. In other words, **the institutions that shape social norms**— those seen as social authorities—**reproduce symbolic racial violence against** ~~American Indians~~(**Indigenous peoples**) **through** legal structures, public **education** locations, consumer products, sports associations, and so on. (pp. 114-115) Supporting students in detecting and disrupting the dehumanization of Indigenous peoples, requires first that teachers themselves can recognize the varied ways media legitimizes racism against Indigenous peoples (Robertson, 2015). Given that discourses and narratives circulating in media are often not only racist in nature but also colonial, detecting and interrupting legitimized racism will require teachers to be equipped with both critical race media literacy (Yosso, 2002), as well as anticolonial media literacy. Anticolonial media literacy builds upon the concept of anticolonial literacy (Sabzalian, 2019a). Akin to “equity literacy,” which involves the ability to recognize, respond, and redress bias, discrimination, and inequity in education, as well as to cultivate and sustain bias-free educational spaces (Gorski & Swalwell, 2015, p. 37), anticolonial literacy involves “the ability to critically read and counter Eurocentric and colonizing educational discourses and practices” (Sabzalian, 2019a, p. 202). Preparing teachers to be versed in anticolonial media literacy can support Native students specifically in developing a “critical race vocabulary” that affords them opportunities to “name their pain” (Matias & Liou, 2015, p. 615). More broadly, anticolonial media literacy can support all students in recognizing and deconstructing dehumanizing colonial logics in media and generate anticolonial alternatives. **We use the term anticolonial**, following Patel (2016), **to “draw into relief the ways in which settler coloniality must be known to be countered**,” a contrast and complement to the term decolonial which “should always address material changes” (p. 7). **Anticolonial literacy is an important complement to decolonial praxis**. In this article, we make a more explicit link to the need for media literacy, and its necessary corollary, critical race media literacy (Yosso, 2002). Though we offered this Superbowl vignette as an example of the way society and media sanction ongoing dominant colonial narratives, examples of Indigenous erasure and dehumanization abound. For example, celebrities and ordinary individuals alike still wear headdresses (Cordes & Merskin, 2019; White, 2017), and racist renderings of the large-nose caricatures of Chief Wahoo are plastered in high school gyms (Strong, 2004). Statues of pioneers, enslavers, and other monuments of white3 supremacy still stand in cities, though there has been a notable increase in their necessary removal recently (Attiah, 2020). While it is important that educators can critically read and counter these explicitly degrading examples, educators must also learn to read and counter subtler colonial logics that surface in media. Media is significant for its role in storing historical memory, reflecting/projecting identity politics, and producing and challenging hegemonic discourses. Media are texts that can be read through their codes and structures that work to produce cultural myths (Barthes, 1972). Educators must learn to read what is not explicit or learn to read the erasures in media. Anticolonial media literacy fosters teachers’ ability to detect the way Indigenous peoples are absent from particular representations, and the larger political ramifications of these erasures. To be sure, **representational literacy is more important than being able to point at media texts and discern them as “good”** (politically correct/humanizing) **representations or “bad”** (politically incorrect/harmful) representations; **it also involves recognizing the ways media texts are re-presentations of dominant cultural ideology and hegemony** (Hall, 1997). Re-presentations help members of society make sense of who they are; thus, Indigenous scholars advocate for “the reestablishment of representational sovereignty” or the right for Indigenous peoples to have a say by producing and consuming texts that are not damaging to our communities (Lewis, 2006, p. 175). This concept has also been referred to as “rhetorical sovereignty” in the context of writing (Lyons, 2000), and “visual sovereignty” in the context of film (Raheja, 2010). To set the context for anticolonial media literacy, we draw on existing literature that articulates the need for critical race media literacy. We complement this body of literature by turning to Tribal Critical Race Theory (hereafter TribalCrit) (Brayboy, 2005). As a means of fleshing out TribalCrit’s central claim—that “colonization is endemic to society” (p. 429)—we turn to two Native studies theories to support teachers in recognizing the varied ways colonial logics surface in media: firsting, replacing, and lasting offered by Jean O’Brien (2010), and settler grammars conceptualized by Dolores Calderón (2014). We then put these concepts to work on specific media texts to model anticolonial media literacy in practice. Because anticolonial media literacy requires moving beyond critique to also seek out and offer students meaningful and respectful alternatives, we end by highlighting Debbie Reese’s advocacy for “critical Indigenous literacies” (Reese, 2018). Media literacy equips students with tools to analyze the power of media in society including media construction, production, consumption and its effects (Buckingham, 2013; Kellner & Share, 2005). Beyond individualized skill sets, **media literacy allows** students to relate to others in their communities (Jenkins, Ito, & boyd, 2016) and engage in contemplative practice to assess the power of media in helping achieve **social transformation** (Morell, 2012). In her foundational article, “Critical Race Media Literacy: Challenging Deficit Discourse about Chicanas/os,” Tara J. Yosso (2002) draws on critical race theory (CRT) to infuse media literacy with the projects of racial and social justice. Yosso argues this conjoining, what she refers to as critical race media literacy (CRML), is necessary as schools and media both reproduce “delusional ideas” about racism, sexism, and classism (p. 53). Drawing on Freire’s conception of literacy that advocates for providing “students with the tools to not only read the word but also to read the world,” Yosso argues, “CRT can challenge students to critically ‘read’ the racism, sexism, and classism in entertainment media portrayals of Chicanas/os–to develop critical media literacy” (p. 54). Through a series of curriculum sessions, Yosso equipped students with social science theories, concepts, and language in media, as well as critical race vocabulary to support them in detecting the ways media reproduce stereotypes and deficit thinking about Chicanas/os. Yosso found critical race media curriculum sessions effective “in describing how media, through repetition of negative portrayals, teach Chicanas/os that they are inferior to whites, and in turn, whites learn that they are better than Chicanas/os” (p. 59). Students also linked these negative media portrayals to “material repercussions for Chicano communities, including fewer financial aid opportunities and community support programs” (p. 59). While CRML “cannot be a magic bullet,” Yosso argued it can “facilitate students becoming critically conscious of themselves in relation to the structures of power and domination in their world” (p. 59). CRML has since been taken up by scholars in generative ways (Hawkman & Shear, 2017; Hawkman & Van Horn, 2019; King, 2017; Lozenski & Chinang, 2019). King (2017), for example, builds on Yosso’s work to illustrate how the Center for Media Literacy’s (CML) “Key Questions for Media Inquiry,” fail to “explore the dynamics of race or provide a racial lexicon” (p. 36). To remedy this, King revises CML’s key question to foster racial literacy (i.e., supplementing the question “Who created this message?” with the question “What are the racially constructed messages conveyed through the news?” (p. 37). Hawkman and Shear (2017) also build on Yosso’s framework to suggest that teachers guide students through a process of confrontation (confronting problematic racial representations in media), interrogation (questioning and critiquing those representations), and navigation (offering students opportunities to challenge those representations). (See also Hawkman & Van Horn, 2019, pp. 107-108). Anticolonial media literacy is indebted to and builds on this important scholarship.

## Links––General

### L––IR

#### The desire for strong International Relations is Settler Anxiety – The constant need to be able to influence the world to control the world feeds into the structure of Colonialism

Cornellier and Griffiths 16 (2016. Bruno Cornellier & Michael R. Griffiths - Bruno Cornellier is an Associate Professor of Cultural Studies in the Department of English. Michael R. Griffiths is a literary scholar whose work focuses principally on settler colonial literatures and histories. “Globalizing unsettlement: an introduction”, Settler Colonial Studies, 305-306, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2015.1090522) //Don Markos

This **issue of Settler Colonial Studies** marks the attempt to think the global adjacent to and, indeed, constituted in relation to questions of internal colonialism and settlement. As editors, we implicitly follow a contention of Scott Morgensen’s that settler colonialism is not merely a violent phenomenon of the colonial periphery, but in fact functions as constitutive of geopolitics at a global level. As Morgensen puts it, ‘Settler colonialismdirectly informs past and present processes ofEuropean **colonization**, global **capitalism**, liberal modernity and international governance. If settler colonialism is not **theorized in accounts of** these **formations**, then its **power remains naturalized** in the world t**hat we engage and in the theoretical apparatuses with which we attempt to explain it.’**1 Settler **colonialism**, then, is not merely a global phenomenon, it **is also constitutive of the global**. So many nation states which were founded on settler colonialism are considered first world nation states, and many are implicated, through this role, in broader operations of regional and global neoimperial control of territory and interests. This is a central premise of many of the contributions to this volume, from Kevin Bruyneel’s analysis of the settler colonial vocabulary that animates US military incursions in the Middle East to Shiri Pasternak’s analysis of the relation between Canadian multi-national private resource extraction and the ongoing dispossession of native lands in Canada to Mark Rifkin’s careful geopolitical reading of indigenous internationalism in the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. If the USA is the most paradigmatic (though not the sole) instantiation of global ‘capitalist-territorialism’ (to use Giovanni Arrighi’s phrase), then as Bruyneel asserts elsewhere ‘the persistent reproduction of the American foundational mythos [ ... ] serves **critically in the reproduction and legitimation of settler colonialism as a structure’**, and does so in the manifest global reach of its neoimperial imprint.2 As such, ‘**via the logic of elimination** [ ... ] **and dependent upon settler colonialism America takes up its imperial stance overlooking the world.** This image illustrates that one cannot acknowledge the fact of US empire without acknowledging settler colonialism, and vice versa’.3 To cite US Empire here, as constituted in relation to its own history of internal (settler) colonialism and manifest destiny is to cite an example of this relation that might be explored globally. If settler colonialism bears relation to the global, as the US example illustrates, then global comparisons of such modes of dispossession also might shed light on the complexity of specific internal settler colonial experiences. This issue, then, calls upon scholarship to address the ideologies that traverse comparable political spaces, of which a number are surveyed in this issue: Australia, Canada, and Chiapas, Mexico. From the perspective of a critique of settler colonialism – which this approach, grounded in the initial premise of internal colonialism and the idea of elimination, is uniquely poised to reveal – what these spaces have in common is a certain strange double vision surrounding their self-conception. On the one hand, settler nation states stress their liberalism and inclusivity and on the other, they aim to either repress indigenous presence and difference, or, alternately to occlude its particularly salient claims by subsuming this difference under a wider multicultural settlement on the management of alterity. Here, the more the modernity and liberalism of the settler state is rhetorically stressed and pushed, the more it indulges in the repression of an indigenous presence often imagined as an anachronistic and aliberal residue of the type of ethnically bound and territorially fixed political cultures that violently clashed and sunk in our pre-global and pre-modern world. This is a second crucial premise of this collection’s relation to the globality of settler colonialism: **liberal multicultural policies act comparably across multiple sites and spaces as avenues for the reinstitution of dispossession**. From Melissa Forbis’ analysis of Chiapas to Michael Griffiths’ argument about the relation between race and culture in Australia, **liberal logics are used to conceal new and incipient modes of dispossession globally.**

### L––Progress/Reform

#### Settler Colonialism exists past the act of colonization – the conceptualization of Natives as the ‘Other’ gives way for systems to ignore indigenous groups even through progressive legislation

**Veracini 11** (Lorenzo Veracini s a historian and professor at Swinburne University of Technology’s Institute for Social Research. He is the editor in chief of Settler Colonial Studies and has been a key figure in the development of the field of settler colonialism. (2011) ISOPOLITICS, DEEP COLONIZING, SETTLER COLONIALISM, Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, 13:2, 171-189, DOI: 10.1080/1369801X.2011.573215, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369801X.2011.573215>) // JLHS AA

Beyond isopolitical relationships, deep colonizing is also essential to an understanding of settler colonial phenomena. Australian-based anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose introduced ‘deep colonizing’ in a 1996 article dealing with the position of Aboriginal women in the context of recent developments in land claims legislation and indigenous tenure. Aboriginal women, she argued, were being disempowered by attempts to integrate Aboriginal policy and Aboriginal structures of governance. Specifically, she noted, women were effectively prevented from meaningfully contributing to evidence gathering processes. Supporting evidence sustaining Aboriginal land claims was premised primarily, if not exclusively, on ‘knowledge’ forwarded by Aboriginal men: While it is demonstrably the case that many formal relations between Indigenous people and the colonizing nation have changed in the past three decades, as have many of the institutions which regulate these relations, it is also the case that practices of colonization are very much with us. More profoundly, many of these practices are embedded in the institutions that are meant to reverse processes of colonization. A land claim is an excellent example. On the one hand it reverses conquest by returning land to Indigenous people. On the other hand, the marginalization of women, along with [invasive] demands for information, perpetuates the colonizing practices of conquest and appropriation. **Colonizing practices embedded within decolonizing institutions must not be understood simply as negligible side effects of essentially benign endeavours**. **This embeddedness may conceal, naturalize, or marginalize continuing colonizing practices**. Furthermore, it can be difficult to offer a critique of the colonizing features without calling into question the whole decolonizing project. Again, land rights offer an excellent example. If the double binds are not teased apart, and if the colonizing practices are not separated analytically from decolonizing institutions, conquest will continue. And if it continues in this form it will be wearing a mask of benign, or even radical, decolonization which will make it far more difficult to challenge at all levels. Deep colonizing is the term I use for this process conquest embedded within institutions and practices which are aimed toward reversing the effects of colonization. (Rose 1996) An ostensibly progressive legislation endowed with unprecedented liberating potential some Aboriginal communities were getting their land back could have, and was having, an oppressive outcome (Rose’s warning was somewhat prophetic: the recolonial federal government ‘intervention’ in the Northern Territory of the late 2000s, when white men were ‘compelled’ to intervene in Aboriginal communities in order to ‘save’ Aboriginal women and children, was also premised on the deterioration of Aboriginal women’s political standing and power within their communities a deterioration that was not countered by the land claim legislation and practice that followed the promulgation of the 1994 Native Title Act).5 **Deep colonizing as an analytical tool identifying a particular dynamic, however, should be pursued further and applied to all circumstances where a progressive and decolonizing move for some ends up further compromising the position of others** (similarly, even if in an entirely different context she was criticizing the concept of ‘Renaissance’ Joan Kelly (1984: xiixiii) famously concluded that ‘events that further the historical development of men, liberating them from natural, social, or ideological constraints, have quite different, even opposite, effects upon women’). Moreover, deep colonizing is an especially necessary conceptual tool for the specific appraisal of settler colonial regimes: if a triumphant colonial society is a state of affairs where, as noted by Partha Chatterjee (1993), change the promised equality between colonizer and colonized is forever postponed (on deferral as a colonial strategy, see also Conklin 1997), where colonizer and colonized know and ultimately retain their respective places, a triumphant settler colonial circumstance, having ceased to be a dependency of a colonizing metropole, having tamed the surrounding ‘wilderness’, having extinguished indigenous autonomies, and having successfully integrated various migratory waves, has also ceased being settler colonial (Veracini 2010). Colonial formations proclaim their permanence; settler colonial formations on the contrary announce their passing. Since it is primarily aimed at producing the conditions of its own supersession, settler colonialism routinely operate via deep colonizing means. That deep colonizing should not be seen as exclusively characterizing the present condition of the settler colonial polities should be emphasized. **As long as the decolonization of the settler colonial situation remains unresolved, settler colonial present and settler colonial past inevitably resemble each other**. Settler independence is one important example of deep colonizing. On the one hand, as mentioned, settler colonial formations are charged with an inherently anticolonial dimension; they upset the hierarchical structures and organization of colonial formations. On the other, settler independence a specific type of decolonization is actually an acceleration of colonizing practices. Marc Ferro, for example, defines ‘colonist independence’ as the ultimate stage of imperial conquest, the ‘most advanced stage of white colonial expansion’ (1997: 21213). A settler freedom that is premised on indigenous dispossession, however, is not a unique circumstance in which, to paraphrase Kelly, events that further the historical development of some have quite different effects on indigenous peoples. Civil rights agendas might be mentioned in this context: when W. E. B. Du Bois noted, for example, in The Souls of Black Folks that ‘the problem of the color line’ would be the critical question of the twentieth century (1994: 1), he performed simultaneously an act of anticolonial resistance and an act of suppression of indigenous autonomy (one could assume that in his estimation the ‘indigenous problem’ would not be a problem at all). Similarly, the Subaltern Studies Group has extensively documented how anticolonial nationalist stances failed to represent a variety of marginalized subjectivities. The anticolonial Indian nationalists could and would not represent ‘voiceless’ (often indigenous/Adivasi) rural subalterns. While these anticolonial erasures can be construed as examples of deep colonizing, and considering that ‘eliminationist’ shifts in indigenous policies in settler colonial contexts have been routinely couched in a humanitarian rhetoric emphasizing equality and emancipation from controlling legislation, it is not surprising that indigenous militancy in a multiplicity of settings has repeatedly shown a stubborn reluctance in engaging with other insurgencies and with state driven emancipatory programs. Ellinghaus’s (2007) comparative work on ‘assimilative pathways’ in two settler colonial polities highlights instances of indigenous dispossession framed as ‘emancipation’ (in other words, deep colonizing). For their exemplarity, two contemporary instances of deep colonizing could be mentioned in this context. As recently noted by Jody A. Bird in an article dedicated to his dealings with Native American issues, future US president Barack Obama repeatedly and powerfully articulated during the 2008 presidential campaign an ongoing project of democratic inclusion. One especially memorable (and frequently reproduced) speech epitomised this logic: For when we have faced down impossible odds, when we’ve been told we’re not ready or that we shouldn’t try or that we can’t, generations of Americans have responded with a simple creed that sums up the spirit of a people: Yes, we can. Yes, we can. Yes, we can.It was a creed written into the founding documents that declared the destiny of a nation: Yes, we can. It was whispered by slaves and abolitionists as they blazed a trail towards freedom through the darkest of nights: Yes, we can. It was sung by immigrants as they struck out from distant shores and pioneers who pushed westward against an unforgiving wilderness: Yes, we can. It was the call of workers who organized, women who reached for the ballot, a president who chose the moon as our new frontier, and a king who took us to the mountaintop and pointed the way to the promised land: Yes, we can, to justice and equality. Yes, we can, to opportunity and prosperity. Yes, we can heal this nation. Yes, we can repair this world. Yes, we can. (Quoted in Bird 2009: 23) This powerful narrative identifies a series of successive emancipatory enfranchisements: of African Americans, of ethnic migrants, of workers, of women. Even the ‘settler pioneers’ are part of this process even they get to be emancipated. And yet, as Bird perceptively points out, there are no American Indians in this picture. Indeed, **Native Americans are doubly absent**: they are conspicuously missing from this list of emancipatory passages, **and they are erased as an obstacle**: the pioneers who ‘pushed westward’ did not move against them (unless we are willing to consider the Indian nations that occupied the continent as part of an ‘unforgiving wilderness’). As such, Bird concludes, as ‘the pioneers, immigrants, slaves and abolitionists progressed towards a destined more perfect union, **American Indian nations had to be pushed to the margins and then out of the picture altogether’** (23). Operating within a system that routinely demands that we forget that the pioneers were either dispossessing Indians or receiving stolen property (especially considering that he was in the business of winning a close election)? Yes, he was. In November 2009 a year after his election President Obama invited 500 tribal leaders to a massive conference the first of its kind dedicated to developing a comprehensive new approach in the management of Indian affairs. His administration is not uninterested in Indian affairs; this agenda, however, is essentially framed in terms of welfare rather than sovereignty (what in Australian parlance would be referred to as ‘practical reconciliation’, and in a US context has been defined by Jessica Cattelino (2010) as ‘need-based’ sovereignty).6 While this progressive agenda envisaging yet another emancipatory passage for US indigenous people remains ultimately premised on an original disavowal, attempts to address indigenous disadvantage that fail to recognize the need to decolonize a settler colonial system of relationships can be understood as deep colonizing. Besides, indigenous welfare and ‘rehabilitation’ are about (settler) benevolence and (indigenous) need, not about inherent sovereign entitlements (Kauanui 2008: 34). Rehabilitation without reconciliation isn’t rehabilitation. An ocean away, newly elected Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd’s official parliamentary apology to the ‘stolen generations’, as noted by Maria Giannacopoulos (2009), who wrote an insightful typology of Rudd’s rhetorical strategies of evasion, provides another example of deep colonizing (for the text of the apology, see Rudd 2008). Firstly, she notes, Rudd’s apology is strictly about the theft of children, not the theft of land (as if child removal could be separated from the system of power relationships in which it happened). Secondly, by definition, an apology is about saying sorry and about defending one’s actions: ‘Rudd’s apology appears to be less about benefiting Indigenous peoples and more about serving as an exculpation mechanism for white modes of power’, she notes. In the apology, the state is both defendant and judge, and as such it self-prosecutes, carefully circumscribing the limits of critique that may be made against it or, more specifically, that it calculatedly makes against itself. The apology functions simultaneously as the site of blame (prosecuted) and as the site of justification (defence). (Giannacopoulos 2009: 339) In this sense, **the apology amounts to a solipsistic act, where the settler sovereign talks to itself about itself, reconciling itself with its past**. Moreover, Rudd’s apology carefully contains its scope, and is construed as only applicable in relation to past occurrences. Thus, Giannacopoulos notes, by ‘blaming itself with reference to its past incarnations the current sovereign controls the parameters of critique whilst also exculpating itself for liability in the present’; ultimately, the ‘apology is made by the current sovereign without the acknowledgment that those things being apologized for persist in the present’ (340). This narrative shift produces a situation in which current indigenous grievances are strategically dismissed: the apology is circumscribed to the past; the past Rudd is quite explicit about this cannot be changed, and the present is another story.7 At the same time, by strictly and explicitly defining the period covered by the apology specifically, the years between 1910 and 1970 Rudd strategically avoids focusing on both the establishment of settler colonial relations (the pre-1910 period), and their ongoing current operation (the post-1970 era).8 As the apology blames ‘bad laws’ enacted by ‘bad parliaments’, a double exculpation takes place: the failure was not settler colonialism’s, and not of those who were personally involved in delivering and enacting genocidal policies. **Both the system and the perpetrators are thus effectively excused (even if it is acknowledged that both policies and executors were racist).** Ultimately, **since the apology is construed as a generous gift, ‘instead of Indigenous people being given something back’ it is them who owe acceptance to Rudd** (Giannacopoulos 2009: 344). Rudd’s concluding remarks underscore this peculiar inversion: ‘my proposal is this: if the apology we extend today is accepted in the spirit of reconciliation in which it is offered, we can today resolve together that that there be a new beginning for Australia’ (Rudd 2008). Giannacopoulos points out: ‘Rudd is making the apology, but only if it is accepted can his plan succeed. If the future does not shine as Rudd anticipates it will, it will be the fault of those who have not fallen into line [i.e., the Aboriginal people who would not accept the apology]’ (Giannacopoulos 2009: 345). Rudd’s settler repertoire of evasion thus includes blaming indigenous people for settler colonialism.9 Reconciliation without compensation isn’t reconciliation.

#### Settler Colonialism is not a one-time event, but a structuring logic of elimination constantly manifested in everyday reiterations of our spatial inhabitance and subjective being.

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If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of u nderstanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sover- eignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writ- ing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ” (xix).

#### The occupation of indigenous land recruits Native bodies on which to write colonial onto-epistemologies, making the annihilation of Native forms of life the aim of colonial world-making through excessive, death-driven violence.

Young 2017(Bryanne Huston “KILLING THE INDIAN IN THE CHILD: MATERIALITIES OF DEATH AND POLITICAL FORMATIONS OF LIFE IN THE CANADIAN INDIAN RESIDENTIAL SCHOOL SYSTEM” Bryanne Huston Young A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Communication in the College of Arts and Sciences. ,Chapel Hill) pg 68-69//ajoseph

What this chapter has sought to establish is the embodied archive of violence that subtends the post/colonial nation-state. This violence indicates a shift Foucault’s identifies as being from ‘territory’ to ‘population’ in the emergence of biopolitics, and the biopolitical imperative that sees sexuality as the potential for a population’s growth and regulation. As Indigenous lands were annexed and occupied, Indigenous bodies—the bodies of children in particular—were recruited as available substratum upon which colonial onto-epistemologies could be authored. In Lacanian psychoanalytic terms, the annihilation of Indigenous forms of life indicates the aim of colonial world-making. The goal of this world-making is the stabilization of civil Canadian society. In terms of this goal, the continual re-presenting of Indigeneity is, in fact, useful, necessary. In the lexicon of the death drive, which props itself or surfs upon existing vital life forces (instincts), the reiteration over and over to “kill the Indian” creates the archive of an impossible telos (Kill the Indian in the Child). The circling around the obstacles that arise on the path to achieving this telos is a function of the death drive, whose mechanism is to double-down around sites of failure with an enjoyment that exceeds pleasure. Unable to master the unruly sexuality of the Indigenous child—an unruliness which we now understand to be so diffused throughout everyday life (remember Freud’s response to the charge of ‘pansexuality’ was the rejoinder that although not everything is sexual, sexuality can be found/can arise in anything) that it only ever eluded attempts to regulate and tamp it down. Frustrated at failure, yet intensely enjoying it—enjoying in the psychoanalytic sense rather than simply the colloquial sense, though they are in many instance imbricated—the drive to mastery satisfies itself with intensifying violence. This is the structure of Fort-da, the child’s game that Freud assures us, is in no way the domain of the gifted, the wise, or the precocious. This is the genocidal logic that, after all, 69 underwrites and helps make logical the affective daily labor of killing an un-killable foe to save and hold sanctified the sovereign innocence of the life that shelters it.

### L––Hegemony

#### Hegemony is a new name for the white man’s burden

Hobson 14 (October 2014. John M Hobson, John Montagu Hobson, FBA is a political scientist, international relations scholar and academic. Since 2005, he has been Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield. “Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line,” pg 88-93) //Don Markos

A further subliminal strategy has been the normative prescription of a “benign” neo-imperial politics that also goes by a whitewashed or sanitised name. Thus neorealist hegemonic stability theory (HST) elevates the exercise of (Anglo-Saxon) hegemony to the implicit status of a civilising mission (e.g. Gilpin 1981), while neoliberal institutionalism does much the same with respect to the role played by Western international institutions, especially the IFIs (Keohane 1984). In both visions, a major rationale of Western hegemons and their international institutions is to culturally convert Third World states along Western civilisational lines: the very essence of the old liberal mantra of the civilising mission. And both approaches echo the manifest paternalist Eurocentric formula of awarding “pioneering” progressive agency to the West and “conditional agency” to the East. These two terms refer to the point that for paternalist forms of Eurocentrism the West is assumed to have the “fully rational” capability to self-generate into modernity (the “Eurocentric logic of immanence”), while the East is said to be blocked from doing so on account of its “irrational institutions”. This led to the paternalist-imperial formula in which Eastern development can occur but only on condition that the rational institutions of the civilised West are delivered courtesy of the benign-paternalist Western civilising mission. Thus for HST and Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism, hegemony and international institutions respectively come to replace the terminology of the liberal civilising mission, even if these former terms perform the exact same logic as the latter. The route into this alternative reading of HST lies with the point that in order to celebrate British and American hegemony Gilpin is forced to suspend some of the cardinal axioms of neorealism. For a key property of hegemony is that it must secure world order and development for all states but in the process this leads inevitably to the relative decline of the hegemon via the “free rider problem”. The immediate problem here is that neorealism, especially in its “offensive” variant that Gilpin supported in the period when he constructed HST (i.e. 1975 through 1987), 6 asserts that states seek to maximise their relative gains over others (Gilpin 1975, 23, 34 – 6, 85 – 92). But it is clear that in HST this principle applies to all states bar the hegemon. Or, put differently, in this vision we are treated to a story in which the leading great power not only does not seek to enhance its relative power over others but instead sacrifices its power for the benefit of others, thereby contradicting the cardinal realist axiom – that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” . Thus in Gilpin’s HST this cardinal realist axiom is precisely inverted: “The weak do what they can and the strongest does what it must.” That the hegemon is exceptional is clear, though why it is so is not explained other than through a circularity as well as through a structural-functionalist mode of reasoning: specifically, that the hegemon self-sacrifices because “that is what hegemons do” (i.e. the circularity); and that without the presence of a hegemon the world economy descends into recession and rising inter-state competition because the international system requires a hegemon to promote stability and world order (i.e. the structural-functionalist assertion). But simply asserting that the system “requires” a hegemon for ensuring world order and stability does not explain why a leading great power chooses to become a hegemon in the first place, especially as all it can look forward to is its decline relative to those that it “helps”. In essence, then, there is no recourse within neorealist logic to explain the highly anomalous altruistic status that HST ascribes to the United States in the 1945-73 period or to Britain in 1845-73. Explaining this gap in the theory requires focussing on the presence of a subconscious American ethnocentrism and subliminal paternalist Eurocentrism which, I want to suggest, lies at the very base of HST. That is, US hegemony reflects the nineteenth-century discourse of “American exceptionalism” and its accompanying neo-imperialist idiom of America’s “manifest destiny”, much as “British exceptionalism” and “manifest destiny” underpinned the idea of the British Empire. For the notion of helping all other states, especially those in the Third World, conjures up the idiom of the “civilising mission” and the “white man’s burden”. Thus I want to suggest that within Gilpin’s theory it is precisely this Eurocentric-imperialist sensibility that underpins the real explanation for why leading Anglo-Saxon great powers choose to become hegemons and why they supposedly sacrifice themselves for the good of others. Still, while my reading thus far is based on logical deduction, nevertheless there is a clear slippage in Gilpin’s “positivist play of mimetic universalism” where he makes explicit reference to hegemony as a benign imperial civilising mission. As is well known, Gilpin begins by differentiating hegemons from imperial powers. Although Gilpin argues that, with the exception of the Soviet Union, the modern world is governed by the progressive non-imperialist politics of liberal hegemons whereas the pre-modern world was based on the cyclical and stultifying/regressive politics of despotic Eastern empires, this distinction is problematised by the obvious point that Britain was the greatest imperial power prior to 1945, as much as the United States has been the greatest neo-imperial power in the post-1945 era. The critical point is that Gilpin attempts to circumvent this obvious inconsistency by explicitly resorting, paradoxically, to the nineteenth-century imperialist trope of the liberal civilising mission. To this end he invokes Karl Marx’s paternalist civilising mission conception whereby modern European imperial powers transferred capital and technologies to the colonies not to exploit but to uplift them (Gilpin 1981, 142 – 3); or again, that the dominant power helps to create challenging powers. Ironically, as Marx himself appreciated, one of the greatest forces for diffusion has been imperialism…. The imperial power has stimulated the colonized peoples to learn its ways and frequently has taught them advanced military, political, and economic techniques. (Gilpin 1981, 176) Here, then, we encounter the key “paternalist-imperial” civilising mission trope, in which liberal empires take on the guise of a benevolent father who teaches his children – both directly and by way of example – to embrace and develop what he has already pioneered so that they can grow up and one day prosper. Thus in defending his “non-imperialist” reading of hegemony it seems clear that Gilpin, like Hedley Bull, is addressing the wrong target. For his assumption is that imperialism is defined by the exploitation of the weak by the strong. But in Marx’s vision – as well as that of the paternalist Eurocentric liberal – **imperialism** is conceptualised as a civilising missionprecisely because it entails the West engaging in the “paternalist uplift**”,** rather than the coercive exploitation, of the East.

### L––Security Commitments

#### **The archive of security commitments began with the securitization of indigenous peoples**

**K-Sue Park 2015** [Teresa K-Sue Park Doctor of Philosophy in Rhetoric and the Designated Emphasis in Critical Theory University of California, Berkeley “If Your World Was Built on Dispossession”]//sheima

This union of unions was not authorized under the charters of the member settlements, which included the newly-created New Haven federation, other federations of the colony of Connecticut, and the colonies of Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth. To govern the union, the United Colonies created Articles of Confederation that justified its formation on the grounds that “hostile Native American tribes to the west” posed an urgent, common threat to its members. They explained: … whereas we live encompassed with people of several nations and strange languages which hereafter may prove injurious to us or our posterity. And forasmuch as natives have formerly committed sundry insolence and outrages upon several Plantations of the English and have of late combined themselves against us. (Pulsifer 1861, 3) ¶ Each colony agreed to maintain its own government and legal order, but approved twelve articles designed to govern their common affairs, including such matters as jurisdiction, procedures for membership, representation and meeting, and proportionate shares of the Confederation’s defense budget and spoils of war, as well as the “removal of residents from one plantation to another; policies towards the Native Americans,” or in other words, immigration and Indian affairs (Pulsifer 1861, 3). To aggregate their power, the colonial federations swore to submit to these Articles, and thereby, to “jointly and severally hereby enter into a firm and perpetual league of friendship and amity for offence and defence, mutual advice and succor upon all just occasions… for their own mutual safety and welfare” (Pulsifer 1861, 3). ¶ Two aspects of this inter-federation compact seem especially noteworthy in light of the foregoing discussion. First, the New England Confederation was analogous to the compacts between individuals that formed its constituent units. Like them, it announced itself as a mutual defense pact, in light of the dangers presented by the hostile relations that they had cultivated with the tribes in the area, or “the state of nature” Locke described. The purpose of this union was similarly to protect colonists’ security and property in America, all of which, in 1643, colonists had but freshly claimed. It facilitated colonists’ ability to hold--but also first to acquire, and then continue to acquire--quantities of goods and land from indigenous people. Another term for this pattern of continuous creation of property through the acquisition of indigenous lands is colonial expansion, which the social compact supported at the inter-group level, as well as the individual level, by making possible the liberal use of violence in transactions with outsiders. The privileges and violence that the social compact distributed placed the collective threat of violence behind every member of the colonial community in its acquisitive, extractive, expansionist endeavors. ¶ Second, the New England Confederation exemplifies a distinct social compact formation that ordered a multi-level system of government. We can thus understand Locke’s narrative as encoding a foundational structural principle that gave rise to a new society in a broader sense, as well as rethinking its character as plausibly historically descriptive. As higher-order social compacts facilitated intergroup cooperation against an ever-expanding background of trade, or “Promises and Barter for Truck” and land, the consent that individuals had expressed to form the lower-order compacts were first once, then twice removed to representatives of the increasingly large imagined communities. The passage of time, or the famous generational problem, did not defeat actual consent within the federated social compact—already an abstraction from the stillfeudal family order-- as much as spatial, territorial ambition, or expansion did. When direct participation became impractical within the government that held itself to be of, by and for the people, consent became synecdochal through political representation. ¶ Thus, while the social compacts founding New England towns and uniting colonial federations were analogous in form, they also existed in direct relation to one another and transformed the meaning of consent to political government. By 1700, the growth and proliferation of federations between the originally diverse townships formed by civil covenants, which had determined “where people settled and lived” and “affected virtually all citizens of seventeenth century New England,” resulted in increasing civil and political uniformity (Weir 2005, 236, 233). The United Colonies’ Articles of Confederation emerged in parallel order with the later 1754 Albany Plan of Union, an intercolonial pact that Benjamin Franklin proposed in order to treat with the Iroquois Confederation. Both preceded the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union ratified by all thirteen of the original colonies in 1781. ¶ As John Quincy Adams stated, “The New England confederacy of 1643 was the model and prototype of the North American confederacy of 1774” (Pulsifer 1861, xiv-xv). In both of these cases, the parties formed the union without authority or sanction from the charters given by the Crown, the authority to which they were supposed to defer. Where the formation of the United Colonies produced tension within this hierarchical relationship, the United States pursued independence through the Revolution, indexing the growing power and appeal of the colonial expansion these unions supported. Adams, indeed, refuted the colonies’ debt of allegiance to the Crown by identifying natural law as the source of authority for these federal compacts, writing, “In both cases it was the great law of nature and of nature's God-- the law of self-preservation and self-defence, which invested the parties, as separate communities, with power to pledge their mutual faith for the common defence and general welfare of all” (Pulsifer 1861, xiv-xv). The law of transnational relations, by his account, licensed the Union to organize their forces against both indigenous nations and the Crown, when it allied with the enemies against whom the colonies had joined forces. ¶ In short, as the advantages of civil society in the state of nature made social compacts proliferate across New England, these compacts’ intensification of the state of nature they produced gave rise to a higher-order compact and the principle of federalism itself, which was finally enshrined in the Constitution. This emergence of federations signaled the appearance of rototypical modern state forms, whose consolidation and organization of force raised the stakes of the omnipresent threat of war in the state of nature. At this inter-group level, the comparison we drew earlier between compacts and collusion or conspiracy also translates as a project Charles Tilly has called “war risking and state making.” Drawing from the European, rather than American context, Tilly describes states as “quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy,” and historical war and state makers as akin to “coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs” (1985, 169). However, where Tilly contrasts this image of states as coercive forces of business against benevolent ideas about the state such as “social contract” (1985, 169), I have tried to show here how the social contract is not the opposite but the essence of the form that organizes and directs the violence of the state that Tilly emphasizes. The historical example of New England, I have argued, sheds light on the Second Treatise by illustrating “the place of organized means of violence in the growth and change of those peculiar forms of government we call national states” (Tilly 1985, 170), from the law-founding consolidation of violence of the first individual and federal compacts, to the new orders of violent expropriation, contracts and compacts that emerged under the United States’ expansion efforts, which I will explore below. ¶ First, however, it is worth noting that the same calculation that incentivized the states to consolidate their force also motivated them, conversely, to seek to splinter their enemies’ power. Even before the Revolutionary War, the accumulated pressures of white immigration, land dispossession and the displacement of tribes were laying the groundwork for a coalition of Northern and Southern tribes, and such a union seemed imminent to colonists by the spring of 1774 (Sosin 1967, 85). As the authors of the Federalist Papers note, the states’ independent activities only exacerbated the threat of a full-blown interracial war; they cite “several instances of Indian hostilities… provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offences, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants” (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1788, 16). During this period, “[t]he menace of unsettled boundaries was everywhere” (Paxson 2001, 48), and the “vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States” was the source of “discordant and undecided claims” lingering “between several of [the States]” (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1788, 34).¶ The creation of a speculative land market based on the conquest of western lands would require cooperation between states and with the federal government, and the formation of a strong counter-union that could face its enemies in war. To lessen the causes of war that a “disunited America” would proliferate, the Federalists therefore argued that a “United America” was necessary to consolidate the power of the states in the service of a common aim; a central power would both constrain and mediate between the states, and between the states and Indian nations (1787, 13-14, 16). For the Federalists, “[t]he utility of the UNION” would be to facilitate continuing conquest: future dispossession would relieve member states of their individual and collective debt, manage internal unruliness by creating a central monopoly on violence, and allow for surplus accumulation that could become the basis of a powerful national economy (1787, 6). On the same principle, under the compact that established the United States, the central government promptly adopted a policy of exploiting longstanding rivalries and hostilities between tribes. This divide-and-conquer approach to Indian Affairs constituted a logical counterpoint to the new, centralized strength of the Union. Under the authority of the War Department, General St. Clair, who negotiated separately with the Six Nations and the Great Lakes tribes, thought he could “set them at deadly variance” (Smith 1882, 113).42 Congress counseled Indian agents to “deal with each Indian tribe or nation as separately as possible,” and insisted that “the tribes were to be kept separated so that negotiations would be easier” (Kades 2000, 1120). ¶

#### The 1ac’s invocation of article 5 is representative of the isopolitical relation that normative IR functions under which guarantees a world centered around America as the epicenter

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Isopolitical interstate associations are especially relevant to settler colonial phenomena. An isopolitical connection enables the seamless transfer of people and their rights between separate polities. In this context, subjects of one polity immediately acquire property rights and enjoy unrestricted political status as they move across jurisdictions. If settlers can be defined as founders of political orders (unlike migrants, who are appellants facing a political order that is already constituted), people who travel with an inherent capacity to possess real estate and father children endowed with political rights, colonizing metropole and settler locale are united in an isopolitical relation. Settlers are indeed subjects who, unlike migrants or other colonized people, can immediately exercise commercium and connubium, both necessary elements of all isopolitical arrangements (of course, not all settlers depart and arrive autonomously, or are immediately endowed with political rights; they can, however, be selectively co-opted at a later stage). Moreover, isopolities, one specific type of ‘interstate kinship’ (Elwyn 1993), and settler colonies are especially related: settler colonialism is inherently about the reproduction of ‘daughter’ colonies. The classical world envisaged a variety of possible relationships between separate political entities, including, for example, isopolity, sympolitical arrangements (when a common federal citizenship is instituted beside the local one), and **symmachy (when a warring league is established, with a polity automatically engaging in war as an ally of another).** Not all the isopolities of the classical world were colonies, but all colonies were isopolitical (for a discussion of isopolitical relations in the classical world, see Hammond 1951). We should recover this variety and utilize it as a conceptual toolbox in an attempt to escape the constraints of national teleologies and the nation-state. Moreover, even if these categories may look exotic and anachronistic, we should keep in mind that the colonizations practised by the Greeks and the Romans informed in fundamental ways the colonial imaginaries of the European expansion. The intensity of colonialism’s imaginative engagement with the ancients should not be underestimated. The question of how British settler nationalisms and metropolitan imperialisms have co-defined each other while operating concomitantly and in reciprocal tension in a variety of settings is the subject of an extensive scholarly literature, and an issue that is periodically approached (and yet rarely resolved).1 The settler nationalisms of the British Empire (and their respective sub-imperialisms) remain intractably ambivalent: their claims are routinely premised on their arising simultaneously from the settler locale and in relation to the originating metropole (see Berger 1970; Schreuder and Ward 2008). Reflecting on the long-term evolution of the relationship between Australian nationalism and Britishness, and convincingly reversing received nationalist and nationalizing assumptions, Neville Meaney concluded that ‘the history of nationalism in Australia was not one of thwarted Australianness but rather of thwarted Britishness’ (2001: 89). ‘Australians had two views of Britain and the Empire’, he noted; ‘while they overlapped’, they remained distinct. accommodate double allegiances, an isopolitical union allows one to be faithful to a relationship; one does not have to choose. At the same time, **isopolitical ties** also **allow for the local settler claim and the metropolitan one potentially to enjoy equal status; as such, settler colonial formations fundamentally challenge the hierarchical relationship between core and periphery that is inherent in colonial and imperial relations**. The distinction between ‘settlers’ and ‘colonists’ as distinct terms and their usage mirrors this shift. ‘Colonist’, ‘colonial’ and ‘creole’ identify people in the context of a hierarchical understanding of the relationship between metropole and settler locale; ‘settler’, on the contrary, expresses a marked degree of political autonomy. Settlers imagine a non-subordinate relationship between settler locale and metropole they operate isopolitically.4 (On the other hand, there is another fundamental distinction that separates ‘colonists’ and ‘settlers’: a ‘colonist’ is someone who may or may not be animated by animus returnandi his intention to stay in the settler locale remains unclear until the question of whether he is a bona fide settler a determination that only a settler society would demand forces the issue. A colonist could indeed be someone bent on accumulating money and returning home, someone who is not fully committed to the local settler project.) In this context, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, for example, espoused a ‘colonial’ conception. In ‘A View on the Art of Colonization’ he noted: speaking generally, colonies and colonists are in fact, as well as in the estimation of the British gentry, inferior, low, unworthy of much respect, properly disliked and despised by people of honour here, who happen to be acquainted with the state of society in the colonies. (Wakefield 1968: 837) **Wakefield thus envisaged a hierarchically integrated system with the colonizing metropole on top, and the settler colonial locales as its subordinate elements** (however, he was convinced that the settler locales could be made to look very much like the metropole and that this could be done immediately in this sense he proposed that their relationship with the colonizing core be only marginally subordinate). Of course, ‘colonist’ and ‘settler’ as distinct even if often partially overlapping categories interacted in a very dynamic context, and their usage and respective meanings underwent important shifts. As James Belich has recently and persuasively documented, ‘settler’ became progressively more important (on ‘settlerism’, the ideology of the ‘settler revolution’, see Belich (2009: 15365); on shifting patterns of perception, see Grant (2005)). The debates that propelled and accompanied the ‘settler revolution’ during the second half of the nineteenth century comprehensively reinterpreted the relationship between core and periphery. In this context, the settler locale 4 Greene (2002) also emphasizes this distinction: ‘my use of the term settlers is deliberate’, he notes, ‘it has long been employed in the historical analysis of other nations that arose out of the British Empire (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa), because it avoids the dependency implications associated with the word colonists (metropolitans always considered colonists to be a category of others)’ (251). On the contradiction between Jeffersonian settlerism and the Hamiltonian ‘creole complex’, see Goudie (2009was redefined as a site for possible political regeneration. J. S. Mill, for example, thought that the colonies he meant the settler colonies could be sites for unprecedented experimentation (see Bell 2010). Belich is right in using a terminology that emphasizes rupture and discontinuity. This was a revolutionary reconceptualization: whereas according to a colonial paradigm the settler locale is appropriate only as far as it resembles the metropole, according to the settler colonial one the settler locale is appropriate primarily because it is dissimilar to it. A colonial relationship was thus reconfigured into a settler colonial one and the imagination became isopolitical. The global settler ‘revolution’, in fact, entailed a global isopolitical turn. And yet, this revolution was grounded in another. The American one had terminated a sympolitical project and defeated a centralizing metropolitan effort to ensure sustained metropolitan ascendancy over its dependencies. Thus, as well as breaking up the first British Empire, the American Revolution could also be seen as actually reconstituting a new one in an alternative form. Not for nothing has Eliga H. Gould defined the second British Empire as a non-unitary collection of polities, ‘a consortium of realms and provinces’. He linked this diversity with the outcome of the Revolution: parliament, he noted, never again attempted to tax in a direct manner the settlers of the empire (Gould 1999: 482). The independence of the North American colonies thus led to a consolidation of (settler) isopolitical forms within the British Empire; that isopolitical ties could grow and consolidate both inside and outside the United States should be emphasized (Belich 2005). The American Revolution could then be seen as an earlier isopolitical moment in a consolidating and expanding settler colonial world. The isopolitical entity that nineteenth-century debates over emigration and ‘systematic’ colonization dealt with is generally referred to as ‘Greater Britain’ (even if, as mentioned, isopolitical imaginings involved the expanding United States as well; see, for example, Kramer 2002; Bell 2007; Belich 2009, esp. 465501). Isopolitics are relevant to these debates. Influential historian J. R. Seeley, for example, was explicitly in favour of isopolitical relationships: in his opinion, the British Empire should do ‘what the United States does so easily, that is hold together in a federal union countries very remote from each other’ (quoted in Gould 1999: 487, n. 50). Froude would argue in very similar terms (see Bell 2009). Seeley’s Expansion of England actually had an educational purpose; it aimed to describe an ‘ethnological unity’ comprising the colonies of settlement, the Caribbean, but not India because it had been ‘conquered’ (Seeley 1931). It was Seeley that popularized ‘Greater Britain’, but the term had originally been invented by Charles Dilke (2005). Seeley was based in Cambridge; E. A. Freeman (a bit later) lectured at Oxford; this was in fact a coherent if not coordinated effort aimed at rethinking the very nature of empire. Freeman toured the United States in 18812, and referred to ‘brethren in a higher brotherhood, born of one ancient stock, speaking one ancient tongue, sharers under different forms in one ancient freedom’ (quoted in Armitage 1999: 437). Sharing ‘under different forms in one ancient freedom’ is a key trait of this type of discourse, a formulation that ultimately amounts to a description of isopolitical ties, where specific entitlements are transferred to different settings and flexibly accommodate changing political circumstances. Albert Venn Dicey, one of the founders of the London School of Economics, eventually explicitly called in 1897 for the establishment of an ‘isopolity’ of the English race (he interpreted it as ‘common citizenship’ ‘isopolity’ was probably only explicitly mentioned at the end of decades of sustained debate because in many ways it had previously gone without saying). Uniting Britain and its settler dominions and the United States, this entity was to be a response to global geopolitical shifts. While Dicey specifically argued that an isopolity should be merely formalized in order to mirror already existing conditions, he was clearly imagining a community of white men: he excluded indigenous peoples from the working of its proposed isopolity, and suggested that an isopolitical move could be effectively used against the migration to the United States of a variety of undesirables (Dicey 1897: 4634, 466). While this framing is a reminder that settler colonial formations are equally exclusive of indigenous and exogenous alterities, his proposal did not ultimately meet with political support. Nation-states were on the rise, but what is remarkable in this context is that in proposing a union between Greater Britain and the United States Dicey was actually taking for granted the sustained isopolitical union of Britain and its settler colonies. Even if the national paradigm was eventually asserted, the long-lasting resilience of isopolitical sensibilities as they applied transnationally to Greater Britain (and the United States) should be emphasized (see, for examples, Gorman 2002; Lake 2003; Lake and Reynolds 2008). Winston Churchill eventually wrote an isopolitical History of the English-Speaking Peoples (see Armitage 1999: 429). The empire proper was then dissolving in the context of a model of decolonization that focused on Westphalian sovereign independence for former colonial possessions; the Commonwealth, despite the protestations and recalcitrance of its settler constituents, had been reorganized in ways that were now including formerly colonized Others (and enlisting them for the Cold War effort), but the ‘empire of racial identity’ was still showing a stubborn imaginative resilience. Isopolity (and indeed simmachy these are times of automatic intervention in foreign theatres) retains contemporary relevance**. The ‘special relationship’ between Israel and the United States, for example, is premised on the seamless transfer of people and their rights across jurisdictions and is underpinned by an extraordinary imaginary engagement that is in turn sustained by a shared settler colonial sensitivity** (Veracini 2007). Isopolitics should not be seen as solely restricted to the past. Recovering the isopolitical character of settler colonial imaginaries is also important because a focus on the tension between ‘colonial’ subordination and ‘independent’ national sovereignty can make settler colonialism disappear. Both in Canadian and US historiographies, for example, a focus on the fundamental rupture represented by American independence has contributed to making an appraisal of settler colonial phenomena especially difficult (it is probably no coincidence that settler colonialism as a transnational interpretative category is an Australasian contribution). In the United States it resulted in an emphasis on accomplished sovereign national independence; in Canada, on the contrary, it produced an emphasis on a sustained relationship and institutional connection with Britain. A focus on the anticolonial struggle against the British occupiers traditionally prevented ‘colonialism’ from entering the analytical field in the United States, while in Canada ‘colonialism’ did not enter the analytical field because it was by definition something done by someone else. Even the historiographical revisions introduced since the late 1960s did not focus on settler colonialism: in the United States the main argument was that, although it had been previously denied, US foreign and internal engagements were actually imperialist (see Kaplan and Pease (1993), which reflected authoritatively on two decades of historiographical revision); in Canada the argument was that British imperialism was actually Canadian imperialism (see Berger (1970), which authoritatively initiated two decades of historiographical revision). The dialectical opposition between rupture and institutional continuity thus prevented an engagement with settler colonialism as an interpretative category. Without an appraisal of isopolitical relationships, settler colonialism can disappear from view.

### L––Fiat

#### The Plan’s Mandated “consent” via fiat undermines Native Consent – which undermines Native Sovereignty recreates a cycle of horror that every Native is sentenced to experience.

Simpson 08 (10/27/2008 7:57:45 AM. Audra Simpson - Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Columbia University. Many of the sources cited in this article were obtained by the author from personal interviews with Mohawks from Kahnawake. LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS was thus unable to independently verify this authority. Unless otherwise noted, these sources are on file with the author. “Subjects of Sovereignty: indigeneity, the Revenue Rule, and Juridic of Failed Consent” pgs. 197-202) //Don Markos

**CHALLENGES TO SOVEREIGNTY: LOST REVENUES AND HISTORIES OF FAILED CONSENT** A. The Problem of Lost Revenues In both Troubled Waters and The Dark Side of Native Sovereignty, “**the problem**” was revenue lost to Canada. Canada raised the tax on cigarettes to combat teen smoking in 1989 and then in 199130 and saw a rapid increase in smuggling. By 1994, Canada estimated that it had lost $2 billion (Canadian dollars) in revenue31 and consequently lowered the tax to combat smuggling. **The public problem of cigarettes then morphed from a corporeal concern with the young citizen’s body to a public concern over the nation’s economy: “smugglers” were harming not only the former, but also the latter—the nation’s pocketbook.** In R.J. Reynolds, **one nation-state** (Canada) acted as a person and filed a civil-action suit against an amalgamation of business interests within another nation-state. The suit was filed in the defendants’ own territory, within their own legal system, in order to sue for damages under RICO for injuries incurred in Canada. Canada argued that an amalgamation of U.S. and Canadian cigarette traders willfully circumvented Canadian taxation by smuggling contraband tobacco and cigarettes—via the Iroquois from reservation communities in the Northeast—from Canada, across the international boundary line for repackaging, and back into Canada, in order to evade Canadian taxation. In conspiring in these ways and in circumventing Canadian taxation, Canada argued, the tobacco company R.J. Reynolds and others “injured” Canadian property and caused additional damages and costs due to the necessity of investigation and legal proceedings. In ruling against Canada by upholding the revenue rule—which states that one country would not act as an enforcer of the other’s laws—the Second Circuit recognized the sovereign status of foreign nations. R.J. Reynolds offers an occasion for insight into **the legal process of how “empire” is negotiated**, where **legal and political territories are acquired and new boundaries and political subjects are decided through the space of courts.** In doing so, the terms—and the process—of political recognition are laid bare for analysis. This is **a case in empire-building because its complicated legal reasoning both responds to and effaces, again, indigenous people’s claims of their “aboriginal” right to trade, upholds and reinforces the singular forms of sovereignty** (even where distributions in capital deterritorialize sovereignty à la Hardt and Negri32), and disables the very possibility of indigenous participation in a contemporary trade network. In R.J. Reynolds, the possibility of a third legal system at work was not admitted into the analysis, thus solidifying settler sovereignty as normal, natural, and ultimately just. B. Histories of **Failed Consent** In contrast, Mohawks interviewed in the films spoke of an alternative mapping of territory. Consider this conversation on transport, place, and the law: Victor Malarek: “So these boxes move out every night and they’re headed for the Canadian side, but look what it says here—‘Not for sale in Canada.’ Where are they sold?” Loran Thompson: “Canuga Hogga territory, indigenous to the people of this country—the Americas.” Victor Malarek: “But they end up in Canada.” Loran Thompson: “Maybe to you they do, maybe to people like you they do, but to people like me, nationalists of my country and my government, that word Canada to me is Ganada—a village.” Victor Malarek: “**When you see this, ‘Not for sale in Canada,’ . . . you’re not breaking the law?”** Loran Thompson: “No.”33 Thompson’s **arguments speak from Haudenosaunee legal and experiential history, a history that is punctuated by such exchanges and differential understandings of place and territory.** Consider the history embedded in these remarks: You are a cunning People without Sincerity, and not to be trusted, for after making Professions of your Regard, and saying every thing favorable to us, you . . . tell us that our Country is within the lines of the States. This surprises us, for we had thought our Lands were our own, not within your Boundaries.34 The white Man put that there, not us, I don’t know why we have to put up with this bullshit. 35 More than two hundred years separate these utterances, yet not much seems to have changed in the Iroquois perspective concerning the border. The central point of each lament, although inflected differently, remains the same: the perception of territory that underpins Iroquois people’s right to cross the border dividing the United States from Canada is radically different from that of either nation. These border utterances speak from the perception of the Northeast as a territory that belongs to the Iroquois, and as a place that was divided and is administered without their consent. These narratives speak as well to the political relationships that underpin this territory, and to the difficulty that Iroquois people have had and still have in moving through the landscape of the Northeast in a manner that is consistent with their self-perception—and rights—as indigenous nationals of that territory. Why is there such a radical difference between their self-perception and the ways in which Iroquois border-crossings are administered? Why is there such incommensurability between Iroquois’ perceptions of the treaty relationship and those of the regimes that now interpret it? What accounts, then, for the dissonance between Iroquois self-perception and state-perception? There are several factors at work in these disjunctions. The most significant are the different understandings of the proper relations that Iroquois and settlers have brought to their interactions through the past two hundred years. These different interpretations are brought to the fore in Mary Druke Becker’s important article on Iroquois sovereignty through time.36 Iroquois chiefs deployed the language of treaty—with concomitant notions of “father” when regarding the British—but did so insofar as these terms furthered their notion of the relation between the two as one of equals. Beginning in the late 1670[]s, the English and French began seeking territorial domination over larger and larger areas of land vis-[à]-vis one another. Each nation argued with the other that the Iroquois had agreed to become their children or subjects. The **Iroquois had agreed to use the Iroquoain term for “father” when addressing Euro-Americans.** This term was used because within the matrilineal Iroquois society a father was an indulgent, not an authoritarian, figure. The term was commonly used among Iroquois nations and by other Iroquois with whom they were in alliance. It implied a reciprocal relation in which care and aid were provided. It was not one which implied subordination.37 These understandings of the Iroquois and by the Iroquois are common to the different positioning and perception of Indians generally through time, and to settler-state formation and asymmetries of power that allow one perception of difference to become institutionalized through law, policy, and other forms of state practice. **Indian tribes were first perceived as nations** (hence the model of international treaty-making which marks the earliest period of their interaction with the Dutch, French, and English regimes) **and were then perceived to be dependant wards who required protection from white unscrupulousness on the frontier.**38 Iroquois, in particular, have resisted their interpretive demotion in political affairs; yet, with the rise of the “welfare state,” many perceive Indians on the Canadian side of the border as clients (among many others) who need to be administered and managed. With this transformation of legal perception in mind, what then is the basis in law for Iroquois self-perception, sense of jurisdiction, and movement across the border? It is largely the nation-to-nation, or “linking arms,”39 metaphor of equality among people, reflective of the treaty relationship, that serves as an interpretive frame for Iroquois engagements with other nations, be they indigenous or nonindigenous.40 This is a notion anchored historically in arguments and deployments of the Two Row Wampum Treaty between the Iroquois and the Dutch,41 manifest in reminders and interactions that have been issued in serial engagements in the national and international arenas over the or repassing with their own proper Goods and Effects of whatever nature, pay for the same any Impost or Duty whatever.46 This explicit right to pass, then, implicitly leaves the legal regimes of Canada and the United States with the power to define who those Indian nations are and how that right to pass shall be rendered and respected. As well, and very critically, the regimes of the United States and Canada were bequeathed the power to choose whom they would recognize as members of these communities. It is prudent now to map out how these longstanding forms of recognition then speak to local forms of recognition, and more critically, how they speak to indigenous notions of citizenship-formation and territory. Connecting these discourses illuminates how legal interests and designations not only affect the possibility of movement, but how these interests also work to define, through identification practices, their own territory and boundaries.47 **Such connections may illuminate as well how these identifications and legal and interpretive acts are reformulated in practice and how they are not only “resisted,” but circumvented, denied, or ignored.**

#### Settler colonialism operates through temporal technologies of linearity that relegate indigeneity to “primitivity” and “pastness” while locating the “solution”, i.e. a radical break from the incomplete conditions of colonialism, as a vanishing endpoint that never arrives – interrogating settler timelines that infiltrate the structure of debate is a prior question to the post-fiat consequences of the 1AC.

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Firstly, Australian settler colonialism holds on to the postcolonial image of a single, transformative moment of a radical political break marking decolonization. While its exact nature is not specified, this change will somehow draw a line under the problem atic colonial relationships of the past and mark the nation’s movement into a newly certain future. Settler colonialism circles around this moment, variously locating it in the past, the present and the future. And yet, in settler-colonial formations, no such radical break ever seems to come — ‘invasion is a structure not an event’. The vanishing endpoint that is continually pursued is, in effect, the moment of colonial completion. That is when the settler society will have fully replaced Indigenous societies on their land, and naturalized this replacement. Secondly, the more widely known temporal narrative of postcolonialism is deployed within settler colonialism in ways that assist this project of full colonization. The settler-colonial project identifies its own endpoint with the moment of decolonization. However, decolonization and settler-colonial completion have very different political effects. The linear narrative of colonization–decoloniza - tion–post-colonialism reflects the very specific histories of subcontinental Asia and Africa. Applying this post-colonial story of linear progress to the settler-colonial project is not only inaccurate, it actually assists the settler-colonial project by obscuring the very different transformative moment to which it aspires. Merging the moment of decolonization and the moment of colonial completion, these narratives can mobilize conservative and progressive settler voices towards colonial goals. Overall, we seek to open up discussion of temporal and teleological narratives within settler-colonial policy-making, and suggest that we need to contest our currently unacknowledged stories of the colonial future. By seeking resolution through extinguishment, these narratives tend to foreclose more productive debates about how settler and Indigenous people might live together differently across time. The first section of this article considers the relationship between settler colonialism and time. It gives a brief account of settler colonial - ism, its relationship to post-colonialism and its sovereign goals. We then consider the limited scholarship dealing with time as a political phenomenon, and argue that political temporality needs to be denat - u ralized and interrogated. The final part of this section explores the temporal technologies of settler-colonial political formations. The second section of this article is an attempt to trace some of these ideas in contemporary Australian Indigenous policy. For heuristic purposes, we identify three recent policy approaches: reconciliation, neo-liberal contractualism and intervention. Each of these phases tells particular stories about the unfolding of settler colonialism through time. We aim to identify and interrogate these stories in order to open up a more focused discussion on the role of political temporality in our colonial present.

#### The settler state is structured by the erasure of indigenous political difference through spatiotemporal exclusion – the aff’s reliance on state-centric fiat as the basis for debate is a reification of eliminatory violence.

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The elimination of Indigenous political difference Settler colonialism is a powerful contemporary force that continues to structure the Australian state’s relationship with Indigenous peoples and to obscure this structuring. It is distinct from postcolonialism, which refers to those large sections of the world that have undergone decolonization by European powers and now face highly mediated global systems of imperial control.8 Colonial theorizing has been dominated by scholars from post-colonial contexts, and this has led to ‘an oddly monolithic, and surprisingly unexamined, notion of colonialism’ that operates problematically in relation to Australia.9 Post-colonial concepts of colonialism assume a moment of transformative restructuring which has not occurred in settler colonies such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. This locates ‘real’ colonialism in the past, and assumes that now policy must deal with the ‘legacies’, ‘heritage’ or ‘reverberative after math’ of colonialism in today’s world — a language that is powerfully present in Australian policy analysis.10 Patrick Wolfe identifies settler colonialism as operating through the ‘logic of elimination’. Settlers aim to replace Indigenous peoples on their land, not to simply exploit natural resources or extract surplus value from Indigenous labour.11 This means that ‘all the Indigenous person needs to do to get in the way of the settler colonial project is to stay at home’.12 Elimination can be physical, but need not be. It can also involve eliminating officially recognized Aboriginal people through ‘blood quotas’, or assimilating them into white society in ways that sever connections to their Aboriginality.13 This conception of elimination resonates with Indigenous observations about the particular disregard that Aboriginal peoples have been subject to in Australia. Norm Sheehan claims that (contra post-colonial theory) Aborigines have not been positioned as ‘the other’ but as ‘the non-other’.14 Irene Watson points to the continual ‘negation of Aboriginal identity’.15 Lyndon Murphy identifies all Australian social policy as ‘terra nullius social policy’ because ‘it operates from a premise of nonrecognition’.16 However, while many agree upon the operation of this eliminatory logic, its object is less clear.17 Is it Indigenous people, Indigenous culture or Indigenous connections to land? The reason that identifying the structural target of the settlercolonial logic of elimination is difficult may simply be that this target shifts. At different historical points, Australian policy-makers have defined different targets of elimination and mobilized the appro - priate policy strategies. While independent Aboriginal existence clearly poses some sort of problem for settler-colonial society, mem - bers of that society have always contested the level and aspects of Indigenous existence that it can tolerate and successfully absorb.18 Recognizing that this logic is always in operation, and is always directed at some aspect of Indigenous existence, seems to capture an important dimension of settler-colonial policy-making. Govern - ments since the 1800s have used the language of ‘the Aboriginal Problem’.19 While the definitions of the specific nature of this problem rapidly change, there is an underlying recognition that the existence and character of Aboriginal people constitute some sort of ongoing political difficulty and that ‘government, rather than citizens, is expected to “do something about it”’.20 Using this approach it is possible to identify patterns in policymaking without searching for the definitive structural target of the logic of elimination. Patrick Wolfe identifies the Indigenous connection to land as particularly threatening to settler-colonial society,21 and others have also traced recurring policy attempts to sever these connections.22 This is because in Western polities land is simultaneously a physical commercial resource and a marker of the boundaries of sovereign authority; land is also territory. Sovereignty is understood to mean supreme and indivisible authority over all within a territory.23 Therefore, the existence of independent or unknown Indigenous polities within territorial boundaries automatically exposes colonial sovereignty, and hence the contemporary settler-colonial project itself, as incomplete. However, we identify another aspect of Aboriginal existence regularly targeted for elimination, at once more limited and more expansive: Indigenous political difference.24 Indigenous people continue to be framed as a political problem, even in instances when they are permanently dispossessed of their traditional lands. Indigenous political difference that cannot be contained or expressed within the confines of the settler state cannot be tolerated by the settler-colonial project, even if this project can absorb some elements of Indigenous society, culture and even land ownership. There are a number of ways to eliminate Indigenous political difference: by physically eliminating Indigenous people; by severing their physical connections to lands that lie at the heart of their political systems; by breaking down families and communities; by drawing Indigenous polities into the state and reforming them; and by entering into explicit, contractual exchanges (such as treaties) which publicly erase the political distinctions between colonizer and colonized. Patrick Wolfe argues that, overall, ‘settler colonialism is an inclusive, land-centered project that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies, from the metropolitan centre to the frontier encampment, with a view to eliminating indigenous societies’.25 However, identifying the target of the logic of elimination as political difference allows a more nuanced understanding of contem porary Australian Indigenous policy-making. A number of settler-colonial policy strategies, such as self-determination, work by investing resources in Indigenous peoples and cultures. There is a tendency among analysts towards identifying these in clusive policies as somehow less colonial than obviously assimilatory strategies such as the Northern Territory Intervention. In the years before the Intervention, for example, Wolfe claimed that settler colonialism in Australian seemed ‘mercifully’ to be in abeyance (although not thereby a thing of the past).26 Alternatively, we would argue that self-determination policies can constitute ‘the most successful practices’ of settler-colonial political assimilation.27 By separating Indigenous culture and community from Indigenous political existence, and supporting and absorbing the former while erasing the latter, self-determination and more radical liberal strategies, such as treaty-making, work towards the com - pletion of settler colonialism.28 By achieving definitive ‘reconciliation’ and permanently resolving questions of sovereign authority in the settler state’s favour, such strategies seek to erase the political differences of Indigenous peoples and pursue the (perhaps impossible) project of fully consummating settler ownership and legitimacy. However, we commonly understand these to be decolonizing political projects, and focus our critical attention on more easily identifiable colonial ‘re-eruptions’ such as the Northern Territory Intervention. If settler colonialism truly is a structure not an event, identifying Indigenous political difference as the target of the logic of elimination allows us to trace its presence throughout all phases of contemporary Australian Indigenous policy-making. Emphasizing this analytical shift from Indigenous society to Indigenous political difference partly comes from our attempt to extend the debate on settler colonialism into political theory and policy analysis. Mainstream Australian political scholars have generally avoided the productive (if sometimes acrimonious) internal debate around their own implication in Indigenous–settler politics that has occurred in other fields, such as anthropology.29 Here, we rearticulate settler-colonial concepts in the terms of our own discipline of political studies — sovereignty, polity, policymaking, liberalism and consent — as an invitation to other political scholars to consider the ramifications of the settler-colonial model.

### L––Distaster Colonialism

#### NATO is an organization structured by colonialism. From Kosovo to the AFF the construction of narratives of “urgency” and “humanitarian necessities” justifies NATOs colonial ambitions and reentrenches an international order that is structurally positioned against those it claims to help.

**Erfani 21**[Ava Erfani graduated from UNC Chapel Hill in 2021 with majors in Political Science and Interdisciplinary Studies (IDST) as well as a minor in Asian Studies, “Disaster Colonialism: The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),” North Carolina Journal of European Studies, https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/downloads/c821gv324#page=28]

The international involvement in Kosovo since 1999 serves as a unique, contemporary case of what I refer to as “disaster colonialism,” borrowing from Naomi Klein’s conception of “disaster capitalism.”5 In Klein’s vocabulary, “disaster” refers to the vulnerable condition of a populace wherein it is unable to express its popular will against undemocratic economic neoliberal reforms, usually due to its focus on survival and recovery following a widespread crisis. Disaster colonialism in Kosovo, I argue, was a project, one which needed the fabrication of a “disaster,” (based on the historical event of the 1999 War of Independence) for a series of international organizations to establish missions that would proliferate following the end of the war. The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia over the ownership of territory was seized by the international community as a “disaster,” catalyzing a self-justifying mechanism that foreclosed the expression of popular democratic will in post-conflict Kosovo. Without the watchword of “disaster,” I claim, the interventions in Kosovo, by NATO, the UN, and the European Union (EU) would not have been possible. Understood in this way, disaster colonialism is a programmatic, top-down method of building a state following a crisis that undemocratically implements techniques of governance imported by a colonizing power, bypassing the will or the consent of the populace. By manufacturing a “disaster”—which declares a populace no longer capable of deciding the future of their government or the shape of their own society––the international community was able to format a legal, economic, and political system in Kosovo that served the interests of a Western, liberal-democratic power structure. Disaster colonialism, then, attempts to diagnose the ways in which a foreign governing body is established, exercised, and multiplied in post-crisis situations using universally accepted norms of international human rights discourse to justify the wide-scale modeling of a society to serve not so much the interests of the governed, but rather the interests of the global order. In the case of Kosovo, the 1999 NATO intervention began the project of disaster colonialism by claiming a stake in the future of Kosovo. The UN continued the project for eight years via direct governance over Kosovo. After Kosovo declared independence in 2008, the UN transferred the remainder of its authority to the EU which utilized indirect methods of control––financial imperatives, Kosovo’s lack of alternative sources of growth and aid––to finalize the mission of disaster colonialism.6 The origins of international involvement in Kosovo did not begin with NATO, but the NATO intervention allowed for the colonial mission to take place. It established that the conflict was out of the control of Milošević, Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, the KLA, and other regional actors. As it had done in Bosnia-Herzegovina only a few years prior, the international community coalesced around the new governance and peacekeeping project: Kosovo. Thousands of international staff members relocated to the new missions in Kosovo in the direct aftermath of the destruction from the 1999 war. Many Kosovar Albanians as well as Kosovar Serbs faced extreme brutalities during the war, including murder, assault, rape, and forced removal as part of the ethnic cleansing campaign. It was in this environment that the UN and other organizations stepped into Kosovo. UNMIK, the OSCE mission, the EU mission, and the permanent NATO presence combined to create the longest and most expansive trusteeship mission in history.7 Kosovo as a post-conflict site gave the international community a center to focus their operations. For organizations like the EC/EU, state-building was a new field in which they could test their power and efficacy. If the post-conflict missions in Kosovo could be successful in creating a European-oriented, stable state, the international organizations could gain greater reputation and power in their global endeavors. Each major international organization was placed into separate spheres of operation termed “pillars.” Pillar I, “Humanitarian Affairs,” originally fell under the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and was responsible for the return and replacement of refugees; Pillar II, “Civil Administration,” was run by the UN and consisted of daily administrative management of the territory; Pillar III, “Democratization and Institution Building,” was led by the OSCE; Pillar IV, “Economic Reconstruction,” fell under the jurisdiction of the EU.8 Each partition of tasks made clear the primary objectives of UNMIK in terms of the type of society it aimed to create in Kosovo: a human rights-respecting, bureaucratic, and democratic government (UNHCR, UN, OSCE) as well as an investment-friendly market economy (EU). This level of state-building had not been undertaken before by the UN, making Kosovo the site of the largest modern experiment in government planning and control. The “disaster” of the 1999 war provided the grounds for this colonial experiment, the purpose of which was to prove the efficacy and hegemony of the liberal-democratic humanitarian style of “good governance” and development. In this paper, I will trace the points in which the UN’s disaster colonialism, administered by technocratic governance experts, reveals the costs of occupation, the collateral damage that is part of the state-building mission, and the tensions between expert rule––even from a human rights-centered organization like the UN––and democracy. The International Commission on Kosovo’s 2000 report on the Kosovo crisis found that the intervention was “illegal but legitimate… because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.”9 The uncertainty surrounding the legality and morality of NATO’s actions in Kosovo was quelled by this consensus, paving the way for the international community’s colonial project to establish its roots in Kosovo.10 The UN was able to establish UNMIK without request from Kosovo, bypassing its traditional insistence on consensual missions due to the “urgency” of the post-conflict situation which made its power as a humanitarian organization necessary, at least according to the international community.11 It is my argument that UNMIK’s administration was fundamentally colonial: the international community worked to control and shape the people and society of Kosovo, implementing Western governance and economic styles, while working against and around the very systems that they implemented. The difference between the colonialism of “old” and the disaster colonialism of the UN in Kosovo is that the UN’s hypocrisy between its rhetoric and action was due to its prevailing belief in its own mission rather than an ulterior motive to attain economic wealth. Those in charge of UNMIK and international organizations in Kosovo could accept the fact that many of their policies went against European and international legal conventions––some costs were necessary, according to their logic, in order to build a stable state for the people of Kosovo. It is this axiom, I argue, which guided UNMIK and other missions in Kosovo and which made colonialism possible as a humanitarian system of governance in the 21st century. The NATO intervention in Serbia and Kosovo was officially terminated on June 9, 1999 when NATO and the FRY government signed the Kumanovo Technical Agreement in Kumanovo, Macedonia. The document created a framework for dispelling Serb troops from Kosovo and for the establishment of a NATO security presence in the province.12 However, in terms of addressing the roots of the territorial conflict, the agreement was much weaker than the agreement at Rambouillet. Milošević rejected the Rambouillet Agreement before the war began largely because of its proposal that a referendum on the issue of independence would be carried out after three years of foreign international intervention in Kosovo. The Kumanovo Agreement focused more on the establishment of international administration rather than on questions popular will or sovereignty. Prior to international intervention, the KLA aimed to gain national sovereignty and independence for Kosovo; this was, however, irreconcilable with the goals of the North Atlantic organizations. As Ray Murphy writes, “The ultimate goal of the KLA was independence, but this was inconsistent with European Union and United States policy. The latter considered that political autonomy and guaranteed minority rights formed the only internationally acceptable solution to the status of Kosovo.”13 The Kumanovo Technical Agreement focused on the security apparatuses in Kosovo, stating that a UN mission would be deployed under a Security Council resolution and that all Yugoslav military forces would be removed from Kosovo’s territory and air space. The agreement established NATO’s sole authority over the use of force in Kosovo, banning any return of the Yugoslav and/or Serbian militaries. The following day, the UN would establish sole governing authority in the region. On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1244 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.14 Article 11 of the Resolution gave UNMIK its main objectives: 11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: (a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); (b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; (c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections; (d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peace- building activities; (e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); (f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; (g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction; (h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid; (i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; (j) Protecting and promoting human rights; (k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;15 Resolution 1244 was the basis of the UN’s power in Kosovo. It ensured that the functions of Kosovo’s society as well as the design of its future would be in the hands of international staff. The scope of the mission was unprecedented; with no clear terminating clause, UNMIK would be responsible for both administration over Kosovo as well as the facilitation of the territorial dispute.16 In the span of two days, Kosovo lost local authority to self-govern as well as establish its own armed forces. The Resolution was seen as the ex post facto endorsement of the NATO intervention––the subject of legal and ethical debates on foreign intervention and sovereignty among international law experts––by the UNSC which had not initially approved the intervention.17 However, some scholars of international law who did not accept the humanitarian premise of the NATO intervention also questioned the legal validity of post-intervention involvement in Kosovo. They argued that the Kumanovo Agreement, which Resolution 1244 refers to as part of its legal basis, was made in violation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states that “a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”18 The crux of the critical argument centered on the use of unsanctioned force by NATO which was in violation of the UN Charter. Legal debates notwithstanding, the UN mission was able to expand its legal and executive reach after the passage of Resolution 1244.

### L––Linear Time

#### Settler colonialism mobilizes temporality itself in service of the consummation of white settler sovereignty – this operates through liberal narratives of progressivism that rely upon a vanishing endpoint of a “better world” achieved through the completion of the project of settler modernity. Normative debate is structured by the imperative of forward motion that locates the plan as a transformative break with colonial society that relegates the backwardness of indigeneity to the past and envisions a settler utopia in its place.

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Time, decolonization and colonial completion Critical geographers use Foucault’s insights to unsettle modern understandings of space as a fixed environment in which politics takes place. Instead, they show that political projects construct, naturalize and respond to particular spatial understandings.30 In relation to Indigenous policy, critical analysts are quick to identify these political deployments of space. SuvendriniPerera, for example, shows that policy-makers represent remote Indigenous communities as ‘set apart from the body of the nation, and as the locus of unspeakable violence and abjection’.31 As part of the discourse of the Northern Territory Intervention, the metaphor of the distant frontier — or vulnerable centre — is pervasive. Remote Aboriginal communities prescribed for Intervention are para - digmatically referred to in media reports as ‘remote Aboriginal societies’, ‘this other Australia’, ‘the remote world’ and as ‘a distinct domain’.32 Unsettling dominant understandings of time is equally important. In his work ‘The End of the Passing Past’, Walters aims to ‘think about change in ways that refuse the obligation to side with or against continuity… and resist the temptations of progressivism and reductionism’.33 He draws on Bruno Latour’s examination of the modern temporal imaginary, and his denat - uralizing of modern political timelines: We have never moved either forward or backward. We have always actively sorted out elements belonging to different times. We can still sort. It is the sorting that makes the times, not the times that make the sorting.34 This interrogation is especially useful in relation to understanding settler colonialism and Indigenous policy-making. Barry Hindess, Elizabeth Povinelli and N. Sheehan, for example, reflect on Western temporal constructions of Aboriginality and indicate how these relate to liberal political agendas. Barry Hindess argues that liberalism tends to locate different cultures in its own past, even when they coexist with liberal societies in the present.35 Indigenous groups, in particular, are located prior to the transformative moment of sovereign agreement, which in turn is read as an indication of their incapacity to enter into this superior, rational political future. Norm Sheehan maintains that settler colonialism in Australia is deeply invested in these kinds of temporal logics: In contrast to previous colonial contexts which tended to focus on constructing difference based on inherent racial traits the antipodean designation as primitive defines this specific other as non-other. The antipodean aborigine is by definition from the origin of (all) mankind which positions this primitive as an earlier and therefore lesser version of European self.36 Elizabeth Povinelli briefly makes a similar point in her analysis of recent Australian Indigenous policy: [E]ven as liberalism came to accept its fate as a culture among other cultures it differentiated the tense and orientation of its cultural difference from other cultures. The West as a general idea would claim the future and claim the potentiality of individuals and assign the past and the constraint of individuals to others — or, it would recognize that these were the values of non-liberal cultures.37 She refers to these patterns of political temporal positioning as ‘technologies of temporality’. Drawing together the work of Walters, Hindess, Sheehan and Povinelli, it becomes apparent that colonialism does not just take place in time. It constructs narratives of time, in ways that create particular political relationships in the present, and attempts to move itself through time to a certain political future. In the remainder of this section, we compare the temporalities of post-colonial and settler-colonial political formations, and argue that both anchor themselves to some sort of transformative ‘endpoint’. This radical political break separates a problematic past from a completed future and, in settler-colonial societies, involves a strange assemblage of ideas about decolonization, revolution, full colonization and sovereign exchange. The term post-colonial implies ‘the notion of a movement be - yond’;38 ‘the “post” in “post-colonial” suggests “after” the demise of colonialism, it is imbued, quite apart from its user’s intentions, with an ambiguous spatio-temporality’.39 In a number of former colonies (both extractive, such as India, and settler, such as Algeria), the formal colonial project has indeed ended. The term postcolonial captures something about the complex political realities of these nation-states today. A dramatic, and often violent, moment of structural decolonization separates these state’s colonial pasts from their post-colonial presents. However, even in relation to those nations which have undergone such institutional transformations, scholars contest the use of the term. Ella Shohat suggests that it erases the ongoing structural imperialisms that persist: ‘How then does one negotiate sameness and difference within the framework of a “post-colonial” whose “post” emphasizes rupture and deemphasizes sameness?’40 Some scholars use the term neocolonialism to indicate political continuity, and to contest the understanding that critical post-colonial work seeks to put out minor spot-fires of inequality left by ‘real’ colonialism.41 If the temporal narrative of post-colonialism is problematic in relation to former extractive colonies, it is altogether inaccurate when applied to ongoing settler colonies such as Australia. Yet post-colonial scholarship has dominated international academic [T]he lack of historical specificity in the ‘post’ leads to a collaps - ing of diverse chronologies … It equates early independence won by settler colonial states, in which Europeans formed their new nation-states in non-European territories at the expense of Indigenous populations, with that of nationstates whose indigenous populations struggled for inde - pendence against Europe.42 Australia has not, and most probably will not, undergo the kind of institutional transfer of control to the Indigenous population that could justify the application of the term post-colonial. And yet it is quite common to see Australia identified as a post-colonial or decolo nizing nation in cultural studies, literary theory and policy analysis.43 One of the greatest contributions of the emerging field of settler-colonial studies is the fact that it provides clear conceptual tools to articulate exactly why it is that nations like Australia and Canada should be understood differently. However, it is important not to overstate the uniqueness of settlercolonial studies in Australian scholarship. Critical Indigenous the - orists are carrying on their own conversation regarding Australian colonial conditions, and have long contested the relevance of the term post-colonial. Irene Watson, for example, argues: I understand the contemporary colonial project as one that has continued unabated from the time of the landing and invasion by the British in 1788 … the Australian state retains a vested interest in keeping the violence going, and the inequalities and iniquities that are maintained against Aboriginal peoples for the purpose of maintaining the life and continuity of the state. A question the Australian state is yet to resolve is its own illegitimate foundation and transformation into an edifice deemed lawful. Within this unanswered questionable structure the Australian state parades as one which has obliterated the ‘founding violence’ of its ‘illegitimate origins’ and ‘repressed them into a timeless past’.44 Aileen Moreton-Robinson instead uses the term post-colonizing, capturing the ambiguous and shifting temporal technologies deployed in settler-colonial Australia. These new conceptual models have grown productively out of the object of our study: the postcolonizing world we inhabit. Our respective geographical locations are framed by nation states such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand where colonization has not ceased to exist; it has only changed in form from that which our ancestors encountered.45 While settler-colonial studies proceeds from a conceptual distinction between extractive and settler colonialism, Indigenous scholarship is based in the lived experiences of ongoing colonization.46 Settlercolonial studies would benefit from connecting to this existing academic conversation that runs parallel to and intersects with its own ideas in important ways. In particular, it draws attention to ongoing Indigenous contestation of colonial projects, and counters the tendency towards totalizing, structural accounts of settler colonialism. As Watson observes: Today our voices are still talking while the colonial project remains entrenched and questions concerning identity politics, and the ‘authentic native’ are constructed and answered by those who have power.47 Up to this point, we have been drawing together points made by other scholars. Settler colonialism has an ongoing, structural temporality, which is generally unacknowledged and contrasts with the linear colonialism–decolonization–post-colonialism narrative. However, we suggest that the application of a unidirectional, progressive temporality to the settler-colonial context is not just an analytical mistake, but a ‘technology of temporality’. This conception is taken up within the settler-colonial project in ways that work towards the consummation of settler sovereignty. The borrowed notion of a ‘radical break’ is variously located in settler colonialism’s past, present or future. By harnessing the decolonizing resonances of this concept of colonial transforma - tion, the settler-colonial project obscures the very different political effects of its own ‘vanishing endpoint’.48 What is this vanishing endpoint, which seems to lurk in all of our imaginations, our policy projects and our political debates? Instead of the moment of decolonization, it is the moment of full colonization — or rather, it is both, because in this imagined moment colonial relationships will dissolve themselves and settler authority will be naturalized. This transformative event is both an impossible colonial dream, premised on the disappearance of Indigenous political difference, and a concrete political project that justifies all manner of tactics in the present. But what are the political con - sequences of such a preoccupation? And do Indigenous participants in the colonial relationship seek the same kind of resolution and dissolution? Significantly, the Western colonial narrative of transformational change maps onto another Western imaginary — the moment of sovereign transformation encapsulated in the social contract. This is the moment that a group of people transition from collective social ‘status’ into individualized freedom and contractual person - hood.49 It is also the movement out of a constraining ‘history’ into an atemporal, rational present. As Hindess argues, liberalism con - signs its Indigenous contemporaries to its own past, and imagines this location in the past to be ‘a kind of moral and intellectual failure’, revealing the incapacity and disinclination to enter into a social contract and join the present.50 Therefore, the movement through time, via a radical transformative moment, is also the developmental movement from incapacity to capacity. An unstable but productive dichotomy emerges between, on the one hand, Indigenous political difference-incapacity-status-injustice-lack of sovereignty, and on the other, colonial completion-capacitycontract-freedom-sovereign inclusion. These oppositions are separated by an image of a single, interchangeable and undefined threshold — the transformative event. This temporal narrative belongs to both progressive and conservative articulations of the settler-colonial future; the settler colonial endpoint is variously positioned as an inevitable global trend,51 a past achievement yet to be fully recognized,52 and a future goal for which Aboriginal people must prepare.53 As Povinelli notes, these conceptions are not only temporal, but also teleological: [T]hese tenses are in turn articulated to other discourses of time and event such as teleological discourses that apprehend events ‘as the realization of an already given end or telos and eschatological discourses that wait for ‘extreme’ or ‘ultimate’ moments and events which immediately precede or accompany ‘the end of history’ and ‘its reversal into eternity’.54 The transformative event is positioned as part of an inevitable and inescapable trajectory (although it may be consistently deferred or delayed). In this way, the eventual legitimacy and stability of the settler-colonial project is always-already assumed. Through this a priori assumption, settler colonialism is able to entrench and sustain itself on the basis of its eventual demise. The following section traces the appearance and temporal location of this settler-colonial end - point in recent Australian Indigenous policy phases.

#### Indigeneity exists in a temporal regime antagonistic to that of the settler state – the genocidal violence of the past accumulates in the present and ensures that the benevolent future offered by the settler state will never arrive. The politics of reformism is a ruse of consent that consigns native being to a perpetual state of half-life -- vote negative to reject debate’s progressive linearity – what good is incremental transformation to the one who expects to die tomorrow ?

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This is our time: death and the future Throughout Born in Flames, countless members of the Women’s Army declare: “This is our time.” The time of the revolution was not the time to abolish anti-blackness, white supremacy, and heteropatriarchy. It was a time that left behind and captured poor (queer) women of color through the progress of democracy and equality. In this way, “our time” and state time are two antagonistic temporalities of violence in the film. As James Scott argues, the modern state’s utopian aim is to reduce the disorderly and chaotic social order under its purview into a mirror of the administrative knowledge central to its observations and governance. The state works to produce temporal and spatial intelligibility with the goal of manufacturing the orderly administration and regulation of the nation’s population, resources, and infrastructure. By disrupting and dismantling spaces, populations, and epistemologies that are illegible to its regimes of knowing and governance, the modern state creates a utopia of visibility and legibility that is open to policing and control (Scott 1998, 82). The management of time is central to this process. “Our time” is what the state seeks to capture. In Born in Flames, state time extends and expands the violence of the past, while “our time” is a temporal regime that exceeds and undoes state time. Again, Fanon proves useful for understanding these differences. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon describes a “time lag, or a difference of rhythm, between the leaders of a nationalist party and the mass of the people” (Fanon 1963, 107). According to Fanon, the rank and file of anti-colonial rebellions demand the complete and utter immediate destruction of the forms of power that render them “more dead than alive,” while both colonial and nationalist governments attempt to manage, temper, and restrain the demands of those who have no more time to give to the promises of a future that is always coming, but never arrives (51). For example, in the film, the state promises that “in the future” there will be jobs, an end to sexual violence, and racial and gender equality. But for Fanon, the “hopeless dregs of humanity” (or the wretched of the earth) are filled with an “uncontrollable rage” and thus exist in a temporal regime apart from that of the party or the nation. This is a time of intensity and immediacy (“the slaves of modern times are impatient”), where the future of the present as it is means no future at all (74). Like the financial, epistemological, and racialized legacies of slavery Baucom sees intensifying in our current moment, Fanon diagnoses the future of colonialism as the accumulation of the social, biological, and living death of the native. The native lives a death in life produced by the racism of slavery and colonialism. The future’s horizon is the accumulation of past forms of racial terror and violence. In this way, Baucom and Fanon draw connections between race and time that are crucial to questions of queer futurity. The relationship between race, gender, death, and the future is central to the immediacy and spontaneity of the Women’s Army and is foundational to the film’s critique of the future. We can 44 S. Dillon turn to the Fanonian-inspired prison writings of George Jackson to further explore the relationship between death, race, and the future. In his 1972 text Blood in My Eye, published shortly after he was shot and killed by guards at San Quentin prison, Jackson writes of racism, death, and revolution: Their line is: “Ain’t nobody but black folks gonna die in the revolution.” This argument completely overlooks the fact that we have always done most of the dying, and still do: dying at the stake, through social neglect or in U.S. foreign wars. The point is now to construct a situation where someone else will join in the dying. If it fails and we have to do most of the dying anyway, we’re certainly no worse off than before. (Jackson 1972, 6) Here, Jackson argues that the social order of the United States is saturated with an anti-blackness that produces, in the words of Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (2007, 28). Jackson’s text is littered with a polemic that links race and death in a way that preemptively echoes Michel Foucault’s declaration that racism is the process of “introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault 2003, 254). When Jackson, Gilmore, and Foucault define race as the production of premature death, they make a connection between race and the future. Race is the accumulation of premature death and dying. For Jackson, race fractures the future so that the future looks like incarceration or the premature death of malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. The future was not the hopefulness of unknown possibilities. It was rather the devastating weight of knowing that death was coming cloaked in abandonment, neglect, incarceration, or murder. In other words, according to Jackson, death was always and already rushing towards the present of blackness. In the last line of No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman similarly connects the future to premature death when he references the murder of Matthew Shepard. He writes: “Somewhere, someone else will be savagely beaten and left to die – sacrificed to a future whose beat goes on, like a pulse or a heart – and another corpse will be left like a mangled scarecrow to frighten the birds who are gathering now, who are beating their wings, and who, like the death drive, keep on coming” (Edelman 2004, 154). For Edelman, the future will necessarily continue to produce a world that is unlivable for queer people. In this way, the polemics of black liberation and Edelman’s anti-social thesis share an affinity around the theorization of the future as overdetermined by premature death, yet they diverge in how they imagine death’s relationship to race and power. For Edelman, the future looks like repetition of the death of Matthew Shepard (a white gay man), while for Jackson, it looks like the premature death of incarceration, the ghetto, and chattel slavery’s haunting contortion of the present. In other words, the state and anti-blackness were central to the anti-sociality of the black liberation movement. Within Jackson’s analysis, the state is the primary mechanism for unevenly distributing racialized regimes of value and disposability. Following the writing of Fanon, Jackson argued that for this relationship to be abolished: “The government of the U.S.A and all that it stands for, all that it represents, must be destroyed. This is the starting point, and the end” (Jackson 1972, 54). Jackson’s polemic crescendos when he describes the future he desires: Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory 45 We must accept the eventuality of bringing the U.S.A to its knees; accept the closing off of critical sections of the city with barbed wire, armed pig carriers criss-crossing the city streets, soldiers everywhere, tommy guns pointed at stomach level, smoke curling black against the daylight sky, the smell of cordite, house-to-house searches, doors being kicked down, the commonness of death. (Jackson 1972, 55) If the past and present have produced the accumulation of the premature death of black people, then Jackson imagines the complete undoing of the social order as the way out of temporal capture. The future of the social order means no future, and so the future must come to an end. Fanon similarly imagines the relationship between the native and the future of the social order: “They won’t be reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the morality of its rulers; quite on the contrary, they take for granted the impossibility of their entering the city save by hand grenades and revolvers” (Fanon 1963, 130). Here, the invitation to the safety and security of the city (or the social order as it is) is an offer to continue a life that is a half-life. Possibility comes from a starting point that is an end. In her writing from captivity, Angela Davis articulates this logic in relationship to the prison. In the 1971 essay “Political Prisoners, Prisons, and Black Liberation,” Davis argues that the sole purpose of the police was to “intimidate blacks” and “to persuade us with their violence that we are powerless to alter the conditions of our lives” (39). Davis theorizes the violence of police and prisons as pervasive and unrelenting. Throughout the essay, Davis names the complicity between an anti-blackness as old as liberal freedom and new forms of penal and policing technologies that emerged in the 1970s in response to political upheaval and insurrection. Davis calls for the abolition of what she terms the “law-enforcement-judicial-penal network” in addition to arguing for the construction of a mass movement that could contest the “victory of fascism” (50). Yet, in line with the political imaginaries at the time – an imaginary articulated by Born In Flames – Davis wanted more than an end to the prison and the violence of the police. Like other early black feminist writing, Davis did not just call for the overthrow of one form of state power so that a new one may take its place. Instead, Davis implied that the social order itself must be undone. For Davis, the prison was not the primary problem. The prison was made possible by the libidinal, symbolic, and discursive regimes that actualized the uneven institutionalized distribution of value and disposability along the lines of race, gender, and sexuality. Davis called for the total epistemological and ontological undoing of the forms of knowledge and subjectivity that were produced by the racial state. In short, hope, for Davis, meant that the prison could not have a future, and more so, that a world that could have the prison would need to end as well. Critically, Jackson did not understand the end of the future of the social order as particularly different from his present because “I’ve lived with repression every moment of my life, a repression so formidable that any movement on my part can only bring relief” (1972, 7). Jackson’s understanding of the future arose from his critique of reform. Derived from his correspondence with Davis, Jackson argued that the essence of fascism was reform or more specifically “economic reform” (118).11 Every reform that modified or improved the operations of global capitalism and white supremacy only extended the life of the 46 S. Dillon social order. And the life of the social order, according to Jackson and Fanon, is parasitic on the control, exploitation, incarceration, and premature death of black people. The creation of a new world could not rely on “long term politics” because patience, reform, and change meant nothing to “the person who expects to die tomorrow” (10). For Jackson, the future is a time those without a future cannot risk. The future was not coming and so the present could not wait. The temporal break between those without a future who demand this is “our time” and the time of the state that declares your time is the future, is most striking in the final scenes of Born in Flames. Towards the end of the film, the president of the United States delivers a national televised address to announce a new reform that will pay women for housework. Simultaneous with the announcement, a cadre of the Women’s Army storms the state-run TV station and interrupts the president’s address with a video that exposes the imprisonment and murder of their leader, Adelaide Norris. Norris was murdered, in part, because of how she understood the relationship between time and violence. This is evident in internal discussions within the Women’s Army concerning the use of violence. When Hilary Hurst and Norris, the two leaders of the Women’s Army (according to the FBI), discuss the role of violence in the actions of the Women’s Army, they have competing visions of the relationship between time and violence. When Hurst tells Norris, “The reality of having to deal with taking up arms, Adelaide, is really heavy, I mean whether we can accept or be responsible for the potential violence thrust upon us, from our own violence thrust out ...” Norris simply replies, “I’m telling you it’s already happening. It’s here. It’s that time.”12 Norris’s response invokes two forms of violence. First, she implies that the state violence Hurst is concerned will come if they take up arms has already arrived (indeed Norris will be imprisoned and murdered within a few days of this conversation). She also indicates that the time is right to intensify their efforts through the deployment of violence. The time is right for counter-violence, because state violence is already the past, present, and future. Norris mobilizes a black feminist analytic where there is no outside to the forms of violence, terror, and subjugation produced by white supremacy, anti-blackness, and heteropatriarchy. As a queer black woman, Norris does not encounter violence in isolated moments of exceptional transgression. Space nor time will bring relief because there is no contingent relationship between blackness and violence (Wilderson 2010, 88). This fact leads to a politics of impatience, immediacy, and spontaneity by the Women’s Army. When the future is not relief, but intensification and accumulation, then the present is all that is left. “Our time” is a time of the present, an anticipatory time that sees the no future of the future as it is.

#### Settler colonialism operates through a logic of constant deferral that locates indigeneity as “vanished”, or an atemporal relic of the past cast aside in service of a settler modernity – the 1AC’s commitment to progressive development as a method of redress for colonial violence is nothing more than a cacaphony of assimilative liberalism that drowns out “backwards” indigenous thought in favor of settler misappropriation.

Hardy ’15 -- (Karl Joseph Hardy, 6-10-2015, "UNSETTLING HOPE: SETTLER COLONIALISM AND UTOPIANISM," Queen’s University, https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/handle/1974/13154/Hardy\_Karl\_J\_06095600\_PhD.pdf;jsessionid=4D4185E83446511624E096AB43CCE454?sequence=1, accessed 12-30-2021)//nikki

The work of contemporary Indigenous critical theorists evidences a collective refusal to be erased, a demand for attention to the ways in which many academic (and non-academic) concepts and discourses ignore the experiences and concerns of Indigenous peoples. It is vital, therefore, to first recognize and situate the manifesting of a body of Indigenous critical theory and Indigenous-led scholarly communities as existing within the academic infrastructure supported and regulated by the white settler nationstate. With this reality in mind, the proliferation of Indigenous studies programs and the work of Indigenous critical theorists, as such, may be generally observed as acts of resistance. Chickasaw critical theorist Jodi Byrd refers to what she terms the “deferral” of Indigenous peoples’ experiences and concerns within the prominent threads of critical theory within the (settler) academy.36 An attending to Indigenous concerns and experiences in discourses such as human rights, postcoloniality, or sustainability rarely occurs, if it can be said that it has ever occurred in a substantial or sustained way. These continual deferrals operate as a means by which the white settler academy, again itself understood here as an adjunct of the wider capitalist settler societies in which it is embedded, can avoid confronting the fundamental contradictions and violence underlying the very condition of settler colonial societies. As Byrd writes, “indigenous peoples are located outside of temporality and presence, even in the face of the very present and ongoing colonization of indigenous lands, resources, and lives.”37 According to Byrd, one of the more prominent means of such acts of deferral is the assignment of Indigenous peoples and their concerns and experiences to the past. This acts to relegate of Indigenous peoples to a state of invisibility and irrelevance in the contemporary world. Colonial narratives represent Indigenous peoples as having vanished or as having otherwise been passed by as part of a linear and teleological notion of human development. This allows for, and indeed perpetuates, deferrals from direct and sustained contention with the genocidal violence of settler colonialism by understanding colonization to have always-already taken place. Settler colonialism is therefore understood as complete, with Indigenous peoples and their nations, cultures, languages, knowledges, governance structures, and spiritualities viewed as mere remnants pushed to the margins, as contradictions that require (temporary) management. These narrative deferrals also often involve an imposed notion of “authentic” Indigeneity to have been fundamentally and irrevocably lost at some point in the past. The supposed loss of authenticity furthers a sense of the inevitability of Indigenous peoples’ assimilation into settler society. This to say that if Indigenous peoples ceased to be authentically Indigenous at some point in the past, then their capacity to be recognized by settler societies as fully human, and as Indigenous nations, rests primarily on their assimilation, the termination of the their Indigenous identities. Obviously, this operates, in part, as a means of deferring engagement with the enduring and ongoing genocidal character of settler colonialism. This includes, but is not limited to, the ongoing reservation and reserve system, the gendered and sexualized violence, and the mass settler state interventions into Indigenous communities (e.g. the removal of children from their families). Furthermore, the ongoing legacy of broken treaties between the erstwhile colonial metropoles, the settler nation-states that Byrd refers to as “breakaway settler colonialisms,” and Indigenous nations, requires the subsuming of Indigenous peoples within the settler nation-state, undermining Indigenous sovereignties and denying Indigenous nationhood.38 While it appears that, to date, the largest non-Indigenous audience for much of contemporary Indigenous critical theory has been in area studies and critical studies of race, gender, and sexuality, the work of Byrd in Transit of Empire offers a wide-ranging set of critical interventions, aimed at postcolonial and poststructural scholarship, as well as cultural studies. Byrd’s arguments focus on the construction of the notion of what she calls “Indian” and “Indianness,” which, in some ways mirror Anishinaabe writer and theorist Gerald Vizenor’s similar characterization of the “Indian” as an imposed nonIndigenous caricature. For Byrd the “Indian” …becomes a site through which U.S. empire orients and replicates itself by transforming those to be colonized into “Indians” through continual reiterations of pioneer logics, whether in the Pacific, the Caribbean, or the Middle East.39 Thus, for Byrd, “indigenous peoples must be central to any theorizations of the conditions of postcoloniality, empire and death-dealing regimes that arise out of indigenous lands.”40 Similarly, Byrd also situates the deferrals of Indigenous concerns in the proliferation of postructuralism, arguing that Indigenous peoples become an “absent referent” on which much contemporary postructural theory is constructed. She argues, “…the Indian is simultaneously, multiply, a colonial, imperial referent that continues to produce knowledge about the indigenous as “primitive” and “savage” otherness within postructuralist and postcolonial theory and philosophy.”41 According to Byrd, even in critical theories that interrogate hegemonic constructions of colonial modernity and which implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the dichotomization of modern versus pre-modern cultures or “civilizations,” there is a tendency to locate Indigenous peoples in the past—as though the pre-modern peoples were all killed or assimilated: vanished. Byrd argues …indigeniety as an ontological prior challenges postcolonial and critical theories because it serves as a significant parallax view—though certainly not the only one—along the baseline of colonialism through which to trouble the dialectical processes that underwrite colonialist hegemonies of racializations and normativities., subjectivities and subjectifications.42 The goals of the Transit of Empire are thus to critically intervene in existing nonIndigenous discourses with the intention of compelling attention to the contemporary presence and experiences of Indigenous peoples and a critical recognition of the effects of the naturalized deferrals of ongoing lived contemporary concerns of Indigenous peoples. Byrd is claiming that a caricatured Indian as subhuman is continuously redeployed as the means of the “transit” of American imperialism, but also that the Indian as pre-modern-and-vanished is deployed as the alternative to hegemonic notions of modernity in critical theory. Byrd also proposes a conceptualization of “cacophony” as means of understanding how liberal multiculturalism defers Indigenous concerns in part via “the noise of competing claims, recognitions, and remediations.”43 Here she is naming the “contradictorily hegemonic and horizontal struggles” within contemporary multicultural settler nation-states as another means of deferring the concerns of Indigenous peoples.44 Byrd’s argument is for an attending to the ways in which the efforts at rights and recognition from the nation-state has the consequences of pitting marginalized populations against one another in a competition that has the effect of further marginalizing and reinforcing the deferrals of Indigenous concerns. In doing so, Byrd’s Transit of Empire represents one of the foremost contemporary examples of contemporary Indigenous critical theory explicitly positioned as critical interventions within non-Indigenous discourses.

#### Timelines of completion are weaponized by settler governance in political and academic spheres to classify indigeneity as “other” and preclude discussions of indigenous interrleationality – the 1AC is an instantiation of the quest for resolution that you are ethically obligated to reject on an a priori level.

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The above analysis suggests that rather than disputing where the nation and Indigenous peoples should be located relative to the moment of colonial transformation, it may be more productive to contest this temporal narrative altogether. Instead, we might ask how and why policy-makers come to have the authority to locate Indigenous lives in settler time. More importantly, we can begin to understand and contest the impacts of these continual temporal classifications of Aboriginality on Indigenous lives, and to consider whether there might be ways that settlers and our structures can engage more appropriately and mindfully with Indigenous peoples and with Indigenous political difference. If settler colonialism is indeed a structure rather than an event, and the moment of radical break functions at least partly as a colonial technology of temporality, then the quest for (re)solution of the colonial relationship through a significant decolonizing event is brought into question. The political challenges we face in Australia are reconfigured as part of an ongoing task involving the identifi - cation of the ways this structure shapes our shared existences, and of finding ways of living together better. Paul McHugh argues that there are often two simultaneous approaches to colonizing/ decolonizing tools such as a treaty and native title.85 Settlers, even progressive settlers, approach them as one-off and definitive moments of change, capable of erasing a problematic past and regulating a new and certain future. For many Indigenous peoples, he suggests, they are instruments in a toolbox of strategies to manage the ongoing relationship between settler and Indigenous residents. Rather than seeking to end this encounter, many have sought rather to make it more just, sustainable and compatible with diverse Indigenous aspirations. As we have suggested, the ways in which academic and political approaches mobilize timelines of colonial completion may foreclose more productive debates about coexisting and interrelating across time.

#### Utopian narratives are a methodological tool of settler modernity that forwards progressive rationality as a means of rationalizing and reconstituting the genocidal project of the New World -- indigeneity is constructed as the constitutive “other” to the unified social desire built around Western progressive rationality

Hardy ’15 -- (Karl Joseph Hardy, 6-10-2015, "UNSETTLING HOPE: SETTLER COLONIALISM AND UTOPIANISM," Queen’s University, https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/handle/1974/13154/Hardy\_Karl\_J\_06095600\_PhD.pdf;jsessionid=4D4185E83446511624E096AB43CCE454?sequence=1, accessed 12-30-2021)//nikki

There is a claim, repeated often in utopian studies discourse, which holds that the past thirty plus years of neoliberal globalization have contributed to a growing sense of pessimism, which accounts for an alleged dystopian turn. That is, the content of what Lyman Tower Sargent terms “social dreaming” is said to have turned nightmarish.14 The potential for utopia is thought to be increasingly unavailable. Instead, it is argued that dissatisfaction with the trajectories of a globalizing society has resulted in the popularity of cautionary, pessimistic expressions of “what ought not be” understood here as dystopia, literally “the bad place.” While recognition of the prevalence of dystopian expressions of warning may appear reasonable and substantially accurate, it must also be recognized that any notion of social dreaming is not monolithic or singular. Utopias, conceived of as social dreaming or expressions of desire for a better way of being, are here understood to be fundamentally social. As such, they are plural, enabled or constrained by context. Moreover, the historical specificities of culture, place, and of existing hierarchical social stratifications each have a substantive impact on who comes to be included, collapsed within, or entirely excluded from the implicit “we” or, alternatively, “they” embedded in each expression of utopia, or dystopia for that matter. It follows that the content and character of utopias are educated, and co-emergent with the location and processes of socialization. Similarly, the ability to realize desires for a better way of being is also educated. And, perhaps more crucially, the selfconfidence of an individual or group of individuals to realize desires for a better way of being is also educated. Given existing social inequalities, elites are clearly positioned to anticipate utopia, to demonstrate willful striving towards the potential concrete realization of their utopian propositions, in contrast to those in subordinate social positions. This notion of the education of desire emerges from the work of Miguel Abensour and Levitas, and may be considered alongside and, in many ways, as drawing upon Ernst Bloch’s related concept of docta spes, or the education of hope. Using the above example of the alleged dystopian turn, it is certainly the case that there are those who do not, in fact, maintain dystopian outlooks on the merits of neoliberal globalization. To the contrary, for some, the contemporary condition may represent the substantial realization of utopia, an “end of history,” which only requires refinement rather than wholesale reconstitution. However, accepting the premise of pervasive dystopianism at the current trajectory of global society, it is also necessary to acknowledge a variety of existing bases for such dystopianism. These may be antithetical to one another, fundamentally troubling the potential for a revitalization of utopianism. Conceived of as social dreaming or expressions of (social) desire for a better way of being, utopias as proposals appear doomed to an inevitable failure. It seems impossible to construct a unified “we,” without stepping outside of history and neglecting the realities of difference. Utopia, or more accurately, eutopia (“the good place”) for some appears to be inescapably dystopian, or, minimally, less-than-eutopia, for others. Recognition of this apparently inexorable condition, however, is the basis of Levitas’ re-conceptualization of utopia as method. Here utopia operates as an educative heuristic, as an enduringly and emphatically dialogical, processual, provisional, and critically-self-reflexive “imaginary reconstitution of society.” Proposals for a better way of being effect an estrangement from the here and now, allowing for a remove that facilitates critical “archaeologies” of the historical present. Simultaneously, the “architectural” construction, the alternative proposal to the here and now, is subject to judgment. Whether described as social dreaming or expressions of desire for a better way of being, the social dimension to utopia as method may facilitate critical understandings of power, of hierarchies of difference, of relationships of domination and oppression: it may constructively educate desire.15 Clearly, scholarly conceptualizations of utopianism as a transhistorical and intercultural meta-category facilitate comparative study. Equally clear is the existence of social dreaming, expressions of desire for a better way of being, or “texts both in the West and outside it that pre-date More’s Utopia that describe a non-existent society identifiably better than the contemporary society.”16 However, I agree with Krishan Kumar’s contention that “utopia proper” ought be differentiated as “the modern utopia that was invented in Europe in the sixteenth century.”17 More’s Utopia, published in 1516, invented the word “utopia,” (often translated as “no place” or “the good place [which is] no place”) and the etymology is itself reflective of a historically- and culturally-bounded conceptualization and expression of desire.18 The notion of a “no place” as a transcendental “good place,” apart from the immanent sphere of existence, reveals a culturally-specific epistemology and ontology. Moreover, Utopia is indeed a profoundly settler colonial text. Put another way, Utopia articulated a narrative—a distinctively utopian narrative—which operated in a variety of ways to rationalize to the genocidal project of the settler colonization of the socalled New World. Following Kumar and others, I also situate utopia as a decidedly modern phenomenon, or, more precisely, as co-constituitive with the creation of early modern narratives, in particular conceptions of a utopian settler modernity. The condition of white supremacist settler colonialism that characterizes what is now understood as Canada and the US was prefigured, in part, by the narrative proposal put forth in More’s Utopia. Furthermore, the utopian traditions of the white settlers of Canada and the US have been, and largely continue to be marked by the naturalization of white settler colonialism within their imaginary reconstitutions of society. The social dreaming of white settlers of Canada and the US has most often implicitly, but at many times explicitly, excluded Indigenous peoples and racialized non-Natives from their proposals for a better way of being. Thus, utopia as a distinct cultural and historical phenomenon has operated to educate the social dreaming of the peoples who have come to live within the white settler colonial societies of Canada and the US. The potential of unsettling utopia, or put another way, centering Indigenous decolonization and ending white supremacy in proposals for a better way of being, requires addressing the contributions that utopia has made to inspire and sustain the naturalized condition of white supremacist settler colonialism in what is now Canada and the United States.

#### The development discourse inherent in the 1AC’s political project is a weapon of epistemic genocide used to dehumanize and antagonize indigenous communities while valorizing expropriation and instrumentalization -- utopianism is the tool through which the settler replaces the native via the construction of stolen lands as a “blank slate” upon which an ideal society can be built.

Hardy ’15 -- (Karl Joseph Hardy, 6-10-2015, "UNSETTLING HOPE: SETTLER COLONIALISM AND UTOPIANISM," Queen’s University, https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/handle/1974/13154/Hardy\_Karl\_J\_06095600\_PhD.pdf;jsessionid=4D4185E83446511624E096AB43CCE454?sequence=1, accessed 12-30-2021)//nikki

This dissertation begins with the first body chapter concerned with contemporary Indigenous critical theory, tracing several key theoretical concepts to establish the critical framework used to intervene in utopian discourses. Primarily I am concerned with demonstrating how Indigenous scholars have endeavored to establish what Robert Warrior (Osage) has termed Indigenous “intellectual sovereignty,” while, importantly, avoiding notions of a romanticized, fossilized authentic Indigeniety. In particular, I draw on Byrd’s work to highlight the potentialities associated with Indigenous studies’ engagement with postcolonial, poststructural and cultural studies, such that Indigenous critical theory is both potentially enriched by and a contributor to critical theories. Following Lina Sunseri, I locate the contemporary assertions of Indigenous nationhood as an affirmation of Indigenous peoplehood apart from the development discourses of modernity, progress, and rationality that were used to dehumanize and disenfranchise. Indigenous communities. I also engage with concepts drawn from Indigenous literary studies, including the work of Grace L. Dillon (Anishinaabe) to locate what she terms “Indigenous Futurisms” and “Indigenous Science Fiction.” It is from this basis in Indigenous critical theory and literary studies that I turn in the second chapter to a close reading of More’s Utopia. Here I develop the notion of utopian settler modernity and trace the pre-figurations of white settler colonialism, including the emergent valourization of labour and instrumental rationalization of landas-resource, as well as the (proto)racialization of human difference as one of the means utilized by More to conceptualize turning Abya Yala into the Modus Novus, the remaking of the New World into a “no place,” a blank slate available for projecting notions of the ideal commonwealth. Ultimately, I argue that Utopia serves as a clear touchstone for colonialist discourses that, in many ways, persist to this day even amongst the most ostensibly radical utopian fiction. I then turn to emergent discussions in utopian studies regarding notions of the “postcolonial utopia” and utopianism from outside the West. I engage with prominent conceptualizations of utopia and utopian theory, including that of educative desire in the work of Miguel Abensour, Ernst Bloch, and Ruth Levitas. Here I am concerned with gaps in utopian studies discourse that has heretofore neglected Indigenous peoples and appears predisposed towards the sort of “add-and-stir” inclusion that Hall’s re-articulation explicitly seeks to avoid. I raise the question of the efficacy of notions of postcolonial utopias to describe Indigenous peoples’ desires for making a better world and, ultimately, raise the issue of the appropriateness of “utopian” language and discourses given their clear relationship with colonialism. In the fourth chapter I survey recent examples of utopian literature created by white settler authors, noting the apparent evidence of desire for indigeneity. I develop the notion of settler ecotopianism to describe the utopian narratives of white settlers that generally involve the instrumental appropriation of Indigenous culture as means of escape from the alienation experienced by the urban industrial white settler society. I engage with a variety of utopian texts ranging from Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward to Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia to the novels of Ursula K. Le Guin, Kim Stanley Robinson, and Starhawk. My central focus in this chapter is the simultaneous desire for an indigenous future combined with the naturalized evasion of decolonial concerns. I then turn to a discussion of contemporary Indigenous sf (speculative fiction) as a means of exploring the re-articulation of utopia in light of the concerns and experiences of Indigenous peoples. I draw on the work of both Byrd and Dillon to demonstrate the emergent scholarship on Indigenous sf as distinct from but also in some ways congruent with the category of “postcolonial.” Ultimately, I argue the decolonial Indigenous Futurisms articulated in the Indigenous sf of Leslie Marmon Silko, Daniel Heath Justice, and others ought be understood as simultaneously proffering an immanent critique of the modern utopian tradition, while utilizing aspects of its conventions to do so. I also discuss how the mixed identities of some authors, including Nalo Hopkinson and Zainab Amadahy provide for a rich basis for transgenre narratives that simultaneously engage Indigenous and postcolonial themes, alongside, for example, ecological and feminist concerns. Ultimately, I argue that today’s social dreaming is increasingly subjected to dynamic, educative, and intersectional critical analyses that evokes Byrd’s notion of “cacophony,” and portends further complexity, humility, and relationality for the human and the other-than-human alike.

#### Conceptualizations of utopia are complicit in the universalizing logics of Western progressivism – resolution demands a perpetually incomplete “pursuit of the ideal” that necessitates the repetitive elimination of indigeneity, the “primitive” and “anti-utopian” other, in service of colonial modernity’s emergence.

Hardy ’15 -- (Karl Joseph Hardy, 6-10-2015, "UNSETTLING HOPE: SETTLER COLONIALISM AND UTOPIANISM," Queen’s University, https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/handle/1974/13154/Hardy\_Karl\_J\_06095600\_PhD.pdf;jsessionid=4D4185E83446511624E096AB43CCE454?sequence=1, accessed 12-30-2021)//nikki

The experience of contact between the European newcomers and Indigenous peoples was broadly diverse and was inflected by the respective metropoles’ own circumstances, especially in relation to their experiences of contact with non-Europeans. Consequently, there were a variety of disparate ways in which the European metropoles conducted their respective colonial endeavors.23 Ultimately, however, where Europeans sought to establish what were conceived of as decidedly modern and utopian colonies in the New World, Indigenous peoples and their land-based spiritual, epistemological, and ontological orientations were, broadly speaking, narratively represented as bygone, primitive, or pre-modern—as indicative of anti-utopia. It follows that such narratives contributed to justifications for attempts at subjugating or eliminating Indigenous peoples via dislocation (forced removal from traditional lands), annihilation (murder), and assimilation (strategies for bringing the Indigenous “up” or “forward” to the level of the European standard or incorporating them as new category of person in the case of the mestizo in Spanish colonies). While the pre-contact narratives of desirable social change of both Europeans and Indigenous peoples are an important consideration—among other things, they may facilitate an understanding of the bases for evolution and change resulting from contact— it is also crucial to recognize the imposition of such supremacist narratives immediately inspired corresponding Indigenous narratives of Indigenous resistances. Furthermore, contact between the Indigenous and the European impacted the self-conceptions of both. From 1492 to the present day, narratives created by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples living in what is now Canada and the US continue to necessarily involve substantial degrees of co-creation and enduring dynamism. To date there are relatively few direct, specific, substantive Indigenous scholarly engagements with discourses of utopia. However, the late historian John Mohawk (Seneca) offers one notable critical treatment in his Utopian Legacies: A History of Conquest and Oppression in the Western World.24 Here Mohawk offers a conceptual distinction between notions of “utopia” and what he refers to as the Western “pursuit of the ideal.”25 Mohawk understands utopianism, as he conceives it, to have existed “since antiquity in most if not all of the world’s cultures,” and to “propose that there has existed, now exists somewhere, or could exist in the future a perfect society, an existence in which all human needs are satisfied, all problems are solved, and everyone’s life is fulfilled.”26 Utopianism, Mohawk maintains, is related but distinguished from what he argues is “the pursuit of the ideal,” a “theme in Western culture” which “articulates all reasonable human beings who have access to an adequate base of information will pursue an identical concept of what is ideal or good.”27 Western utopianism, according to Mohawk, “is dominated by a certainty that an ideal world is possible, that such a world would be in the best interest of all human beings, and its conception and production will inevitably be the product of Western thought.”28 Consequently for Mohawk, Western utopianism historically operated and continues to operate as a self-aggrandizing and humanist ideology based in futureoriented notions of modernity and progress, which, crucially, never fully arrive— therefore providing a basis for its ongoing and continual renewal. In contrast, Mohawk writes of “many ancient societies, [where] utopias were envisioned as located in a distant past when human beings and nature existing harmoniously in blissful unity.”29 Moreover, as a consequence of the oppression imposed by Western utopianism, Mohawk’s brief discussion of the utopianism of Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island is based in notions of an idealized pre-colonial past, one that explicitly rejects notions of transcendental progress: …North American Indians were, with few exceptions, coerced or driven by military force from their ancestral lands. These Indians saw the fowl, fish, and animals of their homelands driven to near extinction; their people decimated by disease; and their land made off limits to them by a relentless invader. For them, utopia would be a place where all things lost would be restored and the material culture of their ancestors could be enjoyed.30 Mohawk’s articulation of this notion of Indigenous utopianism is decidedly a form of “paradise lost” that could be recognized as essentializing insofar as it is interpreted as a call to a “return” to an Indigenous cultural ideal. However, Mohawk later describes traditional Haudenosaunee stories … of the past depicting a time when people were clear about the desires of the spirits who created life on the earth, and found a sense of security and grace in that knowledge. Among the Iroquois myths is a story of human beings becoming forgetful of their obligations for the great good fortune of the gift of life; when this happened, unhappiness, misfortune, and anomie befell them. Therefore, ceremonies of thanksgiving are given by the people to the Creator of Life so they will always remember to be grateful. But, the story continues, someday in the future people will once again become forgetful, the earth itself will grow old, and life will change. Iroquois cosmology is in a sense utopian, but the utopia—the perfect world—is in a shrouded and very ancient past during which the relationship between human beings and the spirits who support life was very strong and cooperative, and even the animals and birds participated along with human beings in the continuous drama of life. As time passed, according to this myth, things changed and continue to change. Even before the European expansion and the end of the fifteenth century and long before the beginning of the Age of Extinction at the end of the seventeenth century, Iroquois storytellers described a perfect age in the distant past and urged the necessity of carrying on traditions to preserve as much of the relationships and knowledge of those times as possible in a present that was becoming ever more distant from that utopia.31 So, while Mohawk states “all societies have had their utopian dreams,” he is explicit in characterizing Western utopianism as progressive, universalizing, implicitly anthropocentric, and continually renewing a sense of modernity. At the same time, he offers a radically different understanding of an Indigenous utopianism that is traditional and embedded within a wider earth-based cosmology. Mohawk approaches these concerns as a historian and so his referencing of notions of “pluralism” as an alternative anti-colonial, quasi-utopian project is understandably brief. While he avoids a more direct and explicit evocation of what he might hold personally as an ideal or utopian vision, he does assert that “[to] the degree a people or nation can be taught to respect the principles of pluralism and tolerance, the prospects of militias committing slaughters and armies participating in wholesale ethnic cleansing are diminished.”32 The growing body of contemporary Indigenous critical theory reflects the development of varied concepts, discourses, and practices that are indicative of the diversity of their respective backgrounds and experiences.33 Therefore, I wish to recognize the dangers of appearing to collapse Indigenous narratives surrounding settler colonialism, Indigenous decolonization, or those otherwise concerned with proposing alternatives to the modern utopian tradition of white settlers. I wish to emphasize that Indigenous critical theories and their narrative proposals cannot be reduced to singular concepts, discourses, or practices that may have the effect of appearing to condense a vital diversity of thought and practice. Moreover, as I discuss below, Indigenous critical theorists and their narrative proposals ought not be reduced to mere alternatives or counters to those of the settler colonial societies they are now situated within. Just as there is danger in reducing the diversity of Indigenous thought to singular concepts, discourses, or practices, there is a similar problematic in a reductive understanding of Indigenous critical theories and narrative proposals as merely defensive or reactive in their inspiration and articulation.

### L––DPT/Deterrence

#### Deterrence theory invests in a theory of human nature that tends towards instability within anarchy, which posits counter-hegemony as criminal and capitulating to humanism

Jurgutis 18 [Jessica E., department of political science and international relations @ McMaster University “Colonial Carcerality and International Relations: Imprisonment, Carceral Space, and Settler Colonial Governance in Canada” <https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/24059/2/Jurgutis_Jessica_E_2018September_PhD.pdf>, 22 nov 2018 ] <Jericho>

The Prison Industrial Complex (PIC) is a global phenomenon. Women worldwide, and especially poor women of colour are the fastest growing prison population and practices of imprisonment are implicated in upholding racialized, sexualized and classed hierarchies of power (Davis, 2003; 2005; 2012; Sudbury, 2005; 2008; Gilmore, 2007). At the same time this has garnered very little attention in a discipline whose founding narratives claim the Prison and Prisoner as their own. The significance of a growing carceral apparatus for questions of safety, well-being and global justice have seen little meaningful engagement in orthodox IR. On one hand, the reality of the PIC—a central formation within the global system—has yet to be engaged from outside a critical political economy tradition. On the other hand, critical IR’s engagement with imprisonment has largely been confined to an emphais on various modes of detention, surveillance and new governance practices, while less work has focused on more mundane practices of incarceration as a feature of colonial relations, and especially settler Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 25 colonial states within empire.12 In this chapter I argue that the prison and prisoner are foundational to, and yet eclipsed by IR, and that the failure for IR to ‘see’ imprisonment has much to do with its inability to see (settler) colonialism. In the Canadian context, this requires taking seriously how Canada’s own history of employing systems of confinement as an everyday tool and strategy of settler colonial governance has largely been taken for granted by IR and the broader discipline of Political Science. Beginning from this starting point my aim is to show how the global political economic and state-making implications of these practices of punishment and carcerality are organized through gendered, racialized, sexualized and classed hierarchies that are reproduced and even transformed through these efforts. This means that I understand the prison and prisoner as categories that are upheld by white supremacy and heteropatriarchy within global capitalism. 13 This chapter will begin by examining the lineage of one of IR’s founding metaphors, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, to consider the work it does to order and discipline IR’s relationship to practices of imprisonment through claims to universalism and rationality, which serve as methods to “resolve” social conflict through the use of force. I trace its deeper intellectual commitments and lineages to modern liberal thought in order to consider the purpose and role of prison and punishment within the settler state, arguing 12 Here I am informed by Tuck and Yang’s (2012) discussion of internal and external colonialism where they argue that neither fully accounts for settler colonial contexts. They state, “Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony” (p. 5). McCoy, Tuck & McKenzie (2017) point out that these are not mutually exclusive, especially as many settler states colonize other lands. 13 As stated in the introduction, this project also begins from the starting point that reproductive work is a terrain of struggle that must be taken seriously as the necessary underpinning of a transnational political economy of carcerality and carceral space. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 26 that the utility of imprisonment rests on its embeddedness within the social contract and methods of coercion and non-consent. In addition to providing insight into the extent to which the prison and prisoner are substantively under theorized in the field, by connecting the prison and prisoner to orthodox international and political theory, I argue that the prison and prisoner are indispensable to an imperial and settler colonial project, because they are integral to the theft of people’s bodies, land, and labour through practices of criminalization. This lends insight into how practices of imprisonment, as well as settler colonialism are substantively under theorized in the field. By examining the political philosophical foundations of imprisonment in social contractarian thought I show that the utility of the prison and prisoner and their corresponding logics resides in their attempt to hide and naturalize the violence required to maintain an international order reliant on the theft of bodies and lands. In doing so I establish connections between land, labour, criminalization and punishment, which links the histories of settler colonialism with the production of carceral space in order to understand the prison and prisoner as central to an imperial and colonial project through how it is required to reorganize relationships between bodies and lands. By establishing the foundations of IR’s ontological investment in prison and punishment as a method of resolving conflict we can more easily access assumptions about whose security, economic interests, well-being and ways of being are to be secured and whose can be criminalized. Finally, this chapter will begin to explore how to make sense of the land-labourpunishment and criminalization nexus within global context. There has been a number of important works that provide postcolonial critiques of the imperial foundations of modern Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 27 political thought. My aim in this chapter is to build on them in order to help to make sense of the relationship between the production of carceral space and settler colonialism. Equally, in the chapters that follow, I provide a more sustained analysis of how these relationships and struggles took shape in what would become Canada. Thus, though tracing these histories in the global context is important, the historical context of a particular place and the land matter a great deal in how contemporary carceral projects can be realized, as well as how methods of criminalization continue to be used as strategies to suppress and quell these longstanding struggles that seek to disrupt their place within empire, and through that attempt to envision and build worlds otherwise. Unpacking and Interrogating the Prisoner’s Dilemma in IR The prison and prisoner have been marked with a conspicuous level of presence and absence in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Game theory, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma in particular, are central tenets of rational choice models in the discipline. The use of game theory became more pronounced in fields outside of economics in the latter decades of the last century and as part of a larger positivist tradition within IR and Political Science. What IR knows as the prisoner’s dilemma has come a long way from the initial intentions and questions of RAND Researchers, Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher (Poundstone 1992, 106). Flood and Dresher hoped to understand why, if cooperation yielded higher payoffs, would rational actors choose selfdefeating strategies? The ‘pair of prisoners’ story was actually added later to provide a Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 28 narrative structure to the model (Marks, 2004).14 Through its widespread deployment in IR it has become more emblematic of a desire to explain and predict the behavior of states as units of analysis and as a method of determining the impact of those outcomes. The way rational choice perspectives have been taken up in IR fails to recognize and grasp the very real presence of the global terrains of imprisonment and a growing carceral apparatus, and demonstratively does not consider them as a worthwhile and serious phenomenon of study. In this sense, there persists a curious level of visibility and invisibility when it comes to understanding the prison and prisoner in IR that intersects theoretical, empirical and methodological terrains. There has not only been a failure in recognition, but a gap in taking seriously its role in informing and reproducing contemporary relations of power in global politics. Presented as a hypothetical test ground for mathematical models and theory building within rational choice perspectives, the prisoner’s dilemma is a formative metaphor in theorizing and producing the international (Marks, 2004).15 The dilemma can be understood as a both a narrative strategy, or metaphor, as well as a model used to organize and predict the actions of rational actors in international politics based on judging and responding to the strategic moves of another in order to achieve maximum payoff. Similar to the other metaphors of game theory, the narrative argues that each rational actor will make decisions that are in their best interest in order to receive the 14 As Marks (2004) explains is not actually required for the ‘dilemma’ to manifest since game theory was never intended to replicate anyone’s lived experience. 15 For an elaborated discussion of the role of metaphors in IR, see Metaphors of Globalization: Mirrors, Magicians, Mutinies (2008). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 29 greatest reward. These approaches have sought to use the prison among other visual imagery as an illustrative scenario to demonstrate the validity and viability of the mathematical models rational choice theories are premised on for the purpose of prediction and explanation. The result is that that assumptions about how prisoners rationally choose their self-interest over collective cooperation for mutual benefit can help to predict the behaviors of states. The narrative says that two prisoners have committed a crime and have been caught, separated, and offered a deal from police that they cannot consult each other on. If one of the prisoners confesses to committing the crime while the other does not, the partner that has confessed will go free while the other that has not will go to jail for ten years. If both prisoners confess both will go to prison for five years, and if each prisoner denies, then both will go to prison for six months. Drawing on this scenario Realists have endeavored to show that in situations where there is instability, or when there is mistrust and information and communication is limited, the actor will logically choose self-interest and reward at the expense of mutual benefit and cooperation, whereas Liberals have been more apt to demonstrate that cooperation is possible and conflict is not the inevitable outcome (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984; Stein, 1990). According to this model, our understanding of states and global structures are reduced to outcomes of conflict (anarchy) and cooperation (order) where states jockey to acquire gains and minimize losses, and where relative strategic success becomes defined in these terms.16 Perhaps the most well-known adoption of this model in IR is **Deterrence Theory**. 16 For a thorough critique of the limits of Game Theory and the Prisoner’s Dilemma see Marks (2004). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 30 Situated within a Realist framework deterrence theory states that in order to avoid the worst-case scenario, it may be in an actor’s best interest to defect even if it produces some consequences that are undesirable. The rationale for this is that, as outlined, these consequences will be better than an alternative scenario in which the other actor defects and we are left with more severe consequences (whether in the form of nuclear fallout or a longer sentence). This strategy is intended to create the conditions to avoid unwanted wars and, in situations of international crises, acting first is considered a strategic move to avoid the worst consequences (Jervis, 1976).17 As Snyder states, “[t]he central characteristic of the game is that, although the parties could enjoy mutual benefits by cooperating, the logic of their situation forces them into conflict and mutual loses” (1970, p. 67). Importantly, in this framework each actor will want to be first to confess even if they will still be punished, since this will still mean less punishment over all.18 What questions does the Prisoner’s Dilemma raise and attempt to resolve for IR? Here it is worth noting that the conditions within which states must act are ones of constraint—a detail that is both crucial for the model to work and exemplified fittingly in the use of the metaphor of the prison. For Liberals, the prisoner’s dilemma narrative implies the possibility of negotiation and cooperation through “collective security” achieved through international agreements and institutions (Snyder, 1971), and shared norms. However, in reality power is not shared equally. This means that although both Realist and Liberal interpretations suggest that their frameworks seek to preserve security 17 For example, as is the case with the security dilemma, arms races and Mutually Assured Destruction (Snyder, 1971; Jervis, 1976). 18 Snyder (1971) explains that within Realist thought this instability is generated from the international system itself, whereas within Liberalism it is generated by uncertainty about opponents’ intentions. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 31 and diminish violence overall, there are a number of assumptions at play that ensure the prison and prisoner cannot be substantively engaged as sites of study in international politics. Both Realists and Liberals ignore that the very presence of the prison and police already assume the use of force as necessary to manage societal conflict. Deterrence theory illustrates this and therefore it should come as no surprise that the idea of the prison would be subject to similar disciplinary conditioning. In a framework that already assumes the use of force and constraint, it is notable that the idea of punishment can become conceived of as a necessary evil or the least violent alternative to minimize and reduce overall harm within a conflict driven and constantly shifting international state system. Here it becomes evident that beyond a narrative or metaphor that becomes applied to the international realm, the prisoner’s dilemma is about producing and sustaining certain logics and practices of IR, which rest on both the material, discursive and knowledge production practices of carcerality. These are the same logics and narratives that eclipse the prison and prisoner as an analytical site in the field. These narratives of conflict or cooperation share a positivist epistemology and a “belief in the universal rationality of economic logic” (Waltz, 1979, as quoted in Ling, 2002, p. 115). Realists like Jervis (1970, p. 73) have aspired “to preserve the international system and the signals that lend it greater predictability” since it is this predictability that they claim will enhance the model’s function overall. For instance, claiming this will be achieved when “the actors value the system, prefer long-run over short-run gains, and have more in common than conflicting interests” (Jervis, 1970, p. 73). This means that the Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 32 system functions better when everyone buys in to or trusts the rules of the game through the punishment and reward system. But as Agathangelou and Ling (2009, p. 15) expose, strong states that set “the rules of the game” that other states must then play by. They go on to say, “[s]hould compliance fail to ensue, or[…] outright violation occur, the Self [i.e. strong states] must discipline the Other” (2009, p. 15). Of course, the Prisoner’s Dilemma was never intended to model human interaction or experiences though it undeniably has implications for how we act, experience and create our worlds. It has come to reproduce assumptions about human nature in constrained conditions as extended and embodied by states in ways that deny the complexity and vast range of human experience within and beyond prison walls (Marks, 2004). Marks aims to rectify this by compiling a more accurate representation of prisoners and their experiences to build a more useful and exemplary metaphor for IR.19 As much as I concur that the metaphor of the prison shapes our actions and our worlds, prison is not simply a metaphor. An understanding of it as such, though certainly opening a valuable vantage point from which to examine prison from a more nuanced, institutional and empirically rigorous standpoint, does a disservice to those for whom it is daily reality and fails to bring us to a more politicized understanding of the global system of incarceration that helps to stitch the fabric of the contemporary neoliberal capitalist world order. That is, the prisoner’s dilemma is not only problematic because of the artificial limits imposed by the payoff structure and the ways this translates to the international 19 His Constructivist commitments lead him to this important argument, but it is also these same commitments that limit the extent of his critique. I am supportive of Marks’ desire to include prisoners’ experiences and to consider what a more sustained analysis of the prison system would yield us in global politics. See for example Der Derian (1998). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 33 (Marks, 2004), but because it takes for granted the full set of power relations that produce the prison itself.20 So despite the desire to shine a spotlight on the work outside the discipline that seriously complicates otherwise simplistic notions of prisons as institutions and the people within them, it fails to help us recognize the substantively material and ideological work that prison and prisoners do for us in global politics, or bring us closer to a more inclusive or transformative vision of justice. Thus, I approach this in a way that does not take the prison as a political-economic institution, set of practices and logics for granted, and which aims to make more explicit its role in sustaining global inequities and hierarchies advanced through colonialism, capitalism, and militarization. Another way of saying this is that the prison and prisoner have been glossed over in IR for many of the same reasons as settler colonialism. One of the implications of taking the Prisoner’s Dilemma seriously as a set of competing, though not substantively different logics, is that we can begin to see their deep and intertwined history with imperial thought. The focus of this dissertation is to examine what is exposed about settler colonialism when the prison and prisoner are made visible and unpacked as a feature of its inner workings. In particular, the specific ways that coercion and the use of force feature in the prisoner’s dilemma, as constituted through claims to universalism and rationality, indicates that the category of the prisoner is also crucial to the formation of racial hierarchies of superiority and inferiority. In doing so this work follows a tradition 20 So, although the use of force has already been assumed, the prison is likened to the international system and intended to illustrate a set of limited conditions that states face in making decisions about how to act within the international structure of states in order to produce the greatest number of rewards. If the state in question acts in ways that promote their self-interest as defined by the rules and norms of the international system they will reap rewards. This means punishment becomes a method to condition behavior towards the rules and norms of the system, as well as the interests of particular states. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 34 of challenging the idea that narratives can continue to be reproduced in mainstream IR literatures as a substitute for analyses of power (Grovogui, 2001). As Grovogui claims, often such “hermeneutics [of race]” depends on understanding “that Africa has served as the counterpoint to the European trajectory in order to provide a justificatory trope for the ontology of international relations, morality, hierarchies, and structures of authority and legitimacy” (p. 426, 427). This can also be said for the Americas and the complimentary, but distinct role that Indigenous peoples were scripted within the civilizational narratives of empire (Beier, 2002). Geeta Chowdhury and Sheila Nair (2002) argue for the interrogation of the power asymmetries and hierarchies that uphold states and their position within a global system, as well as the ways that the imperialist juncture and its related historical processes feature so prominently in these productions. Such an entry point unpacks questions of “the state, sovereignty, order and anarchy” in order to consider how the discipline’s mainstream, is premised on an understanding of power that privileges hierarchy, “rationality,” and a predominantly Eurocentric worldview, thus mystifying the ways in which states and the international system are anchored in social relations. (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002, p. 3). But further, bringing these social relations to light requires moving beyond critical approaches in order to account for the intersectionality of these erasures so as to theorize power in IR (Chowdhry & Nair, 2002). They advocate for the need to interrogate the Eurocentric, white, rationalist, masculine and elite assumptions of mainstream approaches and the coercive definitions of power and conditions of unfreedom they make possible. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 35 Thus, though the state has been interrogated in critical perspective,21 there remain important connections to the material and discursive ordering and operation of power made possible through (in)formal institutional, policy and socio-legal practices and arrangements and their enforcement. The ways the power relations of the prison must be erased in IR also gives us insight into the ways in which colonialism, and especially settler colonialism, must also be continually be eclipsed. Therefore, in this project I hope to provide an intervention that foregrounds an analysis of power and the ways colonial hierarchies work alongside methods and practices of settler colonial law and institutional formation in order to make possible the prison and prisoner as institutions, practices and categories of subjectivity on which settler colonialism and empire relies. When we take imprisonment for granted, we hide a crucial strategy and means by which colonial violence as harm to bodies and lands is made possible. These of course, are not only made possible through the punitive logic at the level of the international, but at the level of state-making. For settler states, the deployment of these logics has profound implications for the terms on which inclusion and exclusion are conceived. In the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it produces a limited and clearly defined set of choices, punishments and payoffs. In this way, although the use of force has already been assumed, the prison is likened to the international system and intended to illustrate a set of limited conditions that states face in making decisions about how to act within the international structure of states in order to produce the greatest number of rewards. If the 21 Chowdhry and Nair (2002) provide a detailed discussion of the gaps in critical IR scholarship in pages 6- 10. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 36 state in question acts in ways that promote their self-interest as defined by the rules and norms of the international system, they will reap rewards. In such a framework, punishment additionally becomes a method to condition behavior towards the rules and norms of the system, as well as a means by which dominant power extends itself over the bodies and lands of others.22 Therefore, the logics which underpin this invisibility take for granted the use of force at the same time that they deny the invasive and transnational methods of governance that were required to make colonialism and settler colonialism possible.23 This is enabled by how the state is taken for granted as a unit of analysis, as others have argued elsewhere.24 However, I want to suggest that when we consider the ways these methods have implicated the prison and prisoner in IR it is possible to gain insight into how the struggle to get colonialism and settler colonialism seen in IR is also compounded by the inability to see the prison and prisoner as well. This means that it becomes difficult to separate practices of imprisonment from colonial and imperial projects historically and on an ongoing basis. Arguably, the prisoner’s dilemma rests on much more longstanding ontological and epistemological commitments in modern liberal thought regarding the centrality of the use of force to good government and governance, as well as the ways these philosophies have often been naturalized and obscured through their application within IR. Despite their differing levels of willingness to engage with questions of power and 22 Marks (2004, 113) has also shown, both prisoners and states have the ability to affect and alter the circumstances or conditions in which conflict or cooperation occur to demonstrate that the international system is not in fact a fixed reality. 23 This is reproduced when, for example, a game theory model is deployed to give an account of the scramble for Africa. 24 See for example, Walker (1997), Campbell (1998). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 37 violence, both Realists and Liberals take the prison as an institution and set of practices for granted: the reality of the prison and prisoner are assumed in the question itself. The implication of this is that practices of imprisonment as well as the prison and prisoner remain invisible and yet absolutely central features and figures in global politics. Marks identifies that, “what matters most in the application of game theory in international relations theory is not the unique imagery inherent in each game’s underlying metaphor but how all the games taken in their entirety convey the same picture about what international relations is about” (2004, p. 35-36, emphasis original). This is true; however, I would like to both broaden and add specificity to this statement by suggesting that the prisoner’s dilemma can be further unpacked by establishing how it is premised on and works alongside other deeply established ontological commitments and erasures in the field. In the following section I read the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a set of logics with deeper roots in modern political thought, and as adding insight into understanding the ways in which abstraction and erasure of the prison and prisoner have become enshrined in IR. By doing so I believe we can gain greater insight into the specific ways prison and prisoners have become both central to and absent in the discipline. Punishment and Criminal Subjectivity in Modern Political Thought Social contract theory rests on the premise that there is agreement to enter into society under certain conditions in exchange for security and protection from the sovereign or government. It is within this agreement that prison and punishment become possible and even desirable, since they are tools that allow the law to be upheld while also Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 38 acting as a deterrent for future violations. But what can be gained by examining the role of punishment, constraint, and coercion within these frameworks? In this section I examine the role of punishment and property in social contractarian thought to highlight that their co-constitution has been under theorized. Paying particular attention to the role of punishment, I show how claims to rationality and universalism continue to structure processes of criminalization along racialized, gendered, sexualized and classed lines. I argue that ways of being in relation to land and labour perceived as deviant become criminalized, which subsequently provides the grounds for coercion and non-consensual inclusion, as well as the means by which the use of force is normalized against particular populations. Examining these relations indicates a more comprehensive lineage of erasure in how the prison and prisoner ensure punishment and criminalization as central strategies of the settler state within empire. Thomas Hobbes’ conception of the “state of nature” works alongside and informs the Prisoner’s Dilemma narrative to establish claims about human nature under anarchy and the behavior of states in an anarchic system. As Marks (2004) identifies, in the same ways Realists establish anarchy as the central problem of IR through the use of Hobbes’ ‘state of nature,’ they also make implicit assumptions about the prison. Namely, that despite an overarching and imposed structure, they are anarchic, violent and primitive— attributes that are easily scripted onto prisoners themselves. Though these assumptions are not widely shared beyond the mainstream of the field, they are difficult to escape and still inform the basis of the most powerful schools of thought within IR alongside other such metaphors (Marks, 2004). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 39 The Hobbesian story of human life in the state of nature as being “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (1981[1651], 186), is well known and not without problems in the way that it has been central in theorizing sovereignty and upholding the order/anarchy divide on which orthodox IR theories have been premised (Walker, 1993; Beier, 2002). For Hobbes, the state of nature is one of perpetual insecurity because under conditions of scarcity human beings will always need to seek their own self-preservation and causing the security dilemma to ensue (Walker, 1993). As Walker claims, Among (proto bourgeois) individuals, Hobbes argues, structural relations of insecurity demand a superior sovereign for an ordered polity to be constituted. Hence, the powerful resolution of the relation between sovereign individuals and sovereign states through a contract that is both freely entered into and yet necessitated by structural conditions. (Walker, 1993, p. 93). This conception of human nature necessitates a sovereign or Leviathan, since peace and order are impossible without. Walker suggests that Hobbes provides a way of negotiating claims of autonomous individuals with a political community since, …[A]ccounts of consent, participation and representation that came to be articulated as a way of holding apart, yet also reconciling, the claims of supposedly autonomous individuals with the claims of obligation to a broader collective, the community of citizens, the people, the nation, the state. (1993, p. 147-148) Beyond the fact that reconciling freedom with sovereign authority under capitalism naturalizes the acceptance of subjugation and asymmetrical relations of power, I want to suggest that Hobbes’ account be understood as one which argues that the social contract must be entered into under conditions of constraint. This is not only because structural conditions naturalize social hierarchy but because consent as described by Hobbes, is actually about coercive “agreement.” John Locke on the other hand, understood life in the state of nature, though Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 40 insecure, to be relatively calm, cooperative and pleasant, so long as everyone followed the rules. Locke argues that though the state of nature is one of equality and liberty, it is not one of license as “no one ought to harm another in their life, health, liberty or possessions” (1980[1690], p. 9). Similarly, to Hobbes, Locke naturalizes his own conceptions of reason, morality, property and punishment through using the state of nature as a rhetorical device that adopts his theorizations about political society. Locke’s conceptions of property have been shown to be of central importance in understanding his theorizations “since the creation of property and its preservation constitute the foundation of the state of nature and civil society respectively” (Arneil, 1996, 60). At the same time, the question of punishment is actually one of the first subjects addressed in Locke’s discussion of the state of nature, where punishment and property are already married. Hobbes’ understanding of punishment follows rather predictably from his ideas of power, authority, order and obedience. Punishment is an action permitted by the sovereign in the event that the law is violated, since the right for security has been surrendered to the sovereign. Likewise, where there is no law, there is no crime: … that the Civil Law ceasing, Crimes cease: for there being no other law remaining, but that of Nature, there is no place for Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accursed onely by his own Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own Intention. Then therefore his Intention is Right, his fact is no Sinne: if otherwise his fact is Sinne; but not Crime. […] That when Sovereign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no Power, there is no protection to be held from the Law; and therefore, everyone may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of the Sovereign Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his own body; for the safety where of all Sovereignty was ordained. But this is to be understood onely of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the Power that protected them: for that was a Crime from the beginning (Hobbes, 1985[1651], p. 337) In other words, there is a hierarchy of violence and crime is only possible when there is a law to violate. Even though in the state of nature the use of force can be used against Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 41 another for self-preservation, the difference is that no one has an obligation to submit. At the same time Hobbes locates the making of sovereignty in the preservation of life in the state of nature. When the law is broken his position is that the state has no obligation to uphold the social contract with criminals since they, as the initial violator of the law (the social contract), become enemies of the state (Brettschneider, 2007). This is consistent with his position that the punishment for many crimes should be the alienation of citizenship.25 Since criminality depends on a “defect in Reasoning” and is “Of the Passions” (Hobbes, 1985[1651], p. 339, 341), unreasonableness is a criterion of criminality and vice versa. Though Hobbes projects that since rational and reasonable men enter into the contract on agreement, this ignores the structural conditions of constraint that make up the state of nature and necessitate the sovereign. Thus, when violators of the law are inevitably accused of unreasonableness and the punishment justified, this is simply an extension of the coercion and violence that is naturalized in the state of nature and foundational to the contract itself. Although Hobbes and Locke come to different conclusions about the conditions and circumstances with which citizens authorize the just use of force in society, I argue that both try to reconcile freedom with conditions of constraint. Hobbes attempts to reconcile freedom and right with supreme and excessive sovereign authority under 25 Brettschneider (2007) also points out that not all social contractarians take such an extreme position. He says, “Whereas Hobbes labels criminals “enemies” outside the social contract, contractualist justification views even the worst offenders as citizens and requires that the coercion they face be reasonably acceptable to them” (2007, p. 181). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 42 capitalism to achieve peace and order, whereas Locke attempts to settle it with a form of collective agreement that claims to be more measured in the use of force, but still rests on the naturalized marriage of property and punishment. Therefore, both Hobbes and Locke argue that the social contract must be coercively entered into in different ways. This means that political community and state formation are about non-consensual relations even on their own terms.26 According to Brettschneider (2007), social contractualism is a not a theory of actual consent, since “[c]ontractualism aspires to be a theory of legitimate coercion” (p. 182). He goes on to argue that, “Never is a state more coercive than when it punishes, [making] punishment a paradigmatic example[…] contractualism hopes to justify.” I however want to suggest that the criteria of assessing the extent to which social contract theory attempts to legitimate coercion may be more effectively perceived by looking to the more insidious forms of its operation and contractualism’s core assumptions. Of course, the moment of punishment lends crucial insight into the operation of power and authority because of the explicitness with which personal, physical, emotional, and psychological boundaries are violated, but this moment is connected, and indeed made possible by the earlier erosion of autonomy and freedom through coercion, constraint and non-consent. Likening the state of nature and the role of punishment for Hobbes and Locke to Realist and Liberal revisions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma suggests that more baggage may 26 Those with the option to enter in to even this coercive agreement included white bourgeois men with an interest in maintaining their security of person and property. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 43 be at play than an understanding of game theory alone makes room for. If the question the prisoner’s dilemma suggests is not if force will be used, but when and how (to what degree), I want to suggest that referring to Hobbes and Locke can give us some indication about the underlying assumptions that are necessary to answer this question. By making the case for the right to punish as foundational to order and good government, the assumption of punishment by force is certainly not exclusive to IR alone, but to Political Science more broadly. In this sense, the concepts of conflict, cooperation and order become illuminated, since punishment resolves any tension, or non-cooperation towards these ends. For Realists and Liberals alike power and cooperation through coercion is the answer that the prisoner’s dilemma provides for IR. This is not simply present when the law has been violated but has a foundational purpose in the formation of political society informed by social contract traditions. Despite the fact that Realists have selectively drawn on Hobbes for theory building purposes, the state of nature metaphor has become established in the field by the theoretical mainstream. Drawing from the work of Peter Hulme and Ludmilla Jordanova, Beier (2002) points out that social contract theorists relied on accounts from European travelogues of the “New World” to formulate the ontological basis of their theories— namely their conceptions of the state of nature.27 Though Locke’s articulation of the state of nature differed from his predecessor, both rested on many of the same racist and Eurocentric ideas (Beier, 2002). If Hobbes has been a staple influence in the discipline’s mainstream theoretical debates, it is not to say other conceptions of the state of nature 27 See for example, Farr (2008). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 44 have not come to bear. Acknowledging Hobbes’ regard among Realists and others alike should be read within a broader context of the discipline’s indebtedness to the foundational assumptions of social contractarian thought and the Westphalean state system, as well as the ways even critical approaches within the field take this foundational colonial and racist violence for granted.28 Locke’s ideas about the state of nature may not have been as readily picked up by IR theorists; however, as others have pointed out, Locke was involved in colonial missions himself and his work has been shown to make arguments that provide much of the intellectual groundwork that formed modern Liberal thought and that would justify colonial conquest in the Americas (Tully, 1993; Arneil, 1996; Hsueh, 2006; Farr, 2008). Locke is also instructive here because, though he shares with Hobbes a propensity in drawing on gendered and racist interpretations of the “New World” and its inhabitants, we can read his argument as a political-economic one explicitly because of the centrality that property takes in his theorizations. In their naturalizing of contractarian theories of property, both Locke and Hobbes’ claims about the state of nature also served to diminish the life ways of the Indigenous peoples of the Americas (Nichols, 2005). In other words, social contract theory provided both the justification for their indigenous removal and the means by which this could be accomplished. In his piece, The Colonialism of Incarceration, Nichols (2014) indirectly follows 28 For example, this has become especially prevalent in the post 9/11 era where, in an attempt to draw attention to the profound violation of civil, political and human rights, a large body of critical scholarship reproduced the notion that extending rights makes it possible for the liberal democratic state to regain its moral and just status. This in effect serves to erase the violence at its foundations and within ongoing practices and institutions. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 45 on this point to argue that it is for this reason that Indigenous claims provide a critique of practices of imprisonment that are based on a different normative foundation than other over-incarcerated racialized populations in the Americas. Despite the accuracy of the statement that critical prison studies has “insufficiently attended to the centrality of colonialism to the origins, scope, scale, and legitimation techniques of carceral power in North America,” he does not develop an analysis of carceral power that takes account for its transnational dimensions and therefore replicates its domestication within the bounds of the state.29 Thus, though he is able to take account for the role of imprisonment in dispossession, through this framework we none the less lose access to a way of understanding relationships between punishment and property as ones that rest beyond territorialized sovereignty. This changes our understanding of carcerality itself. An analysis of property without acknowledging punishment presents a partial image of Locke’s theorizations and what we can infer from them about the way dominant power became secured. For Locke (1980[1690], p. 19), anything that occurs in nature could be possessed by adding one’s labour to it for its improvement: “Whatsoever then he removes out of the state of nature that hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.” As scholars have shown, Locke’s notion of property—specifically the conceptualizations of land and labour that it relies on—have a number of deeply 29 This would in turn alter the distinctions he outlines in his formulation of the critique that Indigenous peoples’ claims provide about carceral power, including whether it can be contained to the notion of critique. Similarly, though Nichols’ (2014) discussion challenging the difference between the logic of war and social pacification is helpful and a discussion to which I hope this project contributes, we miss a chance to explore the role that capitalism plays making a more nuanced theorization of violence and carcerality necessary. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 46 problematic implications for Black and Indigenous peoples (Armitage, 2004). These assumptions include viewing slaves as property (i.e. owned labour that could be used as a tool to accumulate property for the owner), and Indigenous peoples as part of the state of nature (since they were considered as having no government or recognizable way of working and thus owning the land).30 This latter move was particularly useful to Locke and his involvement in colonial settlement in the Carolinas, since it produced both an economic and ethical justification for English colonialism in the Americas, and land theft in particular (Arniel, 1996).31 Locke highlights that land—the earth itself—“is the chief matter of property” and makes clear the superiority of European ways of working the land (i.e. agriculture, cultivation, enclosure) and relating to the land (a hierarchical and asymmetrical relationship in which white men own and control land, labour and all that comes from it) (1980[1690], p. 21, emphasis original). The fact that Indigenous peoples’ lifeways were not understood as meeting this criteria was utilized to provide the intellectual justifications for delegitimizing Indigenous claims to the land where they have resided since time immemorial. Informed by the doctrine of terra nullius, these ideas contributed to the depiction of Indigenous lands vacant and empty, or as Bonny Ibhawoh has put it, “that aboriginal land was in effect no man’s land and that by conquest and “improvement,” European settlers could make legitimate claims to them” (Ibhawoh, 30 Locke makes these claims by both using Amerindians as examples to justify this theory of property and diminish any indigenous claim to land through this framework (Arneil, 1996). 31 Though the emphasis in this project is on the Canadian context, at this moment in history the Carolinas were embedded in the British imperial project. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 47 2013, p. 8; Weaver, 2003).32 Although enclosure has been documented as one of the primary tools of extending colonialism in the Carolinas (Arneil, 2006), this would not be possible without the first move of universalizing settler claims and rationalizing settler possession via terra nullius and hierarchies of value which ascribed European ways of relating to land as superior. 33 Though Locke’s state of nature is less popular among orthodox IR, it is necessary for understanding the economic rationality that is assumed by them. For Locke, the state of nature not only provides the justification for a more responsible or measured version of sovereignty in comparison to Hobbes, but at its center is the necessity of a centralized authority to uphold preconceived moral and political standards for the right to punish and the right to property. It is made clear in his claims about the state of nature that both are crucial in forming the foundations of political society, yet this relationship seems to be sorely under theorized.34 For Hobbes and Locke criminality is a major criteria of assessing reasonableness because, as previously mentioned, those who break the law are understood to do so because they do not possess the capacity to reason.35 It is on these 32 Terra Nullius was a legal doctrine whereby indigenous lands were constructed as unoccupied or ‘empty space’ as a means of facilitating European occupation and theft (Ananya, 1996; Stewart-Harawira, 2005). Whereas terra nullius was used in the case of colonization of North America as justification for land theft, in the scramble for Africa it was used to refer to whether a territory was occupied by other Europeans and ultimately “served the role of international law in prescribing ways to avoid conflict between rival European powers” (Ibhawoh, 2013, 6; Keal, 2002). I will discuss the specificity of terra nullius in the context of Canada in Chapter 3. 33 For example, requiring Amerindians to erect fences around their land and to provide land allotments and boundaries to settlers (Arneil, 1996). 34 It is beyond the scope of this project to fully theorize the relationship between punishment and property in social contractarian thought. My intent is to point out this omission in order to establish some of the intellectual foundations for the presence and absence of prison, punishment and settler colonialism in the discipline of IR. 35 In addition to the power relations previously outlined, the connection that is established in social contractarian thought between criminality and reason also maps on to ableist discourses as well. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 48 grounds that it becomes possible to identify when the use of force is normalized as justifiable, acceptable, rational and measured. In short, when the mundane use of violence by the state is both made invisible and naturalized. The ways in which Liberal conceptions of punishment become secured through Locke’s formulations of political society are telling precisely because they, alongside property, provide justification for criminalization, slavery and Indigenous erasure and land theft in the Americas. If Indigenous life ways were made to be null and void and if the “New World” was a blank space, then there was never any room or purpose for Indigenous peoples and knowledge on the way to progress, according to Locke. Without mixing one’s land and labour in what resembled European agriculture, proof of right would be difficult to establish (Arneil, 1996). Thus, this was part of the political and economic justification for why Indigenous peoples of the Americas were argued not to own the land on which they lived. In light of the under examined connections between the naturalization of punishment alongside property in social contractarian thought, it is instructive to consider how ideas of private property (and the assumptions of land and labour on which they rely) require enclosure, objectification and possession through the control and/or criminalization of undesirable people and deviant ways of life. Locke’s theories about labour are equally important here, since his writings indicate that not all human beings are afforded life in the same ways. Since human beings could become property according to Locke, his theories simultaneously produce an intellectual justification for slavery alongside that of the land theft required for settler colonialism. If criminality is determined based on the acceptability of particular ways of being Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 49 and relating to land and labour, and not only when breaking the law, then the practice of criminalization is connected to law, but not solely grounded in it.36 And given charges of irrationality and inadequacy, we can also see how diffuse the idea of “reasonableness” and “rationality” is. For Hobbes, Locke and other social contract theorists criminality is a major criterion of assessing reasonableness because those who break the law must be without critical faculties to understand that they are challenging authority and “asking” to be punished. It is on these grounds that the use of force is deemed as required since those who are irrational cannot cooperate or respond to dialogue. As such, force becomes justifiable, acceptable, and naturalized. The IR orthodoxy has done very well to draw on the “state of nature” and its corresponding assumptions as described by Hobbes and Locke to make claims about the international state system. Indeed, social contract theories have been central to the development of the modern western state. The depth with which these analogies and their suppositions permeate the discipline is part of why they come to matter when reading the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Examining their role in the intellectual and material constitution of the international can work towards demonstrating how the foundational disciplinary and positivist frameworks of Realism and Liberalism have understood prison and prisoners all along. This reading of the prisoner’s dilemma not only makes this stark empirical absence visible, but also highlights a much longer lineage of utilizing assumptions about the necessity, purpose and centrality of punishment by the privileged in the service of 36 In Chapters 3 and 4 I will discuss the complexities around settler colonial claims to ‘law’ in the Canadian context, especially in light of the erosion of the treaties and longstanding international agreements between Indigenous and European nations as a result of Canada failing to uphold its responsibilities. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 50 universalist claims about the world. The additional context reading Hobbes and Locke provide is to suggest that questions of land and labour, through questions of colonialism and imperialism, are in fact central to how violence, constraint and coercion is constitutive the of the international system, and yet must continually be hidden and erased. Reading Punishment and Criminalization as Features of Settler Colonialism Instead of treating punishment as secondary to other concepts like freedom, right and equality, Andrew Dilts (2012, p. 60) asks what we can learn from Locke’s Second Treatise of Government from the point of view of the centrality of punishment? He points out that it is especially the social contractarian cannon of political philosophy that presumes “the seeming inevitability of punishment” in order to ground and operationalize its conceptions of the social contract and natural rights, since they “have no empirical referent” (Dilts 2012, p. 58-59; McBride, 2007, p. 122). The usefulness of punishment for Liberalism according to McBride lies in the way it serves as an instrument “to establish itself as a political order” (Dilts, 2012, p. 59). The logical purpose of punishment resides in being able to produce criminality in contrast to innocence, and therefore its power lies in its confounding and slippery qualities, so much so that even those who seek to deal with this as a central feature of Locke minimize the tensions it raises or attempt to resolve the contradictions punishment presents (Dilts, 2012). The utility of the question of punishment for Locke is in the ways it comes to embody the inherent instability and unknowability of political life. This excess and instability is displaced onto the criminal in order to make possible the production of stable subjects with the ability to enter into the social contract on the grounds established (Dilts, 2012). In other words, the production of stable subjects is only possible against those who are not: criminals, savages and other degenerates. By making criminals, (Dilts primarily discusses the figure of the thief), to carry the “burden of danger and irrationality” they not only become a physical threat that plagues the state of nature with uncertainty, risk and violence towards one’s property and oneself, but presents an ontological threat as well (Dilts, 2012, p. 61). As figures beyond reason or ability they are unknowable and must be judged through their status with the label and identity of criminal, which simultaneously allows us to know them by their past actions while controlling the uncertainly imposed by the future threat they necessarily must embody. This threat of unknowability and risk of theft and violence, having the potential to spiral out of control in the state of nature, is what necessitates Locke’s foundational claim for the commonwealth, since it is grounded only through making the distinction between the State of Nature and State of War and “the attempt to stabilize the unstable right to punish” (Dilts, 2012, p. 62). In this conceptualization of crime as the use of force and as subjugation the thief is likened to tyrannical power and argued to produce an existential threat to one’s property and oneself simultaneously. 37 Whereas in the state of nature acts of crime may easily veer into a state of war through reciprocal punishment and slavery, within the commonwealth civil society is maintained when a crime has ended since at that moment the use of force has ceased and it becomes possible to categorize the offense and 37 Tyranny is defined as the use of force without right. In this sense, the thief becomes indistinguishable from the murderer and crime is an act of war within the state of nature (Dilts, 2012). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 52 determine proportionality (Dilts, 2012). Society therefore becomes restored in the just use of force in the form of punishment. Slavery is intimately tied to Locke’s logic and rationality of punishment as a liberty of the transgressed, since a transgressor may remain under their master’s power indefinitely.38 The slave, according to Locke, was someone who was “biologically alive” but without the “rights and powers” of humanity (Norris 2005, as referenced in Dilts, 2012). This echoes Rousseau’s own crude articulation: “In taking an equivalent of his life, the victor did not spare it: instead of killing him unprofitably, he killed him usefully” (Rousseau as quoted in Dilts, 2012, p. 67). Indeed, for Locke, the unstable position of punishment and slavery within the State of Nature provide the drive for civil society. Here it is worthwhile to note that it is in this context of having no resolution to justified punishment and slavery that a government must exist to restrain the right to punish criminals and identify aggressors in exchange for protecting one’s life, liberty and property: “[t]his is done by producing the criminal as necessarily beyond reason, as animalistic and dangerous, and constitutively defining the obedient subject as rational, innocent, and, above all, free” (Dilts, 2012, p. 72). Thus, the Lockean project was already about the production of subjects devised to determine who is a rational actor by nature, 38 Dilts argues that, Proportional punishment, on these terms, has no boundaries, and generates the disorder and chaos that characterizes the State of Nature. While the possibility of crime might make the State of Nature unstable and dangerous, the practice of punishment makes it unacceptable. As suggested by Farr, Locke’s argument in favour of slavery follows a “just war” tradition emphasizing action (2008) and in this sense differs from naturalistic accounts (1980). Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 53 but also through the foundational act of punishment.39 This determination marks out the conditions of inclusion for both bodies and land. The rational actor is the only fully human figure in Locke’s framework. The slave and property-owning white man’s innocence is secured at a rate higher than all else in this account and by virtue of criminalizing deviants. Therefore, the work of punishment is that the criminal must not just be managed in light of their actions, but for a way of being (Dilts, 2012). It is exactly this ‘way of being’ that makes space to consider how the identity of the criminal maps on to the other identities that become vilified through claims to rationality which racial, gendered, classed, sexualized and colonial hierarchies have already been established in relation to. These figures are either incapable (i.e. deficient) or uncooperative (i.e. unwilling) to enter into the social contract on the terms set out, and therefore must be coercively included through performing distinct roles that are constructed to legitimate its existence: the slave, the Indian, the criminal, and so on. What this demonstrates is that it is also the substantive difference in the claims to land and labour other ways of being suggest that threatens the legitimacy of the contract. But beyond thinking about this as exclusion from the social contract, criminalization presents the means by which both labour and land, (property in addition to territory), are required through methods of coercion and extraction to make the capitalist settler state possible. Recalling Audra Simpson’s (2017, p. 20) words at the outset of this chapter: 39 This included, “Lunaticks and Ideots,” children, “Innocents,” “Madmen” etc. Criminals are also referred to as “wild Savage Beasts”—as animals, which places them in the state of nature and with others who never leave nature (Locke, 1980[1690], p. 34). On this point, we can begin to contextualize the relationship between criminality, madness and ableism, and how it overlaps with other relations of power through claims to rationality. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 54 “For Native people, this ruse of consent marks the inherent impossibility of that freedom after dispossession, a freedom I argue is actually theft.” Simpson exposes how claims Indigenous people are free through inclusion are impossible and untrue, because of the theft of Indigenous bodies and lands on which the settler state rests. Thus, the social contract is made possible by legalized theft, (and the continued erasure of that theft), both at its founding and in perpetuity—though it can never be acknowledged as such—at the same time that punishment provides the mechanism by which claims that challenge any such reality as legitimacy become criminalized, managed and contained through the explicit use of force. Colonial Carceral Erasures This reading highlights that Realist and Liberal uses of the Prisoner’s Dilemma through claims to universalism and rationality actually serve to make invisible the role and function of the prison and prisoner within IR. Constructivists, like Marks, may be able to question how these institutions and subjectivities produce the international, but they do not offer a way to interrogate the prison and prisoner as providing the material requirements of land and labour that has driven and continues to compel imperial and colonial expansion in the current moment. Critical scholars in IR, though directing attention to imprisonment and carceral space, often do so in a limited way that often reproduces this same erasure of land and/or labour in varying capacities.40 In order to avoid this in this project I strive to take account for the role of the prison and prisoner, 40 I will elaborate on this discussion in Chapter 2. Ph.D. Thesis – J. Jurgutis McMaster University – Political Science 55 and thus a reading of carcerality and criminalization, at an imperial juncture that rests on the widespread theft of bodies and labour through the transatlantic slave trade and external forms of colonization, at the same time that it birthed forms of settler colonialism that require the theft of land that continue today in ways that cannot be captured in an extractive model. Doing so requires a refusal to take the prison and prisoner as a political economic institution, form of subjectivity, set of practices, and logics for granted, and aims instead to make more explicit its role in sustaining global inequities and hierarchies advanced through colonialism, capitalism, and militarization. The ways the power relations of the prison are eclipsed in IR gives us a great deal of insight into how the power relations of settler colonialism are elided as well. The use of force is not only present during the act of punishing the prisoner, as the Prisoner’s Dilemma seems to imply. Here we can recall that the prisoner who does not cooperate or act within the terms set out for them receives the harshest punishment in the form of a ten-year sentence. Social contract theory gives us insight into the ways claims to universalism and rationality undergird cooperation through legitimate coercion, while providing the grounding necessary to disavow the use of force and non-consensual forms of inclusion. These claims also ensure that the making of criminal subjectivity is informed by racialized, gendered, sexualized and classed hierarchies of power. This means that contrary to the story the Prisoner’s dilemma supplies for IR, punishment and the use of force are not exceptional actions introduced periodically or where necessary in order to diminish violence. Rather, violence in the form of the theft of bodies and lands are necessary for the myth of sovereignty, global capitalism, and the making states within the international system itself. Indeed, you cannot steal people’s bodies, labour and land without carcerality. But because the imperial and colonial power relations must necessarily seize bodies and land as property or as targets of elimination, these erasures are in fact (settler) colonial ones which are continually evidenced in the ways carceral institutions are required to manage the relationships between bodies and land.41 Examining the political philosophical foundations of imprisonment in social contractarian thought shows how practices of punishment and criminalization become a method of erasing and “resolving” social conflict within ‘the international,’ as well as settler state contexts. In doing so land, labour, criminalization and punishment are mutually constituted in ways that link the prison and prisoner as central to an imperial and colonial project. By establishing the foundations of IR’s ontological investment in prison and punishment as a method of resolving conflict we can more easily access assumptions about whose security, well-being and life ways are secured through innocence and whose ways of being must be criminalized. We have reason to interrogate the unquestioned status of the prison and prisoner as a central institution and figure in IR, as well as the roles they play in society and in our lives. Indeed, the very presence of the prison, its foundational assumptions, and status as an uncontested and under examined institution in IR can be understood as ones to ensure conditions of the international system continue to be founded on colonial violence and maintained though forceful constraint in the contemporary moment. Settler states continue to rely on the production of criminality and carceral space in order to redefine and reorganize relationships between bodies and lands. These ongoing histories are ones that must be historicized in place in order to fully unpack the lineage of settler state and capitalist expansion in ways that illuminate how carceral logics, imprisonment and the production of carceral space developed as a settler colonial governance strategy on Turtle Island. In the end, the Prisoner’s Dilemma can tell us very little about prison and prisoners as an everyday occurrence in IR. It can tell us little about how and why so many poor and racialized people are killed or in an increasingly privatized and expanding global prison system, or why it is predominately poor and racialized women who are increasingly criminalized or at the very least made to bear the entire burden of work and grief when their loved ones are. Prisoners cannot be conceived as citizens and workers, or even on their own terms and both the land on which prisons are built and the ways in which bodies, labour and resources are organized in order to re-constitute power and accumulate wealth and profit can be linked to ongoing settler colonial projects within political systems that still embody assimilationist, genocidal and master-slave narratives, even if not explicitly. Asking questions of the prison and prisoner in this way is central to moving towards a transnational and decolonial feminist engagement with questions of imprisonment and carceral space, which is the subject I turn to in Chapter 2. There I will draw on feminist interventions in global politics and IR to further theorize the relationship between land, labour and criminalization for the purpose of working towards a reading of imprisonment and carceral space that relies on ongoing colonial violence.

#### DPT LInk

Dunn 08 [Kevin, Professor at Hobart & William Smith Colleges in Geneva, NY., Rethinking the Man Question: Sex, Gender and Violence in International Relations, chapter 2, Page 51-7, ] <Jericho>

Defining ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ The first step in interrogating white male privilege is to illuminate white maleness. This may seem obvious, but most white males do not actively think of themselves in those terms. White males tend to think of themselves as just people. The dominant racial and gender discourses in Western societies tend to powerfully bind whiteness and masculinity to assumed claims of realness (Halberstam 2002: 353). For example, in his work on whiteness, Richard Dyer (1997) begins by examining how white people are imagined within white cultural production. He argues that while other people are raced, white people are self-represented as being just people. ‘This assumption that white people are just people, which is not far off saying that whites are people whereas other colours are something else, is endemic to white culture’ (ibid.: 2). The often unreflective claim to be just a person is an attempt to define the bounds of normality. Such self-representations are both a manifestation of power and an assertion to power. As Dyer notes, ‘there is no more powerful position than that of being “just” human. The claim to power is the claim to speak for the commonality of humanity. Raced people can’t do that – they can only speak for their race’ (ibid.: 2). Often unreflectively, white males simultaneously seek to define what is normal and speak for humanity. Admittedly, this is not a particularly novel insight. Simone de Beauvoir observed in The Second Sex: ‘Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth’ (1952: 161). This obliviousness to gender and, I would argue, race is achieved because white males often assume that whiteness and maleness have little meaning. To refer back to Bourdieu, the social capital white males enjoy given their race and gender is largely invisible. As Harlon Dalton claims, such a disposition is largely ‘the natural consequence of being in the driver’s seat’ (Dalton 1995: 109). But this invisibility does not mean there is a failure to discuss white males as subjects. Most of the time white males speak about nothing else. Because white males frame the conversation in terms of people in general, however, they are everywhere in representation but rarely recognized as such (Dyer 1997: 3). This is a convergence of the simultaneous privileges of race and gender. Whites, in general, and males, in particular, often fail to recognize their own subject positions while seeking to represent all of humanity. At its root, this particular manifestation of white male privilege is about the power to define and lay claim to normality. The normal is the product of discursive practices, and the discourses defining normal in world politics privilege the white male subject position as the human one. Within the academic discipline and practice of IR, one can see a lengthy tradition of North American and western European white males writing about world politics from their own subjective position. Interrogating white male privilege 53 In doing so, they are both drawing from the dominant discourses from which they are privileged and also actively reproducing and entrenching those discourses through their habitus. That is, they are both products of discursive systems and active agents in the maintenance of those systems. To take but one simple example, much of IR theory relies on assumptions about human nature. These assumptions about human nature are manifested in myriad ways: from the myth of the stag hunt to various imagined state-of-nature scenarios. But in virtually all these cases, the actors are expressions of idealized white male subject positions. Introducing race, gender or class into the mythical stag hunt narrative, for example, produces a much more complicated and open story and, as such, a more varied discussion of human nature. Feminist theorists working within the IR discipline have done an excellent job of exposing the privileged yet hidden male subject positions in traditional IR texts. For example, J. Ann Tickner’s engagement with Hans J. Morgenthau’s Six Principles of Political Realism is an excellent study in how one IR theorist wrote from within a specific narrow structural/linguistic frame of masculinity, while claiming to generalize out to all people and humanity. As Tickner pointed out, the list of six principles ‘is a partial description of international politics because it is based on assumptions about human nature that are partial and that privilege masculinity’ (1988: 433). In some ways, the target is too easy, since Realists are so explicit in their claims to objectivity and universalism. There is a lack of self-awareness, since given the assumption that they are just people they can generalize from their own historical experiences and cultural values that are internalized and unquestioned. Thus, Realists like Morgenthau can claim to speak of and for people and humanity while other interpretations are characterized/categorized as being gendered, racialized, cultured and/or classed. This is not an exclusive characteristic of Realism but is representative of most IR theories in general, since Tickner’s tactic could be reproduced in countless white male theorists, from Kant to Keohane, Machiavelli to Marx.3 The normalizing discourses of whiteness and masculinity have enabled definitions and concepts that privileged this narrow segment of the world’s population to become accepted as the norm within IR theory and practice, such as power, the state, civil society, security, and so forth. These concepts are placed at the centre of our intellectual project, which often means that females and non-whites must employ them if they are to be taken as serious IR scholars. Moreover, the meanings and Two 54 normative values attached to these concepts are discursively bound to and typically nurture the needs and interests of the privileged white male subject position and dominant norms of masculinity. While this clearly has important implications for the construction of theory, it also has significant methodological repercussions. That is, white male privilege is not only embedded in our structures of knowledge, it also delineates acceptable systems of inquiry (Ackerly et al. 2006; Cohn 1987). Stephanie Wildman and Adrienne Davis observe, ‘The characteristics and attributes of those who are privileged group members are described as societal norms – as the way things are and as what is normal in society. This normalization of privilege means that members of society are judged, and succeed or fail, measured against the characteristics that are held by the privileged. The privileged characteristic is the norm; those who stand outside are the aberrant or “alternative”’ (1996: 14). This is extremely relevant for IR theory, particularly in its normative manifestations. For that reason, let me offer a few examples. Given the privileging of white male subject positions in the dominant discourses (doxa), the habitus generated by many IR theorists, who are predominantly white males, tend to create a system of dispositions positing their historical experiences and cultural values as the norm for the international community. As such, an idealized image of the Westphalian state serves as the norm. This is clearly articulated in the vast literature on state failure and state capacity. Taking an idealized North American/ western European state as the norm, much ink has been spilled about how and why many non-white experiences with the state are aberrant. Rarely does this literature engage in critical self-reflection, exploring how the assumed norm is the product of subjective experiences, values and imaginations. Thus, we are presented with a towering mass of work on failed or failing African states, for instance, but rarely is the assumed norm troubled or its racial and gender underpinnings exposed (Dunn 2001).4 In its most pronounced manifestations, this body of literature contains dangerous policy prescriptions. Often policies are constructed to make the non-white, non-male other more like us – for their own good. As Peggy McIntosh has observed, ‘whites are taught to think of their lives as morally neutral, normative, average, and ideal; thus, when we work to benefit others, it is seen as work which will allow “them” to be more like “us”’ (2005: 110; see also Eng and Kazanjiian 2002). Of course, it would be a mistake to assume it is always the goal to make others like us. A good deal Interrogating white male privilege 55 of energy has historically gone into the project of constructing and violently policing the boundaries between us and the deviants who challenge accepted understandings and practices of whiteness and masculinity. For example, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the racist and sexist discourses operating in western Europe engendered acts of colonial conquest and domination (McClintock 1995; Lindqvist 1992). Today, in its liberal humanitarian articulation, constructions of alterity have contributed to violent interventionist wars in Iraq and the Balkans. Informing these policies is a manifestation of white male privilege: white North American and western European male IR scholars and practitioners claiming to speak for all humanity because they believe their race- and gender-informed experiences and values are the norm. One can see this pattern repeated throughout mainstream IR theory. Democratic Peace Theory is firmly constructed on an artifice produced by race-, gender- and class-informed subject positions. As Ido Oren (2002) argues in Our Enemies and US, American political science in general, and the scholars advancing the idea of democratic peace in particular, are informed by the dominant discourses in which their own subject positions are privileged; in the case of Democratic Peace Theory, this has resulted in a fluid and historically contingent understanding of democracy shaped by America’s experience and its historical rivalries. The gap in Oren’s otherwise damning critique is his failure to adequately expose the racial and gender components so clearly present in the political science scholarship he investigates. The development sub-field of IR is also representative of how scholars operate under the assumption that their subject position is the norm and that they can speak for all humanity. One can see this within the modernization school, with its explicit attempts to make the non-white world more like the white one. But it is equally true for the neoliberal approaches to development, with their subjective agendas obscured behind claims of universalism. While neoliberalism is in principle gender and race neutral, R. W. Connell notes there has been a ‘sharp remasculinization [and racialization] of political rhetoric and a turn to the use of force as a primary instrument in policy’ (2005: 1815–16). Neoliberalism functions as a form of masculinity politics, and ‘[m]any mainstream policies (e.g., in economic and security affairs) are substantially about men without acknowledging this fact’ (ibid.: 1816). What is at play here is not merely the ability of white males to define the parameters of normality, but also the inability of white male IR theorists to deal with the problems that arise in the way they construct difference. Two 56 Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney eloquently explore what they see as Western culture’s ongoing inability to deal with cultural difference in their International Relations and the Problem of Difference (2004). Drawing on the work of Tzvetan Todorov (1984), Inayatullah and Blaney claim that, since the discovery of the Americas, Western culture has engaged the other through a double movement: ‘difference becomes inferiority, and the possibility of a common humanity requires assimilation’ (2004: 10). In the first move, difference is regarded as the complete absence of commonality, which opens up the possibility of conquest, enslavement and eradication. The second move recognizes commonality, but only as a precursor to assimilation. The possibility of recognizing the other as both the same and different has yet to be realized. Inayatullah and Blaney chart this inability to deal with cultural difference through the foundational texts of IR to the neo-modernization approaches of contemporary IR, most notably in the literatures on liberal peace theory, global civil society and pluralistic global community (ibid.: 1116–21). The protagonist in Inayatullah and Blaney’s narrative is Western IR, but I would suggest the that fact that all the theorists they cite are white males is not immaterial.5 While I wholeheartedly agree with their critique, I would suggest that putting a finer point on Western IR’s inability to deal with cultural difference is both a manifestation of white male privilege and a mechanism for obscuring and maintaining that privilege. Inayatullah and Blaney’s discussion of the problem of difference and the double movement of conquest/assimilation brings to mind Herman Melville’s classic novella Benito Cereno. The protagonist is an American male captain who stumbles on to a ship that, initially unbeknownst to the American, has been taken over by the slaves it was transporting for trade. The story unfolds as the captain gradually sees the blacks he initially sees as docile and inferior childlike creatures who inspire both his pity and a desire to uplift become, in his eyes, bloodthirsty murderers and crazed killers. As Toni Morrison (1997) has pointed out, it is precisely this transformation of slaves from simple, friendly and childlike creatures deserving our help and sympathy into irrational violent monsters which displays the full spectrum of the racist gaze. The first impulse is one of assimilation (like contemporary neo-modernization IR theories), while the second is one of conquest and eradication, like traditional colonially informed understandings of power politics. Both positions deny the possibility of strategic, rational, calculated and intelligent action by those believed to be different from us. Melville’s narrator Interrogating white male privilege 57 is blind to his racism because it flows from his habitus, just as with most scholars. Like Melville’s narrator, white male scholars fail to see that the structures of power, in terms of both the structuring structures and the structuration of practices highlighted by Bourdieu, leave them in a position of privilege, from which they define what is normal and judge others who fail to meet that norm.

### L––Water

#### The affirmative is a hydrocolonial project that projects desires of dominance onto water.

Hofmeyr 17[Isabel Hofmeyr is a Ph.D, 1992, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, “ACLA FORUM: OCEANIC ROUTES Oceanic Routes: (Post-it) Notes on Hydro-Colonialism,” Comparative Literature, <https://doi.org/10.1215/00104124-3794549>]

Another register in which to cast these themes, and indeed to think across them, is the neologism “hydro-colonial.” The possible meanings of the term could include (1) colonization by means of water (various forms of maritime imperialism); (2) colonization of water (occupation of land with water resources, the declaration of territorial waters, the militarization and geopoliticization of oceans); and (3) a colony on water (the ship as a miniature colony or a penal island).6 If modulated to “hydro-imperialism,” the neologism could point to the relation of the naming and labeling of oceans to maritime empires. In all of these usages, the preix hydro points to a material (or hydro-material) turn in recent Oceanic Studies that grapples with the seaness of the sea. The suixes — whether colonial or imperialism — signal an ainity with postcolonialism so crucial to the Southern regions we engage, while both terms in their entirety declare an intention to shift the intellectual center of gravity away from a purely land-focused one. The provocations collected in this forum straddle these “oceanic” and “routes” themes while exploring hydro-colonial poetics. The paper by Ashley Cohen takes an eighteenth-century transoceanic perspective that sutures the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, two arenas normally kept apart (the irst versus the second British empire; the plantation economy versus trade and commerce; the realm of “race” versus that of “caste”; Christian versus Muslim; West versus East). Instead, as she shows, these theaters were imagined as a continuous imperial sphere of the Global Indies: “everything east of Europe . . . the East Indies and everything west of Africa . . . the West Indies.” This worldview, “in which India and the Americas are consistently thought together,” produced literary igures, itineraries, and tropes that are unrecognizable today: slaves who could be both African and Indian, the “black poor” made up of both Asian lascars and destitute Africans in London. Cohen demonstrates the new alignments that come into view by factoring in oceans and oceanic regions, showing how tracing the routes immanent in literary texts and cultural artifacts can lead us to uncover historical “meta-geographies” that both structure conceptions of the world and help bring these worlds into being. Meg Samuelson begins a move from routes towards the ocean itself, arguing for littoral literature, coastal form, and an amphibian aesthetic. Her focus is on two writers concerned with the South-East African Indian Ocean coast: Mia Couto from Mozambique and Abdulrazak Gurnah, a British-Zanzibari writer. Both writers develop a hydro-poetics of the coast that unsettles the binaries of colonial and postcolonial rule. They do this by relecting thematically and formally a shifting “ecotone” of a shore — depicting it not as simply a meeting point of sea and land but as a site for an eddying of cultures and a complex more-than-human environment in its own right. The view from the littoral, Samuelson proposes, “levers open continental categories” and ofers new models for world literature. Pushing against an entrenched colonial mapping of the oceans and its cultural legacies in supposedly postcolonial times, and bringing us into the ocean through the languages and epistemologies of island peoples living there, Alice Te Punga Somerville takes a radical Oceania perspective to raise far-reaching questions about what we and others have described as an originally Atlantic Studies-based oceanic turn in literary scholarship, as well as the nature of Oceanic Studies in general. Our existing oceanic labels (in this case “the Paciic”) are imperially imposed, turning vast bodies of waters into blank and abstract spaces, a mode of imperial cartography that promotes the association of “land with presence, water with absence.” From the perspective of Oceania’s deep Indigenous presence, she suggests that there is no need for a “‘turn to the sea’ . . . because we were already there.” Hydro-poetically, this long-standing Indigenous engagement with the sea produces a series of forms and sensibilities that Te Punga Somerville tracks, arguing that engagement with this (here, largely Māori) writing is crucial to a “decolonial” Oceanic Studies.

### L––Oceans

#### The militarization of the ocean is emblematic of a broader project of globalization and erasure of indigenous bodies.

St. John 22[D.E. St. John ur Toxic Transpacific: Hydro-Colonialism, Nuclearization, and Radioactive Identities in Post-Fukushima Literature. American Studies, https://journals.ku.edu/amsj/article/view/16383]

In thus engaging material ecocritical, transpacific, and decolonial scholarship, this essay employs a reading practice indebted to Isabel Hofmeyr’s (2019) “hydro-colonial” neologism.3 In pursuit of new routes in oceanic studies, hydro-colonialism refers to the ongoing occupation, instrumentalization, and resource extraction of the seas, waters, and oceans by national or corporate powers. This hegemonic striation of the ocean takes the form of military bases, fishing conglomerates, penal colonies, aircraft carriers, plastic landmasses, and nuclear power plants. In reading hydro-colonialism in works of literature, I hope to contribute to the recent “oceanic turn” toward a “tidalectic consciousness”—a concept coined by Caribbean poet Kamau Brathwaite and mobilized by Elizabeth DeLoughrey to explore “the complex and shifting entanglement between sea and land, diaspora and indigeneity, routes and roots” (2007, 2). Hydro-colonial critique builds upon postcolonial and material ecocriticism while shifting focus away from terra-centric and historicist models of colonialism. This pivot creates space for the materiality of the sea to emerge as an agential force while simultaneously buoying postcolonial and Indigenous perspectives to the surface. Read in this light, 3/11 literature takes on a global significance. In addition to lamenting the staggering loss of life, the novels and poems produced postFukushima view the nuclearization of the Pacific as a continuation of Japanese and American colonization. These texts show how governmental oversight and failure to proactively respond to climate change–related disaster resulted in environmental injustice—where the fallout of 3/11 had specific consequences for poor Japanese and Japanese women, whose bodies have been metaphorically and literally altered. This essay navigates these hydro-colonial channels while placing them within the broader backdrops of material ecocriticism and globalization studies.4 I begin by forging connections between hydro-colonial nuclearization and global racial capitalism as depicted in Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being (2013), which has emerged as the preeminent “American” novel in response to 3/11.5 For Ozeki, both racist and deracializing aspects of hydrocolonialism are mitigated through entanglements with nonhuman animals and objects. I establish this theoretical groundwork before examining poems from Roripaugh’s 2019 collection Tsunami vs. The Fukushima 50, demonstrating how imagery of irradiation and toxicity present a posthuman response to the 3/11 disaster, global hydro-colonialism, and the ongoing climate crisis. Colonial Catfish: Folkloric Rectifications to Hydro-Colonialism in Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being begins when Ruth, a novelist living on the coast of British Columbia, discovers a Japanese lunch box washed ashore, carried across the Pacific by the drift of oceanic gyres. Inside the box rests the diary of Naoko Yasutani, a Japanese schoolgirl living in Tokyo. Ozeki’s narrative leaps between these dual protagonists, crossing expanses of space and time in the process.6 As Ruth reads the journal, more of Nao’s story is revealed: how she set out to write the life story of her great-grandmother Jiko, a Buddhist nun, but was distracted by rampant bullying at school and her father’s depression and suicidal ideation. Meanwhile, the act of reading Nao’s journal raises questions for Ruth about the nature of writing, memory, and time. These dual narratives take place before and after the Tohoku earthquake with the disaster serving as a nondiegetic event that occurs outside the time of the novel, yet the disaster haunts the lives of both Ruth and Nao. For Ruth, the act of reading Nao’s diary is an act of recovery, in which she is able to bring both narratives to a satisfying resolution even as the aftermath of the 3/11 disaster is ongoing with some bodies never discovered and the long-term effects of the fallout remaining to be seen. Recent years have seen a number of analyses of the novel through the critical lenses of Asian American literature, Pacific Rim scholarship, and transpacific discourse. In Ocean Passages, Erin Suzuki describes how “transpacific” has become shorthand for studies of Asian and Asian American diaspora while the broad geographical swath cut by Pacific Rim studies can enact the same homogenizing of Indigenous persons and those from smaller Pacific islands of which the term “Asian American” itself is emblematic. Suzuki praises Ozeki for rendering the Pacific Ocean as a site of “submerged and belated histories that have been ignored or occluded by the capital-driven structures of contemporary transpacific politics, economy and policy” (2021, 1). This reading coalesces with Michelle Huang’s (2017), which focuses on Ozeki’s depiction of the 80,000 tons of floating plastic called the Great Pacific garbage patch, which lies at the center of the very gyres that prompt the transpacific journey of Nao’s diary.7 In imbricating environmental devastation, cultural erasure, a disproportionate impact upon raced bodies, and capitalist extraction, these existing readings of A Tale for the Time Being underscore the human and material costs of globalization. However, they do not explicitly address 3/11 or the symbolism of irradiation as a hydrocolonial by-product.8

## ALTS

#### Thus we endorse diversality – an orientation that recognizes the hybridity of alternative epistemologies that focuses on building mutual connections to build new forms of international relations centered around recognition and not dominance

**Taylor 12** (Decolonizing International Relations: Perspectives from Latin America, Lucy Taylor, International Studies Review, September 2012, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 386-400 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23280307>) // JLHS AA

So far, I have focused on politicizing binaries and exposing the colonial wound. This is an important step but it imagines the debate to take place in terms of the colonizer and colonized; **what is missing is an appreciation of mixed-ness or mestizaje, a social fact which is integral to theorizing the coloniality of power in the Americas**. **Here, we return to the colonial difference but emphasize the lived experiences of ‘‘transculturation’’ and ‘‘border thinking.’’** Particularly in Latin America, the colonial wound has generated significant indigenous organizations right across the region, which assert their dignity and political capacity (Maldonado-Torres 2007; Quijano 2008). In doing so, they reveal the existence of the ‘‘colonial difference,’’ marking it as a space of political contestation, but this disjucture is not experienced in the same way by the colonizer and the colonized. While the colonizer, installed in a dominant position, views it as a gap of miscomprehension and disdain, which ‘‘he’’ is not obliged to cross, the colonized must operate in a world dominated by Occidental institutions, languages, and rationales (Mignolo 2000: 64–84). **The colonized must incessantly negotiate the colonial difference and reconcile the demands of a colonized reality with cultural meanings embedded in an indigenous worldview.** Politicizing this mestizaje is key to decolonial politics, and Gloria Anzaldu´a’s notion of ‘‘border thinking,’’ a Latin American response to hybridity, offers significant insights (Mignolo 2000: 49–90; Anzaldu´a 2007). Anzaldu´a’s vision of hybridity is rooted not in the intricacies of intellectual debate or psychoanalysis but draws on her real-life experiences of living between the labels which attach to the binaries so essential to Occidental thinking. Anzaldu´a grew up and lived on the US–Mexico border: she was a Chicana feminist daughter of share-croppers, a Marxist indı´gena mestiza and seventh generation lesbian citizen of the United States (Keating 2009: 1–15). Living at the intersection of so many boundaries (geographical, sexual, political, linguistic, racial) did not leave her feeling incomplete or dismembered, though; her response was to say: ‘‘They would chop me up into little fragments and tag each piece with a label. You say my name is ambivalence?... Who me, confused? Ambivalent? Not so. Only your labels split me’’ (Anzaldu´a 1984; quoted in Keating 2009: 17). By asserting her completeness, she demonstrates the fallacy of the labels. Anzaldu´a borrowed a Nahuatl word to express the space that she inhabited between these tagged categories: nepantla or (roughly) the place at the broken edges. She explained the technique of border thinking in one poem: ‘‘Because I, a mestiza, continually walk out of one culture, and into another, because I am in all cultures at the same time, alma entre dos mundos, tres, cuatro,...’’ (Anzaldu´a 2007: 99) This vision of human agency derived from inhabiting border lands serves to disempower the idea of the border as a stopping point controlled by the state. That the state which she traversed in real life was the US–Mexico border only heightens the powerfulness of her critique and the subversive potential of her work for both IR and the Americas. Equally important, though, is the concept of transculturation, which indicates that processes of hybridity have not only shaped the lives of subaltern groups, but have also conditioned Whiteness and the Western epistemological project in (Latin) American society (Pratt 2008). The concept of transculturation was devised by Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortı´z in 1940 to understand how Cuban society was constituted. He focused on the relationship between slaves and slave owners, understanding that both had shifted from their native soil and that each was intimately influenced by the cultural heritage of the other and the experience of colonialism: ‘‘Each immigrant was uprooted from his native land in a double movement of adjustment and readjustment, of deculturation or exculturation and of acculturation or inculturation, and ultimately transculturation’’ (Ortı´z 1940: 255, italics in original, my translation). He was clear that this relationship of mutual influence was not equal or power-free––how could it be––but asserted that both the African and the European communities were full cultural agents, even though they were locked into a brutal and exploitative relationship (Millington 2007). By imagining cultural exchange to be a two-way street (albeit on a steep hill), Ortı´z highlights hybridity as a social experience of both the subaltern and the dominant. He urges us to consider transculturation as part and parcel of society-making, nation-building projects, and look beyond domination and appropriation to ask how Native American thinking, experiences, and practices have molded ‘‘the USA’’ as a global actor. **Following this thinking, resistance to the coloniality of power therefore involves not only fighting against the colonizing logic, but also seeking to shake that logic from within by revealing the hybridity and diversity within what seems to be a unified and settled settler society.** Border thinking, then, might elicit insights not only at the ‘‘periphery’’ or border but also at the ‘‘core’’ of global power, if we are willing to destabilize its foundations. A useful strategy which might help to unsettle ‘‘core’’ thinking has been proposed by Martinican Edouard Glissant in his Poetics of Relation (1997). He sets out an intellectual politics of diversality (rather than universality) inspired by Caribbean Creole consciousness**. Diversality takes the idea of transculturation a step further by theorizing cultural interchange as not only a social fact but also a political strategy**. Diversality assumes the existence of profound difference, but Glissant argues that ‘‘thought of the Other is sterile without the other of Thought’’ (1997: 154); that is, **merely accepting that differences exist is not enough to generate deep change in our thinking. Rather, he calls for an ‘‘aesthetics of turbulence,’’ which breaks assumptions and allows one’s thoughts to be ‘‘prised open’’ in order to develop new imaginaries and fresh linkages between peoples**. The ‘‘other of Thought’’ is thus created by confluences in which ‘‘each is changed by and changes the other’’ (1997: 154–5). **Diversality involves not only being prepared to recognize difference on an equal footing but also a willingness to open one’s thoughts to ‘‘turbulence’’ which will destroy assumptions and rebuild hybrid modes of thinking in its wake.** The Americas occupies a privileged role in this theorizing because, as Anzaldu´a, Ortı´z, and Glissant assert, social (and sexual) mixing is not a ‘‘new’’ process but rather it is deeply embedded in the Americas––in 500 years of colonial encounter and its resulting hybrid identities. **A ‘‘mestizo Americas’’ approach could therefore play a crucial role in developing decolonial political struggle, not only by denouncing the injustice of colonialism but by prising open, shifting, and hybridizing conventional ways of understanding international relationships––and International Relations.** The issue of how this might occur requires more time and space to explore, but I begin a discussion here by identifying three questions that a decolonial politics might ask of IR. 1. What other ways are there to understand the world? (And how might this influence our thinking about the international?) This question invites IR to acknowledge diversality. It assumes the completeness, complexity, and sophistication of non-western ontologies and epistemologies in a move which should be humbling**. It opens up our minds to new ways of imagining human existence;** to imagine time as being circular (King 1993), **or that land does not belong to people but people to the land** (Silko 2006), or that boundaries are delineated by walking ⁄ presence (Larsen 2006), or that the world is configured not through dualities but threes (Kusch 2010), or that colonialism is an illness (Momaday 1989; Burman 2009). This work has already started; Marshall Beier’s incisive critique of conventional IR conveys the immensities of the colonial difference in his discussion of Lakota life-ways which he contrasts to the ‘‘hegemonologue’’ of mainstream IR (2005**). These differences might influence understandings of the international, not so much by adding new ideas but by destabilizing our mode of thinking––our aesthetics of thought,** as Glissant might suggest. Encountering fundamental disjunctures of human experience should convey a sensation of difference experienced as a visceral confusion and disorientation. **A decolonial IR project must, then, be prepared to approach non-occidental worldviews with a mind that is willing to be made uncomfortable, that is ready not to comprehend, and that is prepared to feel out of control**. This is not just an exercise in submission though, because we can use the sensation of disorientation to heighten our awareness of the Occidental project and the contemporary coloniality of power. It helps us to map out the narrow limits of the Western imaginary and to perceive its contours, its regime of knowledge, and worldview more profoundly**. An awareness of diversality shows the limits and fallacies of universal thinking, and by unsettling our certainties, it generates space for new thought**. 2. What does IR not know? (And what has this got to do with the coloniality of power?) This question highlights the hidden side of knowledge––ignorance. It suggests that the chasm of colonial difference is far too deep and wide to be bridged, which means that **single-vision understandings of world history or IR cannot possibly comprehend the experiences and worldviews of ‘‘others’’**. Glissant reflects on the academic project and concludes that ‘‘no matter how many studies and references we accumulate, we will never reach the end...; knowing this in advances makes it possible for us to dwell there. Not knowing this totality [of experiences] is not a weakness. Not wanting to know it certainly is’’ (1997: 154). Perhaps counter-intuitively, then, this ignorance brings a number of intellectual benefits. Firstly, being aware of profound difference might act as a brake on drawing easy parallels without listening and thinking very hard first, promoting critical and complex thinking. Secondly, gaining a sense of just how different difference can be helps us to perceive the realm of possibilities because it is an orientation point in a vast galaxy of difference. However, the purpose of identifying deep difference is not to label or pin down with words ideas which are outside the realm of European imagination. Rather, it is to accept that the chasm cannot be closed––that such ideas are simply untranslatable into European languages and regimes of knowledge (Mignolo and Schiwy 2003). That is, a decolonial IR must accept its ignorance and learn what it can about the world not only by studying what is knowable but also by reflecting on what is beyond comprehension. The caveat reminds us, though, that this realm of thinking about the international takes place not on a level playing field of competing worldviews but on a pitch riven with geohierarchies conditioned by the coloniality of power. **A decolonial IR project must foreground the colonial nature of this difference to expose the injustices that conventional approaches enact in the name of universalism**. 3. How might conventional IR be ‘‘prised open’’ by difference? (And how is this linked to the USA?) This question asks what would happen if IR were to move beyond simply acknowledging diversality to generate an aesthetics of thinking Other-wise (Glissant 1997). This involves recognizing that the chasm of colonial difference is far from absolute, indeed that it is spanned, everyday and often, through processes of mestizaje. Thus, difference should be viewed as a border zone which acts as a space where new ideas and cosmologies might be imagined, emerging from transcultural meetings. One key way in which conventional IR might be opened up by difference is by refocusing attention on ordinary people’s experience of the international, as Te´treault and Lipschutz propose. **This takes on a decolonizing role if the coloniality of power is highlighted, a move which not only creates awareness of difference but promotes border thinking––thinking inbetween categories and based on everyday lived experiences of negotiating coloniality ⁄ modernity**. Such strategies complement attempts by Inayatullah and Blaney and many more to destabilize IR’s traditional building blocks such as nation-states, sovereignty, and the binary of war⁄peace**. The USA as global actor, as Western beacon, and as home of the discipline is intimately entangled with IR**. **This is why border thinking at the binaried intersection of the Americas is particularly acute in its capacity to destabilize conventional thinking because it is a geographical metaphor for many of the boundaries which set out global hierarchies and help to structure IR**. Not least of these is the First World ⁄Third World binary embodied at the US–Mexico border and its attendants, Whiteness⁄Blackness, and civilization⁄ barbarism. Shifting from thinking about the border itself to embrace border thinking invites us to step beyond the fence and its checkpoints to consider the USA as a profoundly hybrid place. **We move beyond US hybridity as immigrant melting pot, to focus on mestizaje––a complex amalgam of settler, Native and African slave descendants whose relationships are vividly marked by the coloniality of power and the logics of modernity**. A decolonial IR writing from a ‘‘prised open’’ USA not only looks for radical, destabilizing difference, such as Native American thinking but also recognizes hybridized connections which generate openings for dialogues. We should not assume that the USA, like the Cuban slave masters described by Ortı´z, is not profoundly conditioned by the colonial encounter. However, such interactions do not occur in a power-free zone. For this reason, **a decolonial analysis of hybridity in the international must vigilantly foreground the presence of inequality, injustice, and the potential for violence in cultural interchanges conditioned by the coloniality of power**. Border thinking in this broad sense, inclusive of IR perspectives, offers a realm of imagination, connection and intellectual opportunity from which to rethink and challenge dominant economic, racial and epistemological modes. The role of mainstream IR in such re-imaginings of intergroup relationships is crucial, not least because, as critical scholars like those cited in this article attest, conventional IR is a central mainstay of the unequal global order.

#### The alternative is incommensurability – decolonization is a project that requires the repatriation of indigenous lands, the abolition of slavery and property, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. \*Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

**Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements.** **These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts.** **We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects.** There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. **We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable.** Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations **The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications.** This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. **For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars**: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition **The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state.** As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). **Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land.** For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). **Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies).** Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991). Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. **Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers.** Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. **There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved.** **Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe.** Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. **“Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’.** The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. **The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.** It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

#### Indigenous struggle can use technology to create international movements against settler society

**Cleaver 98** (The Zapatista Effect: The Internet and the rise of an alternative political fabric, Harry M. Cleaver, Journal of International Affairs Vol. 51, No. 2, Technology and International Policy: Essays on the Information Age (Spring 1998), pp. 621-640 (20 pages), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357524>) // JLHS AA

The role of the Internet in the international circulation of information on the indigenous rebellion in Chiapas developed quickly and has continued to evolve. Early on, the Internet provided a means for the rapid dissemination of information and organization through preexisting circuits, such as those which had been created as part of the struggle to block the NAFTA, or those concerned with Latin American and indigenous issues. **These networks existed** primarily **at an international level**, mostly in computer-rich North American and Western European countries. News reports on radio and television were complemented by first-hand reports in cyberspace from a record number of observers who flooded into Chiapas with hitherto unseen alacrity, as well as from more analytical commentators who could voice their opinions and enter into debates more quickly and easily in cyberspace. These few circuits were rapidly complemented by the creation of specialized lists, conferences and web pages devoted specifically to Chiapas and the struggle for democracy in Mexico. The breadth of participation in these discussions and the posting of multiple sources of information has made possible an unprecedented degree of verification in the history of the media. Questionable information can be quickly checked and counterinformation posted with a speed unknown in either print, radio or television. Instead of days or weeks, the norm for posting objections or corrections is minutes or hours. It is important to note that the EZLN has played no direct role in the proliferation of the use of the Internet. Rather, these efforts were initiated by others to weave a network of support for the Zapatista movement. Although there is a myth that Zapatista spokesman Subcommandante Marcos sits in the jungle uploading EZLN communiques from his laptop, the reality is that the EZLN and its communities have had a mediated relationship to the Internet. The Zapatista communities are indigenous, poor and often cut-oft not only from computer communications but also from the necessary electricity and telephone systems. Under these conditions, EZLN materials were initially prepared as written communiques for the mass media and were handed to reporters or to friends to give to reporters. Such material then had to be typed or scanned into electronic format for distribution on the Internet. Today, there are dozens of web pages with detailed information on the situation in Chiapas specifically and the state of democracy in Mexico more generally Several widely used news and discussion lists devoted to the daily circulation of information and its assessment are available. These various interventions operate from many countries and in many languages, and they are all the result of work by those sympathetic to the rights of indigenous peoples and to the plight of the Zapatistas. Some of these efforts were launched in Mexico. For example, the "chiapas-l" list is run through computers at the Universidad Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) in Mexico City The Zapatista National Liberation Front (FZLN)16 operates both a list ("fzln1") and a series of voluminous multi-lingual web pages carrying news and documents regarding the negotiation process in Chiapas and more general discussions in Mexico. Other sites have originated outside of Mexico. The first unofficial FZLN webpage, for example, was implemented through the Swarthmore College web server in Pennsylvania.17 More recently, **the Zapatistas have begun to craft their missives and adapt their public interventions as they have grown to better understand the effectiveness of the Internet in making their voices heard, communicating with supporters and forging new alliances**. Today, through the intermediation of the FZLN or other friendly groups and individuals, **Marcos and the EZLN regularly send messages to others around the world, including, for example, messages to a European-wide demonstration in Amsterdam against Maastricht and unemployment, to an Italian gathering in Venice against regional separatism or to a conference of media activists in New York**. In these communications they make their position on various issues known and seek to create or strengthen ties with far away groups. The Internet is also playing an increasingly central role in particular organizing efforts initiated by the EZLN. While its role was limited in the formation of the meetings of the National Democratic Convention in 1994 and 1995, which drew together a wide variety of groups from all over Mexico, the Internet was employed to a greater extent in the subsequent national and international plebiscites. The Zapatistas used the Internet in those cases to seek feedback from their supporters regarding the direction their political struggle should take.l8 During the plebiscites, most participants in Mexico voted at booths set up throughout the country by Alianza Civica, a well-respected pro-democracy Mexican NGO. In addition, some 81,000 foreigners from 47 countries took part, mostly via the Internet.l9 According to Alianza Civica, total participation in Mexico was over one million persons.20 The most dramatic organizational efforts in which the Internet has played a central role are the joint cooperative efforts between the Zapatistas and other social movements linked to them. These efforts have included the organization of large-scale meetings in response to the January 1996 Zapatista call for continental and intercontinental "encounters" to discuss, among other things, contemporary global neoliberal (capitalist) policies, methods of elaborating a global network of opposition to those policies and formulas for interconnecting various projects for elaborating alternatives. The result of these organizing efforts included: a series of continental meetings in the spring of 1996;21 an intercontinental meeting in Chiapas in the summer of 1996; and a second intercontinental meeting in Spain in the summer of 1997. Through extensive E-mails and a small number of intermittent, face-to-face meetings, possible approaches to the organization of discussion were debated, agendas were hammered out and logistical arrangements were made. The results were stunning. Thousands came to the continental meetings-3,000 to the intercontinental meeting in Chiapas and 4,000 to the intercontinental reunion in Spain. Grassroots activists from over 40 countries and five continents attended both intercontinental meetings. Without the Internet, this turnout would never have been possible. It is only recently that such encounters have become regular features on the margins of meetings organized by supranational institutions like the United Nations. **It has usually been governments, not poor villages of indigenous peoples, that have had the means to organize such gatherings. The Zapatistas, however, successfully organized these encounters on a scale that far exceeded anyone's expectations, and this fact alone warrants close attention by those interested in the evolution of international politics.**

#### Prefer the critique’s impact. There’s a cognitive bias to downplay settler violence.

King 20, PhD, professor in the Liberal Studies department at Grand Valley State University (Sarah, “What We’re Talking about When We’re Talking about Water: Race, Imperial Politics, and Ruination in Flint, Michigan,” in *The Wonder of Water*, UMich Libraries)//BB

For many North Americans, reflecting on and analysing their role as settlers in colonial nations2 – and about their relationship to place in this context – is a fundamental challenge. The liberal discourse of equality often denies that racism is a systemic or everyday problem, promoting instead a “‘national story’ of benevolence and generosity” (Srivastava 2005, 35). Srivastava suggests that Canadians operate within “contemporary national discourses of tolerance, multiculturalism and nonracism” that mask ongoing racialized conflicts (35). Addressing the racialized structure of society is profoundly challenging because Canadian and American moral identity is so tied up in a vision of equality, a vision that, like all national visions, “requires not only sameness and communion but also forgetting difference and oppression” (Benedict Anderson, in Srivastava 2005, 39). This vision of sameness and nonracism is fundamental to the vision that the Canadian government sought to uphold in Esgenoôpetitj, and that the Michigan government used to frame its emergency manager laws. Confronting the racism inherent in North American relationships with Indigenous peoples requires confronting fundamental questions about the history and legitimacy of the colonial states of Canada and the US. Taiaiake Alfred, an Indigenist academic, argues that most Settlers are in denial. They know that the foundations of their countries are corrupt, and they know that their countries are “colonial” in historical terms, but they still refuse to see and accept the fact that there can be no rhetorical transcendence and retelling of the past to make it right without making fundamental changes to their government, society, and the way they live ... To deny the truth is an essential cultural and psychological process in Settler society. (2005, 107) Many settlers know Canada/the US as their only home, and wonder, as some of the people I interviewed in Burnt Church did, why they must pay for the sins of their forefathers. But the problems inherent in settler relationships with Indigenous peoples are not only historical; they exist in individual, social, and political lives in the present. The fundamental discomfort of reflection on race and racism makes it difficult for many to reflect upon their shared position in the colonial present.

# Policy Affs

## SPACE ASSETS

### L––ASATS

#### **we hate your satellites**

Damjanov 15 (Damjanov, Katarina, School of Social Sciences, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia The matter of media in outer space: Technologies of cosmobiopolitics. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. 2015;33(5):889-906. doi:10.1177/0263775815604920) // JLHS AA

Satellite population and orbital security Over 6000 military, scientific and commercial satellites have arrived in Earth’s orbital space to take on a key role in advancing global production, distribution and consumption of media content.3 Designed to perform specific tasks, they have been disseminated across different orbital altitudes; Low Earth Orbit has been mostly occupied by the earth observation, remote sensing, communication and reconnaissance satellites, Medium Earth Orbit by those used for global positioning, Geosynchronous Orbit by broadcasting satellites and High Earth Orbit has been increasingly utilised for their disposal. More than 1200 of them are currently operational;4 **arrayed around the planet as if to imprison it under omniscient technical armour, they provide a major logistic backbone for governmental practices that expedite** what Deleuze (1992) **identified as the ‘society of control**’, extending Foucault’s ideas about ‘disciplinary societies’ onto the contemporary context of automated, multifaceted systems of ubiquitous global surveillance. Yet at the same time, **satellites are themselves besieged by the same systems of control that they make possible**. Their conduct in space is subjected to exhaustive diagnostic management via specialised schemes such as The United States Space Surveillance Network and the European Space Agency’s (n.d.) Space Surveillance and Tracking program, similar projects led by other states and space agencies, and independent expert groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists. **The orbital constellation of satellites necessitates another security layer around the global apparatus of biopolitics – the control of its control infrastructure, forging a double-bind diagram of networked governance.** Satellite control is guided by the perspective of Space Situational Awareness (SSA), which, although central to orbital logistics, is thus far without an official definition (Kaiser, 2014). In essence, SSA is concerned not only with observation and surveillance of satellites as a way of knowing details of their orbital position, but also with collecting, aggregating and analysing a wide range of types of data about all objects and events in orbital space as a reference point from which to estimate the best courses in their management. One of the many descriptions of the SSA postulates it as the pursuit of ‘a comprehensive knowledge of the population of space objects, of the space environment, **and of the existing risks and threats’** (European Security and Defence Assembly, 2009). While suggestive of the biopolitical agenda of securing human activities in the orbital milieu, this formulation symptomatically reveals a turn towards object-oriented governance: SSA focuses upon the ‘population of space objects’. On one hand, the term ‘space object’ is a legal classification of all human-made items placed in outer space, a nomenclature introduced by the OST and elaborated in the Liability Convention from 1972, which gives their legal owners exclusive rights to control and interfere with them. On the other, the phrase ‘population of space objects’ – an expression which is customarily used in expert vocabulary surrounding SSA5 – signposts a repositioning of the human-centered en masse purview of biopolitics to incorporate a population of technologies. The biopolitical use of the term ‘population’ originally specifies a mass of living humans; however, with its application to the assemblage of human-made satellites, biopolitics in outer space becomes central to attempts to manage a population whose bodies are neither human, not animate, but that of technology. This twofold satellite logistics which focuses upon both singular ‘space objects’ and a collective ‘space population’ to assess multiple variables that determine their productive capacity and manage risks associated with their occupation of orbital space, reinforces regimes of satellite management which operate parallel to that of humans. At both its administrative and executive levels, the governance of satellites regulates their material presence in space, managing their distribution, traffic, operations and decommission. Satellite launches require technical and procedural compliance with national and international protocols. Information about each satellite is stored in the United Nations Register of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space that functions as an inventory of their births and deaths, and while apparently excluding undisclosed missions,6 acts as an (always incomplete) global census on satellite population. Activities of satellites are continuously examined, evaluated and upheld via a multifaceted management system termed Tracking, Telemetry and Control (TT&C). TT&C enables ground control centres to monitor satellites via sensors and on-board computers with which they are equipped, telemetrically measure their ‘health’ by determining the ‘condition and performance of various subsystems such as fuel status, attitude and output of solar panels’, and adjust their trajectories, configurations and functions (U.S. Army Space Division, n.d.). Within satellite logistics, authority over each satellite is restricted to its owners and allows for its individual proprietary control, but the overall population of satellites is seen as a shared matter of global security, which necessitates cooperative collection and exchange of data between space agencies, commercial and space experts and enthusiasts. There is a range of satellite tracking software and databases, some with restricted access such as the US Space Surveillance Network that only provides data to subscribed governmental and commercial parties, and others which are freely available online such as the UCS Satellite Database or the website Heaven Above that enable the public to monitor the movement of satellites. Taken together, **these examples of logistical inscription and calculated management suggest attempts to institute a global system of networked satellite control which corresponds with the twin-poled organisation of power over life**. It simultaneously centres on an individual satellite (aiming to diagnose and restore its health and discipline its conduct in order to maximise its productivity) and their entire population (overseeing its demographic distribution and circulation and seeking to uphold its ‘public health’).7

#### The 1ac’s drive to emerge into space is built off of American ‘transcendence’ – the way in which America centers itself as the centre while expanding is military and social project of imperial control

Sage 14 (Sage, Daniel (2014). Daniel Sage is a professor at the Institute of Geography and Earth Science, University of Wales. How Outer Space Made America: Geography, Organization and the Cosmic Sublime (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315587189>) // JLHS AA

In the preceding eight chapters I have argued that some of the unique qualities of outer space—vastness, Otherness, sublimity, timelessness, spacelessness—are just as integral to extra-terrestrial projections of US geopower, as its well-known capacity (Arendt, 1963; Cosgrove, 2001; Dickens and Ormrod, 2007; Dolman, 2001; Macdonald, 2007) to function as an Archimedean high point to monitor and control the surface, and atmosphere, of the Earth. While the focus of my study has been the United States, and more specifically NASA, the implications of this cosmic projection of geopower—the American transcendental state—are global in reach, from enabling and shaping imperialistic ideologies (Chapters 1-3 and 7) to fuelling the extension of technocratic managerialism (Chapter 4-6 and 8). What is more, messianic hope in America remains a global commodity, consumed, for example, through the internationally franchised Star Trek television episodes and films (Penley, 1997: 98-99), multinational ‘Space 2.0’ corporations, like SpaceX (Chapter 6), worldwide audiences to the addresses of American presidents (Chapter 6) and global tourist attractions like the National Air and Space Museum and Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (Chapter 7). These global circulations suggest that while my empirical focus in this study has been on the extra-terrestrial assemblage of the American transcendental state, as viewed from within the borders of the US, the salience of my analysis is geo-political. **The development of the American transcendental state through space exploration must also be viewed as an integral component of a far older geopolitical project—the production of an American identity defined in terms of the transcendence of limits, whether technological, economic, spiritual or territorial, enabling the moral aggrandizement of the past, present and future of a horizontal strata of sovereign territory and its peoples** (McDougall, 1997; Noble, 2002; Nye, 1994; O’Brien, 1988; Ricard, 1999; Stephanson, 1995). Over the last decade or so, a growing number of scholars, including geographers, have turned their attention to how messianic-exceptionalist visions of America as the ‘Promised Land’ of ‘Chosen People’ have inflected various imperialistic projects including: the pursuit of democracy through military intervention in the ‘global south’ (Anthony, 2008); the technocratic ‘greening’ of Western global capitalism (Singer, 2010); the building of a ‘culture of war’ in foreign policy (Marsella, 2011), the circumvention of international institutions (Agnew, 2006); and most prominently perhaps, George W. Bush’s ‘war on terror’ where invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq became justified as a ‘cosmic struggle between good and evil’ (Agnew, 2006: 183; see also Barkun, 2010; Dijink, 2006; Strum, 2010; Wallace, 2006). All of this work indicates two points: first, the enduring Apocalyptic influence of dispensational pre-millennialism1 on both interventionist and isolationist currents within American (geo)politics (Strum and Dittmer, 2010: 18); and secondly, the rise of a religious cosmology that **positions America at the moral, geographical, and spiritual, centre of the universe** (Strum, 2010: 150). My analysis of American spaceflight adds to this body of work on religion and geopolitics by drawing attention to five less discussed conduits of this pious vision of American geopower: (i) the secular—museums, family theme parks, systems management; (ii) the sublime—astronomical artwork, Moon landings and distant Nebula; (iii); the profane—Nazi slave labor camps, technocratic patriarchy, and dead astronauts; the technological (iv)—rocket production lines, O-rings, electrical wiring; and (v) the revolutionary—female astronauts, May 1968, and Richard Feynman. Analytically, these diverse registers suggest the utility of working with a broader, less explicitly spiritual, set of theoretical assumptions, to address the cosmological aspects of American geopolitics. This is why I mobilized the concept of the ‘American transcendental state’, rather than ‘deified nation’ (O’Brien, 1988: 41) within this study. This deliberately hallucinogenic sounding term captures some sense that the messianic-exceptionalistic projection of American geopower is a more diffusive, experimental, fantasmic, embodied, and ostensibly secular, affair, than conveyed within much discursive analysis of the religious undercurrents inflecting American geopolitics (for example Agnew, 2006; Dijink, 2006; Strum, 2010; Wallace, 2006). I would like to suggest now that there is another benefit in bringing together these diverse practices under a broader analysis of the American transcendental state: their common geography becomes all the more obvious. That is, all these practices involve thinking, doing or resisting, celestial transcendence as an apparatus of American geopower; hence they can all be rightly considered ‘vertical geopolitics’ (Elden, 2013; Graham, 2004; Graham and Hewitt, 2013). This label has developed to identify a body of work addressing how the circulation of American geopower involves more than two-dimensional geographies of area. It currently includes analyses of; drone warfare (Gregory, 2011); aerial bombardment (Graham, 2004); police helicopters (Adey, 2010); **satellite surveillance** (Macdonald, 2007) **and satellite drone navigation and targeting** (Gregory, 2011). Elden (2013: 40) explains that ‘vertical geopolitics’ is mostly focussed upon how state political technologies allow diverse populations to be measured, calculated, controlled and killed, ‘from above’, and occasionally ‘from below’ (for example Elden, 2013; Graham and Hewitt, 2013). By contrast, the vertical orientation I have adopted here, while related, is different. Specifically, I have described how aspects of the projection of American identity, geopower, and territory, also involve a vertical spacelessness—a deterritorialization—a potential collapse into sublime, cosmic, insignificance; in short, rather than the ‘view from above’, the perspective I have traced has been a ‘view into the above’ (and back). In part, therefore, my study can be considered a response to Elden’s (2013) recent question: ‘How would our thinking of geo-power, geo-politics and geo-metrics work if we took the earth; the air and the subsoil; questions of land, terrain, territory; earth processes and understandings of the world as the central terms at stake, rather than a looser sense of the ‘global?’ (p49) I propose we add to this list celestial entities, including the Moon (Chapter 3), the Martian surface (Chapter 6) and the Eagle Nebula (Chapter 7), as well as God (Agnew, 2006; Dittmer and Strum, 2010; Strum, 2013). Thus, perhaps we should be cautious of Elden’s (2013b) rather geocentric call ‘about how geopolitics might be thought as earth-politics rather than simply a synonym for global politics’ (p59). Instead, it might be more useful to bear in mind Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988: 101) argument that even absolute deterritorialization—something akin perhaps to the mathematical cosmic sublime of Kant (Nye, 1994: 7-8)—always involves reterritorialization(s). Recall how Charles Bonestell (Chapter 2), William Clancey (Chapter 6) and the National Air and Space Museum (Chapter 7), respectively, and persuasively, associated vistas of the Moon, Mars and the Eagle Nebula with the American West, and by extension locate America at the centre of God’s universe (Boime, 1991; Stephanson, 1995). This analysis of American spaceflight also sheds light on seldom acknowledged connections between religious and vertical geopolitics and technocracy. The relation between critical analysis of geopolitics (O Tuathail, 1996) and technocratic management (Alvesson, 1987), remains remarkably undeveloped. Arguably this lacuna says more about the disciplinary separation between critical security studies and organization studies (Grey, 2009) than the various intellectual cross- fertilizations between organization studies and human geography (Clegg and Kornberger, 2006; Dale and Burrell, 2008; Parker, 2013). Nevertheless, there are, as Grey (2009) maintains, clear resonances: Indeed it could said that, in the same way that **the development of security studies in particular, and organization studies to an extent, was shaped by geo- politics of wars both hot and cold, so too many current and future directions be in part a reflection of developments in contemporary geo-politics** (p31). Some **organizational practices are** of course, very much **on the ‘front line’ of practical geopolitics**; that is, they comprise the ‘the foreign policy bureaucracy’ (Ó Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 4) **through which geographical concepts are deployed to aid ‘conceptualization and decision making’ in ‘everyday foreign policy’** (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). **Examples here include the work of the US Air Force, the CIA** (Central Intelligence Agency) and the UK’s Foreign and Common Wealth Office. There are also a host of other **organizations that no doubt influence how practical geopolitics is produced, from** **security analysts like the RAND Corporation to global defense contractors like McDonnell Douglas**. However, analysis of the relationship between organizational and geopolitical practices remains embryonic. For example, Anderson’s (2011) study of urban counter- insurgency and Gregory’s (2011) of drone warfare, do no more than merely infer that the rise of the ‘networked organization’ is reworking the projection of American geo-power. Correspondingly, two organizational studies of the military only hint that, for example, masculine discipline (Godfrey et al., 2012) and team identities (Corona and Godart, 2010) shape and are themselves shaped by grand geopolitical narratives like the ‘war on terror’**. But the imbrication of geopolitical and organizational practice can also be more subtle and much less militaristic—concerning the anticipation and cultivation of geopower through shared national identities, that is ‘popular geopolitics’** (O Tuathail, 1999: 110). Here, the connection to organizational practices is no less significant, yet invisible in the literature. NASA offers a good example: from its inception, the space agency developed increasingly refined technocratic techniques that aligned people and machines to naturalize the pursuit of a popular geopolitics wedded to American geopower. Viewed in this way, imperialistic geopower and technocratic-managerialism are interwoven forces; hence the present study suggests the richness of more sustained critical analysis of organization and geopolitics. However, I am all too aware that in stressing the widespread application of this concept of the America transcendental state to understand American geopower— and, concomitantly, the fecundity of bringing together analyses of religion, verticality and now technocracy within critical geopolitics—I run the risk of constructing a totalizing, monstrous, edifice. The reader might rightly ask at this juncture, paraphrasing Nietzsche, have you not gazed into the cosmic abyss of American geopower for too long; are you not also reifying American geopower in the cosmos rather than challenging it? Indeed, throughout the preceding chapters I made reference to a rather singular sounding concept of the ‘American transcendental state’. But, as in the introduction, I must stress again here, that I took this decision for reasons of analytical clarity rather than to suggest I have revealed an independent, singular, definite and a priori reality (Law, 2006), some essence akin perhaps to what Agnew (2006: 184) refers to as ‘Americanism’. Instead, within each chapter I have traced the progressive assemblage of the American transcendental state—that is, nothing less than the divinely sanctioned, exceptional, and messianic, right and duty, of America, and its leaders in its name (Wallace, 2006: 225), **to command cosmic space and time by evoking forces of ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘us’ and ‘them’** (Agnew, 2006; Strum, 2010). But the immutability of this cosmic vision (Strum and Dittmer, 2010; Wallace, 2006) belies the transformative, fragmented, heterogeneous components that sustain it, across landscape artwork, through Kennedy’s Moon Speech, to the O-rings of Space Shuttle Challenger. Throughout this study I have suggested countless relations through which this vision is not only produced (Dijink, 2006; McDougall, 1997; Noble, 2002; Nye, 1994; Ricard, 1999; Stephanson, 1995; Wallace, 2006) but circulated, maintained, resisted, repaired, transformed, and experimented with. How then to conceptualize this heterogeneous, but obdurate, cosmic being? Latour’s actor-network theory (1987; 2005; 2012) is useful to an extent here; first, we can conceptualize the transcendental state as an ‘immutable mobile’ that ‘ends up traversing the universe’ by ‘pay[ing] for each transport with a transformation’ (Latour, 2013: 127); it is ‘not displacement without transformation but displacement through transformation (Latour, 2005: 223); second, the transcendental state can be understood as offering a prophetic, but partial, ‘panorama’ of the ‘world [cosmos] to be lived in’ (p189) which must then, in turn, be: ... carefully situated inside one of the many Omnimax theatres offering complete panoramas of society—and we now know that the more thrilling the impression, the more enclosed the room has to be. **[American] Society is not the whole ‘in which’ everything is embedded, but what travels ‘through’ everything, calibrating connections and offering every entity it reaches some possibility of commensurability**. (p242) Read against Latour’s concepts of the ‘immutable mobile’ and the ‘localizable panorama’ it is easy to see why my analysis of American transcendental state has involved mapping circulations within as well as beyond our lives. And this is a political move too, because it suggests that opportunities to test and resist the American transcendental state are closer to hand than we might think. As revealed in Chapter 8, a great deal of effort is required to keep the transcendental state circulating because the heterogeneous conduits it passes through—electrical wiring, teleconferences, flight readiness reviews, budget decisions and O-ring joints—are capricious and experimental; that is, affective. Other Chapters acknowledged similar fragility accompanying the assemblage of the transcendental state, including; the partially-owned Declaration of Independence (Chapter 1), the globally unifying Earthrise photograph of Apollo 8 (Chapter 3) and the rusting rockets on display in the gardens of the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex (Chapter 7). Now located within this chain of heterogeneous transformations, what strategies might aid us in purposefully transforming this now confined totality? Or put differently, how might we engage outer space to resist this cosmic deification of America (O Brien, 1988)? In concluding this study, I propose three techniques but no doubt there are many more. First, we can expose the void at the heart of this messianic-technocratic projection of geopower (Wallace, 2006). This approach was evidenced in Chapter 1 by Derrida’s (2002) deconstructive reading of Declaration of Independence. Derrida (2002) emphasizes how signing the Declaration in God’s name entails no democratic ownership over America’s future, in outer space or elsewhere. Across the development of American spaceflight, the perils of messianic, free- floating, notions of ‘Progress’, ‘Exploration,’ ‘Frontier’ and ‘The Future’ are all too apparent, not least for NASA itself. Lester and Robinson (2009) suggest the emergence of this critique within the American space policy community: We should accept that “exploration” is a multivalent term, with many meanings, some of which are contradictory, and all of which have historical precedent. For too long we have looked at the history of exploration selectively, seeking to find the antecedents which justify our own vision of exploration: as science, as human adventure, as geopolitical statement. This is a definitional fight which cannot be won. Space policy must acknowledge the multiple visions for space exploration, developing a clear-eyed metric of value which avoids the vagaries of lofty “exploration-speak”, If the merits of human exploration of the Moon and Mars are primarily symbolic and geopolitical, what are these goals worth in terms of federal funding? I am unconvinced by the economically instrumentalist conclusions made by Lester and Robinson (2009) about putting a value upon even NASA’s ‘softer’ geopower, but the general caution about harnessing nebulous messianic mythologies to advance American space exploration is valuable. Of course the problem is this tradition of finding our God in the cosmos is long-established as Olsson (2007) suggests via this retelling of the Babylonian creation epic, Enuma elish: Marduk is the Lord of lords ... Hail to the Chief! Fifty were his names, so numerous that if ever attacked he could always hide behind another alias. Never catchable as the specific this or that, always on the move as an ambiguous this and that ... Ungraspable multiplicity. ... In this mist-enveloped region of religion naming is the name of the game, an exercise in ontological transformations where earthly people appear as projections of heavenly gods, social relations as signs in the sky. ... a signified meaning searching for its own coordinates (Olsson, 2007: 23). Perhaps a more modest approach is required: we should simply resist the urge to name, and tame, the cosmos as a Whole, by naming a celestial Godhead in it that we claim for ourselves (Wallace, 2006) but cannot ever fully own. ‘Evil is the disaster of a truth when the desire to force the naming of the unnameable is unleashed . ... Evil is not disrespect for the name of the other, but rather the will to name at any price’ (Badiou, 2004: 115-6; original emphasis). Challenging the cosmic aggrandization of America might therefore imply some attempt to resist naming our God/Future/Progress in the cosmos. Put simply, this all too easy act of cosmic de/reterroritalizaiton is too crude, too undemocratic, too costly. A second, related, strategy which can be adopted to resist the American transcendental state was discussed within Chapter 3; this is the capacity to push transcendence to another plane or refuge—to follow one line of flight of cosmic deterritorialization and then re-territorialize the Earth in a panorama that starts with a common human experience, rather than those of any particular nation/ God/future. The aim of this strategy is to mobilize a cosmic imagination that can register something of the shared experience of being human. In Chapter 3 I discussed how the Earthrise photograph from NASA’s Apollo 8 mission have stimulated new cosmic imaginations—including ‘spaceship’ Earth (Cosgrove: 2001, 257-262; Henry and Taylor, 2009; Ward, 1964), Noetic science (Benjamin, 2003: 60-61), global political ecologies (Connolly, 2002)—that defied nationalistic appropriations by inferring a human transcendence. However, as the American author Kurt Vonnegut explains such a transcendental image of humanity, emptied of territorial divisions and difference, is not itself without risk: ‘Earth is such a pretty blue and pink and white pearl in the pictures NASA sent me. It looks so clean. You can’t see all the hungry, angry earthlings down there—and the smoke and sewage and trash and sophisticated weaponry’ (Vonnegut cited in Burrows, 1998: 423). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari (1988) suggest we should always remain sceptical that de-territorialization is a progressive act on its own: ‘Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us’ (p500). A third strategy is to augment different affects amid the assemblage of the American transcendental state. As described in Chapter 8, **the American transcendental state depends upon the cultivation of confidence in technocracy allied to an affective becoming hopeful—a positive openness to the future as life enhancing—orientated around the transcendence of America in cosmic space and time**. But, as Anderson (2006), explains, becoming hopeful does not necessarily need to operate in this transcendental manner: hopefulness can also emerge not to ward off suffering, but through every day sorrows, through diminishment of the body’s potential to affect and be affected. Consider, for example, how Dotty Duke refused to discuss her fears and anxieties with her astronaut husband as she kept the ‘house in order and [took] out the garbage’ (Duke 1990—Chapter 5). Dotty Duke epitomizes a different kind of becoming hopeful—a capacity to remain open-ended about the future in a life enhancing manner through diminishment—devoid of discussion of a better future in Earth or in the cosmos; this is hope that challenges ‘the easy equation between transcendence and a future elsewhen or elsewhere in favor of an imminent transcendence from within vectors of diminishment’ (Anderson, 2006: 749; for more analysis of immanent transcendence related to Space see Smith, 2009: 211). Another affect which is useful in short-circuiting the hopeful assemblage of the transcendental state is boredom. Anderson (2004) describes boredom as the moment when the ‘“forgetting” intrinsic to habit has been momentarily incapacitated. It is the unravelling of habit, a sudden realization of the again’ (p743). Boredom depresses the life enhancing capacity of ourselves to be open to the future, engendering stillness and slowness of thought-action in space- time, where, as Anderson (2004) puts it, the capacity to experience the ‘not yet’ (p749) is suspended. The evolution of American spaceflight might appear to some the antithesis of boredom, but, as Jorgensen (2009) suggests, the American humanization of outer space has gone hand in hand with endless repetition (of middle America): The August 1969 Life Special Issue, released to commemorate the landing, wants to produce sympathetic accounts of the astronauts. It is filled with glossy, high color photographs of the astronauts not only mastering outer space, but their domestic spaces as well. Neil Armstrong bakes pizza, Buzz Aldrin jogs through the suburbs, and Mike Collins prunes his garden. These images resonate with outer space itself, as the astronauts use tools in both terrestrial and extraterrestrial environments. The spatula and shears the astronauts use to cook lamb curry and prune roses with resemble the objects they hold while walking the moon, these being a laser reflector, seismometer and solar wind sheet (p179). There is no hopefulness on offer in Jorgensen’s (2009) reading of American spaceflight. Instead the boredom experienced in the cosmic repetition of middle America signals despair: ‘Apollo 11 represented an America that had become unhinged by its own technocracy, its middle class lifestyle, and television’ (p188). Jorgensen (2009) is not, of course, alone in identifying aspects of spaceflight repetitive, even boring. As the emergence of the Teacher in Space program demonstrated (see Chapter 8), NASA itself has historically attempted to introduce elements of excitement, even increased risk, to engage a global audience. Yet, of course, a balance has always had to be struck, as Parker (2009) explains of Apollo: ‘Everything was supposed to be boring, because boredom meant no surprises, and hence the possibility of the adventure in some sense rested on its denial’ (p326). Although fleeting, boredom is surely an unavoidable ingredient in NASA’s technocratic confidence, but when focused and channeled, it does suspend hope in the cosmos as a better place, perhaps providing an opportunity for us to pause and register something of the sublime Otherness of Space, where we concurrently repeat and differ ourselves into infinity: ‘Media representations of space travel turn the vastness of space into the similitude of domesticity, as human familiarity comes to stand in for the infinite. At the same time, the domestic attains the dimensions of the infinite, and in turn becomes strangely unfamiliar to the television viewer’ (Jorgensen, 2009: 179). **These three techniques of cosmo-political intervention—refusal to name, human transcendence, and sensitivity to new affects—are all worthy of greater attention, especially when they can be connected up to, and interfere with, the assemblage of the American transcendental state.** Clearly not all of those involved directly in the development of spaceflight will want or be able to practise these techniques. Nevertheless **even among this group these techniques are intended to offer greater receptivity to new cosmographical imaginations which move beyond the cosmic aggrandization of messianic-imperialistic-technocratic impulses. If we have entered the Cosmic Age where all territorializing assemblages, all States, now derive vital energy from the Cosmos** (Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 342**), then the imperative becomes not to simply do cosmopolitics** (Latour, 2005) **but rather which cosmo-politics do we want to pursue?** My favoured vision of a Geography of Space is one where this question is endlessly asked but never answered with absolute confidence.

#### Environmental monitoring systems place indigenous groups on the backburner only ensuring their erasure.

**Thill 18** [Zackery Thill received his master’s degree from Lund University, “Rights Holders, Stakeholders, and Scientists: A Political Ecology of Ambient Environmental Monitoring in Alberta, Canada,” University of Oregon, http://hdl.handle.net/1794/23767]

States increasingly rely on ambient environmental monitoring systems to provide information on environmental conditions in order to make science-based decisions on resource management. This kind of monitoring relies on a network of state and intergovernmental agencies to generate indexes, thresholds, and indicators to assess the status of air, water, and biodiversity. As a result, these thresholds and indexes generate representations of environmental change, and they establish acceptable limits on pollution. However, in settler states like Canada, there are often major gaps in how First Nations experience environmental change compared to the agencies that produce the science. In recent years, monitoring has taken on a new importance because the findings from these agencies contribute to understanding how industrial development impacts First Nations’ treaty rights. Many First Nation communities have called for greater say in government agencies and have advocated for indicators that represent both their basic environmental concerns and their treaty rights. Using oil sands monitoring agencies as a lens, this dissertation examines the politics of environmental knowledge production between Indigenous groups and the state. I employ the “logic of elimination” concept from settler colonialism studies to explore the extent to which Indigenous groups have been incorporated in research design, decision-making, and the establishment of environmental thresholds. I use interviews, participant observation, and a Q-method survey to develop an understanding how settler colonialism functions not only through policies and legislation, but also scientists’ positionalities. The findings from this research demonstrate that monitoring agencies have no uniform policies to guide how they work with First Nations. Because of this, agencies have continually engaged with First Nations as stakeholders—not rights holders. This designation places First Nations on the same level as other interest groups and limits their abilities to shape what is monitored and how thresholds are set. As a result, the stakeholder position offers few avenues for First Nations to ensure treaty rights are considered in monitoring activities.

## OCOs

### L––Russia

#### The villainization of Russia within US media constructs the possibility for violence to be justified by the western order – only a reorientation towards our analysis and norms can dissolve the securitization that keeps a constant war

**Lazarov 20** (Same old Russian Enemy? A Content Analysis of the Portrayal of Russians in Call of Duty: Modern Warfare Danny Ivan Lazarov, Malmo University, Sweden, Peace and Conflict Studies, Bachelor Thesis, FK103L, 15 credits Spring Semester 2020, Supervisor: Katrine Gotfredsen, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1483665/FULLTEXT01.pdf>) // JLHS AA

While the cold war might be a distant memory to many people in the world, today its effect on society is still being felt. Russians are still villainized in Western **and particularly US media** from movies to local news. From popular news station Fox News constantly presenting news stories from Syria about the Russian troops bombing and attacking Syrian rebel strongholds focusing more on the Russian government involvement within the conflict and less the Syrian government which it supports (McKay, 2019), to constant reporting on Russian meddling in in the US elections of 2016 (Pappas, 2018) showing them as masterminds manipulating elections and governments around the world. **This idea of stereotypes and norms which persists after war or in this case the cold war, can be attributed to what Johan Galtung Calls negative peace the idea that violence does not end when the peace is signed between nations but instead lives on in the form of cultural violence** (Galtung, 2013, pp 173). Cultural violence is according to Galtung the aspects of culture who promotes or make direct and structural violence acceptable. This culture comes in many forms such as media in general (Galtung, 2013, pp 41). **In a sense this means that media can be used to create an environment where violence is justified and feels right to the perpetrator**. With this idea of negative peace it could be argued that while at the moment the stereotypes and ideas which are spread by the media might seem to be passive and neutral, used for entertainment and not for war, they can easily be turned into something negative creating an enemy image which is **one of the requirements for armed conflict to be justified** according to Louis Oppenheimer (2003, pp 2). While this study does not deal with this problem directly, by highlighting these forms of cultural violence it brings awareness of their existence making it possible for them to be further debated and researched in future papers. This thesis is also highlighting the relationship which at times is forgotten between media, public culture, and politics and that everything can be political. This theme is explored in the book War, Politics and Superheroes: Ethics and Propaganda in Comics and Film by Marc Di Paolo (2011). Di Paolo explores how different political discourses and ideas show up in comics and films. From stories such as Batman fighting against Osama Bin Ladin to Superman fighting the KKK (2011, pp 49, 138). His book shows us that entertainment media can be influenced by politics both reflecting important political discourse’s but also important political events such as the Punisher being influence by **Middle Eastern conflicts and the Vietnam war** (Di Paolo, 2011, pp 115). This means that all entertainment media can be influenced in the same way, from films to video games making the studying of entertainment media important as to understand how and what political discourses are spread by video games.

#### From Geronnimo to Gernoimo EKIA settler memory frames the native as the eternal enemy. The projection of nativity onto the modern enemy of the US is a part of the collective settler memory that pursues the elimination of the other while reliving fetishized moments of settler colonial violence. This logic is embedded in engagements with foreign enemies deemed as threats by the US that become the racialized punching bag of the US’ settler colonial tendencies and a continuation of the US’ settler colonial project abroad.

**Bruyneel 15**[Kevin Bruyneels is a Professor of Politics at Babson College, “Codename Geronimo: settler memory and the production of American statism,” Settler Colonial Studies, 10.1080/2201473X.2015.1090528]

To see the way in which settler memory connects the dots from Geronimo to Bin Laden as it concerns American state practices I now examine the relationship between colonial and imperial statist violence as articulated in a book published in late 2011, in the wake of the Bin Laden assassination. The book’s title is Wanted Dead or Alive: Manhunts from Geronimo to Bin Laden. The book’s author is Benjamin Runkle, a Harvard trained political scientist who was a US Army captain in the Iraq War, worked as a speechwriter for the National Security Council during the W. Bush Administration and also worked as a staff member for the House Armed Services Committee. In 2014, he was program director for the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, and the organization’s motto is ‘Securing America, Strengthening Israel’. Runkle is thus both a product and an agent of US liberal colonialism and its imperial articulations, and he provides here an insider’s perspective on the production and purposes of American statism, expressed as much habitually as consciously. The book’s first sentence offers a call to contemporary memory: ‘It is both a cliché and an understatement to say that Tuesday, 11 September 2001, is a day that will forever be etched into the memory of all Americans who lived through it.’ 22 The historical chapters begin with the ‘Geronimo Campaign’ and then focus on the US military’s effort to ‘hunt’ down, in order, Emilio Aguinaldo of the Philippines in 1901 near the end of the Philippine-American war, Mexican Revolutionary General Pancho Villa from 1916–1917, Panamanian leader Manual Noriega in the late 1980s, Mohammed Farah Aideed of Somalia in the early 1990s, and then Saddam Hussein, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, and Osama Bin Laden in the early twenty-first century. As is clear, all eight of these targets of American state violence are racial and ethnic others to the white settler American somatic norm. As well, all eight stem from nations or regions shaped by colonialism and imperialism, and each in their particular way offered forms of resistance to US state imperatives, a number of whom were direct or indirect allies of the USA at some point in time. To draw these similarities is not to defend or easily analogize any of these figures in terms of their individual politics, practices, and ideologies, but to place their targeting in the context of the development of American statism that is premised upon colonialist and imperialist practices, institutions, and violence. The fact that Runkle starts this narrative with Geronimo is itself no coincidence. It speaks to the necessary power of history and memory in the production and legitimation of American liberal colonial statism and US imperialism. Runkle is as an advocate for the American state practice of what he calls ‘manhunts’, proposing that ‘strategic manhunts will be increasingly attractive to future policymakers’. As well, he bemoans the way in which ‘the individuals targeted by US forces are often sanitized and romanticized by history, while the “quiet professionals” who protect us are often forgotten’. 23 Runkle also argues that manhunts are ‘not assassinations,’ because the essence of the latter is its ‘treacherous nature, which includes the use of violent force during peacetime by covert personell. Conversely, strategic manhunts use at least some overt deployment of uniformed forces acting under an established chain of command.’ 24 Here Runkle’s perspective reflects and re-iterates American statist practices in their constitutive relationship to settler memory, from someone trained in an elite US educational institution, deployed in combat in the US military, and who worked in two of the three federal branches. From his insider’s viewpoint, Runkle’s perspective is helpful because he offers an acute assessment of US liberal colonial practices in at least two respects. First, I would argue that Runkle is correct that those who are deemed to be the outlaws to the American state do, at times, become transformed, ‘sanitized and romanticized,’ although not by history, but in and through the politics of collective memory. Interestingly, though, of the eight ‘manhunt’ targets discussed in his book, it is really only Geronimo who has gone through this mnemonic transformation to such a significant degree, and maybe to a lesser extent Pancho Villa. But by my reading the other figures are either forgotten for the most part (Aguinaldo), or are in no evident way romanticized (Noriega, Aideed, Hussein, bin Laden) in American political culture. It is really Geronimo alone who epitomizes this form of mnemonic transformation, and in that respect it is a distinctly settler form of memory, one which seeks to transform him into a heroic but tragic figure who represents both the development of and resistance to colonialism, but thereby also stands mnemonically as the tamed, defeated product of US settlement. In other words, Geronimo’s persistent place in settler memory stands as evidence of US occupation being a settled matter and how it became so, with the ‘manhunt’ form standing here as an historical event that legitimates and sutures the practices of organized statist military actions as key components of contemporary settler colonial assemblage. Secondly, while I disagree with Runkle’s parsing of assassination versus strategic manhunt in an ethical sense, politically he offers what I deem to be an accurate, insider’s understanding of the purposes and practices of American statism when he claims that strategic manhunts are historically persistent, institutionalized, overt state functions, not rogue, covert, or atypical operations. ‘Strategic manhunts’ and operations of their ilk are not the exceptions to the functioning of statism. They are the statist rule for a liberal political community built upon colonial conquest and maintained through settler violence, law and memory. I would include the execution of the Dakota 38 and the massacre at Wounded Knee as two other such examples – two among many we can locate – that need to be remembered not as rogue exceptions to liberal statist practice, but rather as the rule of liberal colonial statism and US political development. They are not outside or at odds with statism, they are statism in practice. With regards to the invocation of Geronimo’s name, then, it is not a minor matter that Runkle’s narrative begins with Geronimo the historical person and ends with the killing of Bin Laden under the codename Geronimo. Rather, it points to the necessary role of settler memory in iterating and legitimating the purpose of statism in a liberal colonial context such as the USA. To invoke the name ‘Geronimo’ is to first call forth the violence of and resistance to colonial conquest and in American lore the settler victory over Indigenous peoples, and then to connect it mnemonically to the colonialist and imperialist practices of contemporary American statism. And the role of settler memory here is more powerful, more constitutive of settler ideology, by the likelihood that the association of Geronimo with Bin Laden, while not random, was likely more a product of the work of habitmemory than recollection-memory. As deployed here, settler memory habitually reminds the American population that the cold, violent state remains the vengeful defender of yore, and that the work of statist dispossession – of land, of life, of identity – goes on, and must do so. In this regard, ‘Geronimo EKIA’ is a prime example of a settler mnemonic that turns violent statist practices into unifying gestures linking past conquests to those of the present, and back again. We can see efforts to make this wider linkage clear in more radical political critiques that were articulated in the aftermath of the Bin Laden assassination. These critiques did not speak in language of multiculturalism or recognition, but rather in the discourse of colonialism. For example, on the show Democracy Now, Anishinaabe writer and activist Winona LaDuke offered her analysis, stating: The reality is that the military is full of native nomenclature. You’ve got Black Hawk helicopters, Apache Longbow helicopters. You’ve got Tomahawk missiles. The term used when you leave a military base in a foreign country is to go ‘off the reservation, into Indian Country’. So what is that messaging that is passed on? It is basically the continuation of the wars against Indigenous people.25 And Suzan Harjo, in an interview separate from her appearance at the Senate hearing, offered a similar reading to LaDuke’s, arguing that the use of Geronimo’s name shows ‘how deeply embedded the “Indian as enemy” is in the collective mind of America’. 26 I agree with their assessments, but would also add that what we see here, as we can with the many other examples of these forms of identity appropriation, is that the work of settler memory is fundamental to the reproduction and legitimation of settler colonial assemblage through a relationship to the past that is not about forgetting. It is a powerful form of national remembering. Conclusion In the contemporary era, I would include politics itself as among the facets of existence that settler colonialism colonizes. That is, settler colonial assemblage defines and seeks to bound that which is legitimately subject for debate and contestation as it concerns the distribution and role of power, identity, interest and institutions. Before one can even ask the question of settler colonial violence, dispossession, and appropriation, the question may be rendered moot, outside the bounds of legitimate, or realistic, politics. In this light, my suggestion here is that the response to such appropriations as that of Geronimo’s name should not be to ask the White House for an apology, and thus concede the status of this statist institution. Instead, the association should be embraced, in one key respect. To embrace the association is not to stand in alliance with Osama Bin Laden or Al Qaeda at all or the US military, but rather to re-assert the fact that Geronimo was, indeed, an enemy of American statism and settler colonialism. It is to maintain the political posture of friend versus enemy, and to render as important and necessary the status and actions of what political theorist Joel Olson called the zealot or fanatic as an important political category that holds out the possibility for more radical transformation of the political order.27 It is to say that the use of Geronimo’s name is not simply the sign of an absence of respect or sensitivity for Indigenous people, but is more evidence of the active presence of settler colonial assemblage in the specific form of US liberal colonialism. In sum, in critiquing the problem with the Codename Geronimo case, we should seek to avoid either reproducing a politics of recognition and multicultural discourse or diagnosing it as a sign of collective amnesia, as if only people knew all the ‘facts’ of history things would be fine, or better. Rather, in this regard, LaDuke and Harjo get it right I believe in emphasizing the persistent posture of American warfare against Indigenous people. While this is a difficult framework to ponder, it is the appropriate one for a decolonizing, unsettling politics which insists on drawing clear lines for and against settler colonialism. In this sense, the unsettling response here is to put settler memory front and center as an active contemporary practice, in which Geronimo’s name is utilized by the US military because the invocation of his legend habitually calls forth – possibly unlike any single figure in US-Indigenous history – the appropriative violence of settler colonial conquest that fundamentally shapes, as an active verb in the twenty-first century, the political development and status of American liberal colonialism.

# K Affs

## PESS

#### Criticisms of decolonization and suggestions of them being anti black remain attatched to the settler colonial understandings of property and land, black and indeginous struggles are not only compatible but necessary to work with eachother

**Curley et al 22**[Andrew Curley is a researcher at the University of Arizona, Pallavi Gupta is a PHD candidate at UNC, Lara Lookabaugh is a PHD candidate at UNC, Christopher Neubert is a PHD candidate at UNC, Sara Smith is an associate professor at UNC]

Whereas Garba and Sorentino suggest that land struggles are antiblack, we contend that the authors’ own understanding of land remains ontologically attached to settler colonial understandings of land as property, despite a quick acknowledgment of Native epistemologies of land. This we suspect emerges from the conflation of settler colonial studies as a scholarship, whose categories are most in dispute here, and decolonisation as an Indigenous-led political project that challenges the foundations of white supremacy in the first place (see also A Simpson [2011](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0082); Snelgrove et al. [2014](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0091)). To distinguish between these analytics, we follow King’s ([2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0047):65) designation of white settler colonial studies, in reference to the work of Wolfe ([2006](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0099)) and how his premise and scholarship “end up consolidating settler colonial studies as a White field that displaces Native and Indigenous studies”. King ([2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0047):65) observes that this practice, paradoxically (or not), “enacts a discursive shift that privileges a theoretical and ethical engagement with settlers, settlement, and settler colonial relations … this works to displace conversations about genocide, slavery, and the violent project of making the human (humanism)” (see also O’Brien [2017](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0068); Snelgrove et al. [2014](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0091)). Tuck and Yang ([2012](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0095):5) write that settler colonialism undoes Indigenous relationships with the land, cosmologically, epistemologically, and ontologically, rendering Indigenous peoples “premodern” and “savage”. Garba and Sorentino critique Tuck and Yang’s point, accusing them of leaving Indigenous understandings of land undefined. In this way, Garba and Sorentino replicate the ontological violence of colonialism, demanding Indigenous peoples account for themselves while insinuating Native land projects are suspect, or “not methodologically innocent” (2020:772)—guilty of the crime of wanting their land back. If we begin from these categories, we concede to a world that is how the settler-enslaver wishes it to be. We must unsettle these definitions of land. Against an understanding of land-as-property or land-as-resource, Native scholarship provides more nuanced and relational theorisations of land that are not accounted for in settler categories (see e.g. Daigle [2016](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0017), [2018](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0018); Liboiron [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0050)). As Tonawanda Band of Seneca scholar Mishuana Goeman ([2015](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0035):71) writes, “maintaining relationships to the land is at the heart of Indigenous peoples’ struggles”. Native feminists help us understand land and bodies as intimately connected, as sites of colonial struggle, relationality, and community (Cabnal [2010](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0007); Denetdale [2011](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0026); Goeman [2013](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0034); Paredes [2012](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0072); Yazzie [2018](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0103); see also Zaragocin and Caretta [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0106)). Tanana Athabascan scholar Dian Million ([2018](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0064):26) unpacks the difference between Indigenous and settler-colonial understandings of land; she writes, “Indigenous peoples’ lifeways as ancient nations are different ontological and material interpretations of life that question and offer alternative imaginaries outside of capitalism”. We cannot accept the settler-enslaver definition of land or the premise that Black people in the Americas are dispossessed from connection to land through slavery in such a way that past and future connections to land are foreclosed (Lanier [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0048); McKittrick [2011](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0061)). While settler-enslaver truth asserts a clear, distinguishable division among colonised subjects, the project of settler colonialism has “never been concerned with which came first, or which is more elemental” and remains pervasive precisely because it rejects its own dichotomies and thrives in ambiguity (Leroy [2016](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0049)). As Kauanui ([2017](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0045):258) writes, “to assert blackness as ontological is to recapitulate colonising thought, to take colonial ideology as truth”. Cordis ([2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0011):10; see also Kelley 2017) succinctly describes this problem in settler colonial theory as maintaining the dis/placement of Black bodies “through an implicit association of Blacks as dislocated or attenuated settlers or exploited labourers, eliding the intersection of blackness and indigeneity or Black indigeneity”. Robin D.G. Kelley ([2017](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0046)) points to the acceptance of settler truths as a pitfall of settler colonial studies in Wolfe’s ([2016](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0100)) formulation. Wolfe ([2016](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0100):2) declares that the role colonialism gives Indigenous people “is to disappear”, but that, “By contrast, though slavery meant the giving up of Africa, Black Americans were primarily colonised for their labour rather than for their land”. For Kelley ([2017](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0046):268), this limits Indigeneity to the Americas and Australasia, and erases African Indigeneity “through linguistic sleight of hand”, because “Africans are turned into Black Americans”, a renaming that “severs any relationship to their land and Indigenous communities”. Kyle Mays ([2021b](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0059):43) disassembles the Black/Native binary that settler colonial studies relies on, asking: “what if we take seriously that those Africans who were Indigenous peoples stolen from their own places of home and forced to labour on dispossessed land, were actually Indigenous?” By recognising Indigeneity beyond the Americas, Mays frames Black Indigeneity as an analytic that allows connection between contemporary African American cultural expressions and belonging and Africa. This belonging is generated through cultural practices, but is complicated when claims to land and reparations assume the unimpeded futurity of the settler state as undergirding these claims. Mays’ engagements with Black Indigeneity remind us of the necessity of working through multiple and contextually-grounded frames of analysis and claim-making. As Vimalassery et al. ([2016](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0096):3) explain, “when settler colonialism is deployed as a stand-alone analytic it potentially reproduces precisely … effects and enactments of colonial unknowing”, that is, a refusal to know how colonisation has shaped the world—the “act of ignoring” colonialism is an “epistemological orientation that works to preempt relational modes of analysis” (Vimalassery et al. [2016](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0096):1). “Colonial unknowing” also speaks to “the artificial impasse” in academic scholarship, and citational practices. We argue that these acts of unknowing also permeate scholarship. Citizenship and the categories of the white supremacist state, for instance, foreclose the possibility of Indigeneity for both enslaved Africans and migrants. Jackson ([2012](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0041)) highlights how Indigeneity and Black identities come together in the formation of creole racial categories, one example of the multifaceted expressions of Black Indigenous identities which are place-based and context specific. In her work with Indigenous women migrants to the United States from Mexico and Guatemala, Speed ([2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0092):9) describes how the Indigeneity of migrants is erased when they cross the border into the US and are categorised as Guatemalan or Mexican nationals: “The erasure of Indigenous migrants’ identity as Indigenous people is one in a long series of technologies used by settler states to eliminate Indigenous people, and as scholars we should not participate in reifying settler-imposed national borders in ways that facilitate such erasures”. Building on Coulthard’s ([2014](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0012)) “grounded normativity”, Byrd gives us the language of arrivants, subverting settler-enslaver categories with a more generous reading of land and its ability to enable movement. Byrd’s “grounded relationalities” acknowledges Black and Indigenous people’s relation to land and sovereignty—“in place and in movement” (Byrd et al. [2018](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0006):5). Through reduction and conflation, a people’s struggle for liberation is casually disregarded. Reductions limit our understanding of the processes and violence of settler-colonialism and slavery or push towards overdetermination by employing a single framework, inhibiting interdisciplinary dialogue and solidarity. Decolonisation is a political project to end oppression, restore sovereignty, and liberate colonised peoples. In her own work, Chickasaw scholar Jodi Byrd rejects the impasse and draws on the political agenda of Black feminists to strategise Indigenous liberation. Citing the Combahee River Collective, she writes, “we are left to ponder to make correct this core axiom: ‘If Black women were free, it would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate the destruction of all the systems of oppression’” (Byrd [2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1111/anti.12830#anti12830-bib-0005):208).

#### Revolutionary acts of indigenous resistance and black resistance must work together to combat the colonial structure as a collective movement of struggle

**Kidane 13**(Luam Kidane, 10-29-2013, "Building connections across decolonization struggles," ROAR Magazine, <https://roarmag.org/essays/african-indigenous-struggle-decolonization/> , Luam Kidane’s curatorial work, research, and writing examines movement building at the intersections of anti-authoritarian thought and practice, cultural production and articulations of self-determination. She is the co-curator of NSOROMMA, a pan-African arts initiative.) // JL AA

On October, 4, 2013 Herman Wallace, an Afrikan Freedom Fighter, died in the United States after being held in solitary confinement for 42 years. On October 7, 2013, Indigenous groups joined in an international day of action, to “proclaim the importance of indigenous sovereignty” and to mark the 250th anniversary of the Royal Proclamation: a document claimed to be both a foundational recognition of Indigenous rights in Canada and “a British declaration of ownership.”Two separate days and two seemingly disconnected struggles. In order for our stories not to die in the silences that separate them, our movements must move toward what Pamela Palmater has called the “fundamental change that is needed to keep the status quo from killing our people.” **We must flip the script of our seemingly isolated struggles by connecting the pathways that transcend colonial borders**, and by reflecting on the strategies we are employing in our shared struggles for freedom. The rallying cry of the Idle No More movement first surfaced online in November 2012. Since then little has changed. Bill C-45 — the Orwellian Jobs and Growth Act against which the movement first arose — has become law. The 13-point Declaration of Commitments that ended Chief Theresa Spence’s hunger strike has yet to be implemented. The Harper government refuses to support a national inquiry into murdered and missing Indigenous women. On October 7th, UN Special Rapporteur James Anaya was finally allowed to enter Canada to begin his inquiry. Where are we, as the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island, since the first wave of actions swept across public consciousness? Herman Wallace was released three days before his death. After 42 years of imprisonment, Federal Judge Brian A. Jackson ordered his release on a technicality because women were excluded from the jury in his trial. The release said nothing about the contradictions of a legal and penitentiary system built on slavery and genocide, holding captive an Afrikan activist fighting for the freedom of his people. To mitigate the tragedy of Wallace’s passing, many have tried to find comfort in the notion that he might have found peace and freedom in death. But in what state are our struggles if we somehow find reprieve in death? BEAUTIFUL, BUT THE STRUGGLE ISN’T SO LOVELY [A]s architects of discourse and as builders of a movement, what do we know about the bottom of the barrel? How is that place of knowledge, clarity, injustice and violence reflected in our work? What everyday choices would we make if we were accountable to that place?— Alexis Pauline Gumbs Colonialism, displacement, and the violence of the state has Afrikan communities under continual siege. The bottom of the barrel for Afrikans is a place of abject poverty, alienation from ancestral histories, and a place where every 28 hours an Afrikan person in the United States is murdered. The everyday survival of Afrikans, in a world that sees us as valuable only in terms of profit margins, is a revolutionary act in and of itself. **But we must constitute our revolutionary struggles beyond just survival.** What everyday choices are we making as Afrikan communities? What structures of governance are we creating or replicating? How do these structures affect our fight for self-determination? Afrikan communities are in a state of emergency. Our people are being killed in the name of ensuring the growth of capital and, by extension, the systems of white supremacy that embody its cultural hegemony. We are seeing these patterns from Haiti to the Congo. The continual subordination of Afrikans is the basis on which white supremacy flourishes. There is an inherent contradiction in the fact that Afrikans’ continue to seek refuge from this violence by imagining our freedom within the state. As Sem Mbah and I.E. Igariwey put it in their book, African Anarchism, “electoralism in Africa [and the Diaspora] is merely a diversionary tactic used to mask the transfer of power from one group of exploiters to the other. The fact that countries such as Congo, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Malawi have lately installed multi-party electoralism is evidence that it leads to nothing really new.” As architects of discourse and builders of movements, it is imperative that we shift our political paradigms and begin to act on alternatives that can provide for the material needs of Afrikan peoples, without further tightening the chains of our oppression. **Our self-determination cannot be confined to systems of governance that require us to always be hungry in order to function.** Kai Barrow calls this contradiction “**raw opposition**” — **a space that is created when people fighting to be free must navigate the reproduction of oppressive systems: “this contradiction creates a “raw opposition” that is explosive**… As organizers, our challenge is to identify the nature of our raw opposition and build/create within the space between oppression and freedom. We are charged with entering the space of raw opposition with clarity, precision, and analysis, passion, energy, and generosity.” The choices we make as organizers, if we were responsible to the explosive raw opposition, must incorporate anti-authoritarian alternatives. **Our appeals to the state are precisely what allowed our Afrikan Freedom Fighters to sit in solitary confinement for 42 years to find freedom only in death.** Our appeals to the state have gone unanswered. We must do things differently. We must, as C.L.R. James put it in his History of Pan-African Revolt, turn away “from protests by asking for reforms, to protests by revolutionary action.” WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE CALL-TO-ACTION BECOMES THE ACTION ITSELF? The Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island must also turn away from the endless cycles of protests and appeals to the state, by seeking new forms of revolutionary action. Before the glazed-eyed apathy of our media-haze became a stupor-induced refrain of endless proclamations, calls-to-action, proposed mobilizations and incessant repetitions of demands, there was movement. Indigenous people have long refused to be idle in the face of ongoing colonial violence. Our resistance remains a precondition of our survival. And though our organizational networks have expanded through the recent upsurge in Indigenous activism, existing colonial power structures remain intact. Indigenous resurgence continues to be met with equal and opposing force. How are we enacting new forms of struggle in the face of state violence and corporate coercion? The persistent survival of Indigenous nations has long been perceived by settler society as inherently outmoded, savage and obstructive. Yet **the seeds of our strength can be found in the occluded spaces of this narrative of domination**. Indigenous peoples’ collective capacity to obstruct, to interrupt and — substantively — to break from the destructive force of the colonial status quo, constitutes much of our “raw opposition” and regenerative political power. Our strength is constituted in a pre-colonial Indigenous nationhood that remains rooted in our homelands and territories, manifest in our laws, ways of life and traditional systems of governance. Our power predates the state’s official revisionist histories. Indigenous nationhood exceeds the limits of the settler imagination. The legacy of the Idle No More movement is to have given renewed voice to this disruption. When the movement exploded into public consciousness with the full force of our repressed histories of resistance, our struggles were made visible: colonial Canada was laid bare. And when thousands of our people lined the halls of parliamentary buildings, malls and public spaces, our multiplicity coalesced, powerfully, into the unitary force of a determined presence. We were many as one. But emergent fault lines became visible in the silences that followed. While some fight for decolonization, others continue to pursue ideals of justice and freedom defined by settler paradigms of state-based rights and recognition. Our movement has succumbed to new forms of stasis. We have been coerced into accepting the false promises of fulfilled treaty partnerships, revenue sharing agreements, Royal Proclamations, and United Nations declarations. Networks of Established Activism, and an accompanying phalanx of settler sympathizers, have infiltrated our movements at every turn. And this defanged form of contention is now performed through re-purposed protests, marches and re-branded public demonstrations. The “Indigenous rights revolution” has become a mechanical spectacle. Yet, facing this crisis of credibility, the rhetoric of sovereignty continues to be called upon to designate all forms of Indigenous political action. Sovereignty is proclaimed with every neoliberal utterance of selfhood, public declaration of presence, and aphoristic status update. What happens when the call-to-action becomes the action itself? Declarations of revolution remain trapped in their own enclosed rhetoric — abstracted from action and severed from the very doing and becoming that are necessary for us to produce alternative “possible futures”. Action becomes the production of affect, divorced from the more urgent project of transforming the material conditions of colonization that have produced our oppression in the first place. And as the recent crisis in Elsipogtog demonstrates, **every assertion of Indigenous autonomy that disrupts the flow of capital sparks a new round of state violence and repression**. “THE LOUDER MY VOICE THE DEEPER THEY BURY ME” Our organizing demands clarity of purpose in our actions in order to mutually reinforce our shared struggles, as peoples and nations, seeking to reorder our world. Actions that do not move us closer toward these objectives have to be jettisoned. If we can accept that raw opposition exists in the silences between battle cries and spectacularized public sentiments, we can recuperate the power of a potential found in interstitial disruptions of state-made memories. If we accept the current corporate form of Indigenous activism and Afrikan electoralism as the basis from which to articulate our political demands, we will encounter a form of colonial bondage which dictates that the struggle for freedom be waged in terms that are already accepted by state institutions. What does this freedom look like? As George Manuel reminds us, “They say freedom has no colour. It’s pure white”. Our survival as Afrikan peoples and the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island will be determined by how well we are able to build movements not for the sake of their own motion, but with the capacity to conceive and enact transformations of our existing political institutions. The textures of this transformation will require us to weave our resistance with fabrics of creativity and accountability. **These dreams of freedom mean that our acts of resistance are inextricably linked** as Afrikan peoples and Indigenous Peoples of Turtle Island. But fundamentally, **what this means is that we need to seriously, purposefully and with urgency begin look to each other — not to the state —** for our self-determination. As Kuwasi Balagoon put it, “freedom is a habit” we need to start practicing.

## CYBERNETICS

#### Attempts to restrain and control crisis creates a state of insecurity that makes conflict inevitable, this creates a vortex of death where the clean up of one crisis only guarantees the next–––exporting violence in order to preserve domestic peace makes instability perpetual

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If this scholarship charts global extensions of US security concerns, how is this assemblage of security and war theorized? Reyna (2016) draws on a Marxist structuralist view of global socioeconomic inequalities and contradictions. He makes a case both for the globalization of US warfare and for its imperial character from the early beginnings of the United States since its independence in 1783. But he focuses in detail on the period from 1945 to 2014. The most recent decades are described in terms of the “situational fixation” on oil and terror (Reyna 2016, p. 309). For instance, the US war in Afghanistan was an attempt to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda, where they formed from elements of the US-supported anti-Soviet mujahideen movement. But, for Reyna, it is also part of the “scramble” for Caspian oil that started in the 1990s. Because this area was landlocked, “Central Asian [oil] wars have actually been fought outside the Caspian Basin in areas suitable for pipelines,” namely in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Kosovo (Reyna 2016, p. 412). Force is a central category in Reyna’s approach. But it is a complex construct because its use is simultaneously the mark of a given system’s expansion and entropy. Elites’ structural dispositions produce d´elire—a constitutive anxiety that leads to violent action where and when, for this elite, “peace fails” but which in turn does not resolve but exacerbates socioeconomic and political contradictions. In Afghanistan, despite changing tactics and deploying new military technologies, including drones, the US military intervention failed on both oil and counterterror fronts (Reyna 2016, pp. 419–23). It is such a failure that engenders what Besteman (2017) terms a “security empire”: the “imposition” of multiple security regimes, in Somalia as her case in point, that are managed from the outside. These security regimes are constituted through the imperial logic of the US domestic concerns but with unintended consequences. She argues that it was the US foreign policy toward Somalia after 9/11 that enabled the emergence of Al Shabaab as an effective anti-Western terrorist group (Besteman 2017, p. 411). This action, in turn, made suspect, and thus vulnerable, Somalian refugees in the United States. In short, the incoherence and multiplicity of these security regimes are, in fact, generative of the opposite: “spaces of uncertainty, fear and violence” (p. 405). This view stems from Foucault’s (2003) understanding of the foundational role of security for the modern biopolitical state. If Reyna focuses on security elites as agents who decide on going to war, this perspective is about governance regimes over various populations that are continuous across “multiple and often interlocking spatial scales” that branch out from body, family, neighborhood, city, and region to the national and the global and, in turn, generating these spatial scales themselves (Gluck & Low 2017, p. 285). There is a homology between these ¨ spaces and scales, but it is relative. This perspective does not constitute a “Russian doll model of a fixed and nested hierarchy” but one of criss-crossing flows, linkages, and horizontal networks (p. 285; see also Fawaz & Bou Akar 2012, Goldstein et al. 2010). It is also hierarchical; its relatively homologous base is to ensure, however improbably, that there is no violence, whereas its top is to ensure that it can exercise violence. We see a Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence distributed unevenly in these spaces—hence the concept of “empire” in the singular rather than that of multiple “empires.” A military isomorphism developed along these spatial scales (Pretorius 2008) in what one may call security metrology, but of course it is not for all kinds of arms. A relative homology may blur the distinction between domestic and international states of security, but other distinctions are clear: There are constitutive acts of warfare that some agents, such as Reyna’s elites, can legitimately do and that others cannot and should not. Hardt & Negri (2000) identify the Christian concept of the just war in the face of the enemy that represents a moral as well as a military threat as underpinning this monopoly of violence. But it is Agamben (2005) who had been influential in linking these forms of governance and specific means of warfare. Drawing on Schmitt’s Political Theology, he highlighted the extralegality as a conceptual foundation of sovereignty, making it possible to address ethnographically the new reality of war, e.g., the unaccountability of its brutality, subcontacting, violations of human rights, use of foreign territories for prisons and violent interrogation, etc. This approach has been useful for understanding the beginning of the War on Terror. But both this war’s duration and its geopolitical effects—some revealed by the ethnographies of war that I discuss here and some that are still to be explored—challenge the analytic developed by Agamben. First, this perspective assumes a singularity of the concept of sovereignty. Here, the work of Asad (2007) on suicide bombing is suggestive of alternative views of sovereignty as well as of dangers of reading such alterity through a Euro-American lens, whether Orientalist or Agamben-inspired. Not all contemporary forms of citizenship are grounded in the distinction of z¯o¯e and bios—of bare or “natural” life versus “full” or “good” life. Not all contemporary forms of sovereignty have a legalistic foundation—specifically, the Roman law to which the state of emergency is a state of exception. Kalinin argues that the contemporary language of the Russian state is Bakhtinian as it draws on the notion of the outside that is nonfinalizable and thus unaccountable but not exceptional. He exemplifies this concept of the nonfinalizable with a statement of Russia’s Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu about the presence of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine: “It’s very difficult to look for a black cat in a dark room, especially if there’s not any cat. And it’s...stupid to look for a cat [there], if the cat is smart, bold and polite” (Kalinin 2017, p. 5). This statement simultaneously denies and admits, jokes and does not joke. The phrase “polite people” has become a euphemism for Russian troops in Crimea during its 2014 annexation. Second, in the hybrid peace that has emerged as a result of this warfare and global security regimes, these different forms of sovereignty are mutually constituted. The argument that Besteman (2017) makes with regard to Al Shabaab in Somalia as engendered by US foreign policy is applicable to the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The comment by Sergey Shoigu that Kalinin discusses is intended for a domestic audience. But if it implies at all the issue of international legitimacy of recent military interventions, it is only to question who exactly is the sovereign who decides on exceptions. In turn, Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical statements beginning with those from his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference consistently called into question the legitimacy of Western interventions from Kosovo to Iraq and Libya. But he also used these interventions to shape his own idiom of Russian sovereignty and its zone of influence (Russkii mir)—and not just to take Western interventions as a mark of a “new normalcy,” to borrow a 2001 phrase from US Vice President Dick Cheney, and not just to assert that the “theater of operations” that this “new” normalcy inaugurates (Masco 2014, pp. 7–8) is not a single-actor stage, but also to ground it in the narrative of the “old” normalcy of the Soviet and Russian imperial legacies. Third, the ethnography of war that I have discussed has raised doubts about whether this view of sovereignty is not contingent on “Schmittean politics” in which both sovereignty and security are territorially bound. Masco makes this point by drawing on the political philosopher Carlo Galli: Globalization is the epoch in which the State no longer protects its citizens from external turbulence. The principle of protego ergo obligo (“protection, therefore obedience”) was the load-bearing column of modern politics, but in the global age, anything can happen anywhere, at any moment, precisely because the State no longer filters disorder from the external environment (terrorist acts, migratory flows, the movement of capital) and is no longer capable of transforming it into internal peace. (Galli 2010, p. 158, cited in Masco 2014, pp. 35–36). Yet even if the state’s goal remains this filtering of disorder, this simply cannot be achieved by a global extension of domestic security. As Gusterson (2016) demonstrates, drone warfare and global surveillance technologies, while creating a global panoptic space, are not accompanied by a territorial rule aimed at transforming this gaze into disciplinary power. These technologies of global vision are deployed to guard security within select red lines and to do so by pointed and “nomadic” interventions (see on this further below). However, the recent shape of the “external environment” to which Galli refers is not simply global. It constitutes distinct territorial patterns of sources of danger and targets of military interventions. For instance, Reyna grounds the decision of US security elites to go to war in what he calls “Shultzian Permission.” This principle takes its cue from US Secretary of State George Shultz’s comments about one of the occasions when the Reagan administration resorted to violence: “If nothing else worked, the use of [military] force was necessary” (Reyna 2016, p. 45). War is a certain time when politics fails. However, this is not just time but also space. George Shultz’s case in point was not the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) but Grenada and Panama. Politics has not (as yet) failed in the relations between nuclear powers and in relations between nuclear powers and strong nonnuclear states, such as Turkey. The United States does not conduct undeclared drone warfare against Russia or China. There are places, however, where one can afford to have politics fail and where one can also afford significant enemy casualties while reducing one’s own to a minimum. This worldview is entrenched geopolitically as well as culturally and assumes a hierarchical division of spaces and populations. It was this that Schmitt (2006) has put as nomos: order that constitutes order, an ordo ordinans or “order of ordering” (p. 78). In other words, I argue that the analytical purchase of a “Schmittean politics” looks different if it does not privilege Schmitt’s Political Theology and The Concept of the Political but incorporates his other writing as well.

# AFF ANSWERS

### AT Thesis

#### Now is the time to rethink the way we think about outer space by shifting to an indigenous engagement with it

Smiles 20 (Deondre, “The Settler Logic of (Outer) Space”, October 26, 2020, <https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/the-settler-logics-of-outer-space)-> AB

Indigenous Engagement with ‘Space’ [image omitted] "River of Souls" by Carl Gawboy (as published in Indian Country Today, 4/2/16) I want to now turn our attention towards the possibilities that exist regarding Indigenous engagement with outer space. After all, the timing could not be more urgent to do so—we are now at a point where after generations and generations of building the myth that America was built out of nothing, we are now ready to resume the project of extending the reach of American military and economic might in space. To be fair, there are plenty of advances that can be made scientifically with a renewed focus on space exploration. However, history shows us that space exploration has been historically tied to military hegemony, and there is nothing in Mr. Trump’s temperament or attitude towards a re-engagement with space that suggest that his push toward the stars will be anything different. A sustained conversation needs to be had—will this exploration be ethical and beneficial to all Americans? One potential avenue of Indigenous involvement comes through the active involvement of Indigenous peoples and Indigenous perspectives in space exploration, of course. This involvement can be possible through viewing outer space through a ‘decolonial’ lens, for instance. Astronomers such as Prescod-Weinstein and Walkowicz have spoken about the need to avoid replicating colonial frameworks of occupation and use of space when exploring places such as Mars, for example (Mandelbaum, 2018). The rise of logics of resource extraction in outer-space bodies have led to engagements by other academics such as Alice Gorman on the agency and personhood of the Moon. Collaborations between Indigenous people and space agencies such as NASA help provide the Indigenous perspective inside space exploration and the information that is gleaned from it, with implications both in space and on a Earth that is dealing with climate crisis (Bean, 2018; Bartels, 2019). Another potential avenue of engagement with Indigenous methodologies and epistemologies related to space comes with engaging with Indigenous thinkers who are already deeply immersed into explorations of Indigenous ‘space’ here on Earth—the recent works of Indigenous thinkers such as Waziyatawin (2008) Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (2017), Natchee Blu Barnd (2018) and others provide a unique viewpoint into the ways that Indigenous peoples make and remake space—perhaps this can provide another blueprint for how we might engage with space beyond Earth. And that is just the work that exists within the academic canon. Indigenous people have always been engaged with the worlds beyond the Earth, in ways that often stood counter to accepted ‘settler’ conventions of space exploration (Young, 1987). In one example, when asked about the Moon landings, several Inuit said, "We didn't know this was the first time you white people had been to the moon. Our shamans have been going for years. They go all the time...We do go to visit the moon and moon people all the time. The issue is not whether we go to visit our relatives, but how we treat them and their homeland when we go (Young, 1987: 272).” In another example, turning to my own people, the Ojibwe, we have long standing cultural connections to the stars that influence storytelling, governance, and religious tenets (CHIN, 2003). This engagement continues through to the present day, and points to a promising future. A new generation of Indigenous artists, filmmakers, and writers are beginning to create works that place the Indigenous individual themselves into narratives of space travel and futurity, unsettling existing settler notions of what our future in space might look like. As Leo Cornum (2015) writes, “Outer space, perhaps because of its appeal to our sense of endless possibility, has become the imaginative site for re-envisioning how black, indigenous and other oppressed people can relate to each other outside of and despite the colonial gaze.” [image omitted] (Photo Credit: Indigenous Education Institute) These previous examples should serve as a reminder that the historical underpinnings of our great national myth are built upon shaky intellectual ground—we need to be honest about this. America did not just spring forth out of nothing; it came from the brutal occupation and control of Native lands. Despite the best efforts of the settler state, Native people are still here, we still exist and make vital contributions to both our tribal communities and science. We cannot expect Donald Trump to turn his back on the national myth of what made the United States the United States—in his mind, this is the glorious history of what made America great in the past. And it should serve as no surprise that Trump and others wish to extend this history into outer space. Even when Trump’s days in the White House are over, the settler colonial logics that underpin our engagement with land on Earth will still loom large over the ways that we may potentially engage with outer space. But for those of us who do work in Indigenous geographies and Indigenous studies, it becomes even more vital that we heed the calls of Indigenous thinkers inside and outside formal academic structures, validate Indigenous histories, and push to deconstruct the American settler myth and to provide a new way of looking at the stars, especially at a crucial moment where the settler state turns its gaze towards the same. [i] While this essay focuses on an American context, I highly recommend reading Alice Gorman’s piece “The cultural landscape of interplanetary space” for some examples outside of the United States, such as the British/Australian Woomera rocket range and its effects upon Aboriginal peoples.

#### Settler colonialism is an essentialist framework – in its desire to simplify the Native/Settler binary, it reproduces epistemological whiteness and undermines Indigenous knowledge

**Andersen 9** (Chris, Associate Professor of Native Studies at Alberta, “critical indigenous studies From Difference to Density”, Cultural Studies Review, Vol. 15 No 2 2009, pg. 80-100) //Don Markos

**Champagne’s abstraction**, imprecision and internal contradictions **make it difficult to produce definitive conclusions about his work**. However, **Indigeneity-as-different constitutes a major staple of his argument and even a sympathetic reading requires some agility to avoid the essentialism which grounds it.** My point is this: Champagne’s argument that the ‘**continued emphasis on how race and ethnic identity in mainstream institutions tends to overshadow the less well understood perspectives of an Indigenous paradigm grounded in the cultures, sovereignty, identities, land, and nation building of indigenous peoples’42 loses its relevance if it fails to include a precise explanation of what the latter terms mean and how they differ from ‘race’ and ‘ethnic identity’.** **His repeated failure to delineate them leaves little analytical purchase to deal with the complexities of being Indigenous in modern, Western societies, either with respect to how we identify ourselves, how we critique dominant, whitestream representations or how we employ Western discursive authorities in our daily struggles**. For example, **Champagne proposes that** ‘[i]mproving existing theories or categorizations [of Western disciplines] will involve significant revision, and it is doubtful that existing theories can conceptualize or explain the cultural, land, self-government, and col- onial histories of Indigenous nations’;43 and further, that ‘**most current theories do not provide powerful enough tools for explaining the Indigenous experience’**.44 **One of many questions which arise from such statements**, of course, **is the extent to which Indigenous studies**—which must necessarily **place itself within the same academic relations of power that shape ‘Western’ disciplines**—**can under any circumstances cash the kind of cheque Champagne is writing on its behalf** (more on this in part three). Of more immediate concern: **given that Native studies must operate within the forms of power and associated conditions of possibility that characterise other academic disciplines, what allows it to step outside in ways the other disciplines cannot? For Champagne**, it is our valorisation of Indigenous epistemologies. Given the centrality of his criticism of Western concepts, his positioning of their central terms deserves to be quoted in their full length, pre- cisely because they explicate the conceptual bases from which he launches his critique of Western disciplines: race: ‘Race and critical race theories focus on marginalization of socially conceived racial groups and provide critiques of dominant group methods of oppression and control ... **the focus of race and critical race theories tends to assume achievement of equality and inclusion into US society** as a primary goal.

#### Sweeping theories of radical indigenous ontological difference ignore the nuances of actual struggles that strategically repurpose settler categories

Rosenow, 19—Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Oxford Brookes University (Doerthe, “Decolonising the Decolonisers? Of Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy and Beyond,” Global Society, 33:1, 82-99)

Despite the force and importance of this argument, I have felt slightly uneasy when reading those conclusions. Focusing on radical ontological difference can easily lead to a romanticised reification of other peoples’ difference that is in danger of ignoring actual political struggles and demands on the ground. As Cusicanqui argues, those struggles might very well emerge out of an “indigenous modernity”, rather than an insistence on the right to one’s difference. By this she means that some Indigenous people aim to formulate a hegemonic vision for how to structure a society that is valid for everyone (Indigenous AND non-Indigenous): they work for a society that is in their “image and likeness”, and to use modern notions such as “citizenship” for this purpose, rather than rejecting the latter as irreconcilable with one’s own world.39 By contrast, some North American Indigenous intellectuals call for an Indigenous “resurgence” that, rather than seeking hegemony, altogether turns away from seeking recognition by wider (colonial) “society”. As Leanne Betasamosake Simpson points out, in such “resurgent mobilization … there is virtually no room for white people”. 40 But my unease was also emerging from something else, which is what I want to focus on in this article: the problem that encounters and conflicts are yet again made sense of within overarching structures of knowledge production rather than cultivation (despite the intention to do otherwise). As de la Cadena herself makes clear in the quotation above, what is encountered as “different” is inevitably described “in forms that I could understand” (my emphasis)—even whilst simultaneously recognising that one’s description does not capture what the encountered practices actually do. Sense-making, for de la Cadena, takes place at what could be called two levels: At a first level, there is the inevitable process of making sense of an alienating affective experience on the spot, from within one’s own framework of understanding the world. At a second level, then, de la Cadena attempts to make legible her grappling and not-understanding in the context of a book for an academically literate and interested audience—in other words, in the writing-up of her ethnographic research. In Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s case, given that their articles do not aim to make an empirical contribution, sense-making takes place at what could be called a third level: what is drawn upon is the understanding that emerged out of the ethnographic work of others, which is brought into conversation with various bodies of theoretical work in order to make a conceptual contribution. This takes place via the coining of central concepts and the outlining of all-encompassing frameworks that are meant to help us understand the analytical, normative and political consequences of their argument for scholarly work more broadly. The ontological encounters of others are used to delineate the merits of ontological encounters in general, in IR and beyond. This objective leads to a particular way of developing and structuring a generic argument that makes it difficult to move beyond sense-making frameworks that are necessarily geared towards settling all those unsettling and disconcerting experiences that were the focus of the articles in the first place. This is also the problem of some central decolonial work. Drawing on Edouard Glissant, Mignolo, for example, critiques the “requirement of transparency” that forms the basis for understanding in Western social science scholarship. He argues for the “right to opacity” of those located on the other side of the colonial difference.41 But this claim sits at odds with his simultaneous desire to write a new, all-encompassing history of “the modern/colonial world system”. 42 And like in Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s articles, terms such as “pluriversality”43 or “diversality”44 are coined in order to have a (one!) concept for a similarly all-encompassing solution to domination. While de la Cadena is critical of her own “anxiety to understand coherently (with which I meant clearly and without contradiction”), and while she points out how this “was often out of place”, 45 Mignolo as well as Rojas and Blaney and Tickner seek to place such anxiety in yet another coherent framework that holds everything together. The question arises whether this can be any different in scholarly work that is not directly based on ethnographic research itself, and which can therefore not lay claim to a direct experience of ontological controversies. This has become an important question for my own (likewise third-level) work on anti-GMO activism. My work to date has primarily aimed at making a conceptual contribution, and has relied on a conversation between the ethnographic research of others and various bodies of conceptual work, including decolonial and “ontological turn” literature.46 But as I have already indicated in relation to de la Cadena’s work, when writing up their research for academic purposes, even those who have directly experienced ontological encounters find it hard to resist the tendency to conclude their work with stringent, overarching, coherent conclusions that the Westerneducated reader can grasp and “take home”. In the next section, I will draw on two anthropological ethnographic texts that are significant for research on the GMO controversy to show how this works. The two texts that will be analysed in the next section engage with the GMO controversy in Paraguay and Mexico respectively, and they have stood out for me in the way they manage to convey a sense of unease and grappling with ontological encounters and conflicts. However, as the next section will show, they as well end up providing a framework and conclusions that can accommodate and make sense of the encountered ontological difference. 3. Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy According to Susana Carro-Ripalda and Marta Astier, much of the research that is carried out in relation to the question of what smallholder producers in the Global South truly think of (and say about) agricultural biotechnology is unable to grasp the “ontological incompatibility” that exists between the experienced human/nonhuman relations in small-scale agriculture on the one hand, and the logic that underlies genetic engineering (GE) on the other.47 This is precisely because most social research is itself grounded in the crucial modern/colonial nature-culture divide: the former can only be known through scientific means, while the latter can be known through the study of social/cultural/political practices. Knowledge about nature is about establishing “facts”, which are either true or false (i.e. nature as “one” is either correctly or incorrectly represented), while knowledge about culture is about studying meaning, which is necessarily (due to the existence of different cultures) multiple. The question of whether GMOs do or do not pose a “factual” danger consequently lies outside of the remit of the social sciences, which therefore focus on the social dimension of statements that are made about nature. But as Kregg Hetherington’s reflections on his own anthropological research journey in Paraguay make clear, this tacit signing-up to modern ontology can lead to difficulties in understanding the reality of the people one is interested in.48 Coming from a position in which he took for granted the scientific distinction between (proven) “fact” and “error”, Hetherington explains how he “translate[d]” the claims of the leader of a local peasant movement49 (Antonio) about the truth of (GM) soy “killer beans” into something else: Until this point, I had approached ethnography as an extended discussion with and about humans, and I was less interested in beans than I was with what Antonio said about them … To be blunt, Antonio kept pointing at the beans, and I kept looking at him … I was comfortable saying that this was a figure of speech, a kind of political rhetoric, or even to claim that this is what Antonio believed, all of which explicitly framed ‘la soja mata’ (soy kills) as data for social analysis, rather than analysis itself worthy of response.50 However, Hetherington points out that not believing in the truth of the killer bean did not prevent him from “participating in Antonio’s knowledge practices”. 51 Becoming involved in the anti-soy bean activism of the peasants, Hetherington became “part of the situation” that made the killer bean turn into a crucial agent in a court case that was brought against two soy farmers for the murder of two activist peasants. As a result, killer beans became transformed into a matter of national concern. Crucially for Hetherington, participation involved more than joining the situation in spite of his lack of belief: it led to him becoming immersed in a relation with both peasants and beans that started to have a physical impact on him—in de la Cadena’s words, he indeed became “partially connected”: 52 Beans didn’t scare me at first. Indeed, as a foreigner to the situation that gives rise to killer beans (a Canadian no less), giant fields of soy were a familiar, even a comforting sight. But it took only a few months with Antonio for me to start feeling the menace from those fields. Soon, the sweetish smell of glyphosate, recently applied, and especially the corpselike smell of 2, 4-D mixed with Tordon, could ruin my appetite and make me expect to see people emerge from their homes to show me pustules on their legs and stomachs.53 Similar observations are also found in Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s contribution to the 2014 Agriculture and Human Values symposium on the challenges of making smallholder producer voices being heard in relation to agricultural biotechnology.54 While most of the contributions to the symposium concentrate on how to tease out smallholders’ “real” voices in the most effective way, Carro-Ripalda and Astier critically reflect on their own perceived failure to become knowledgeable about smallholders’ voices in their research on GM maize cultivation in Mexico. It was through ethnographic fieldwork in rural areas in Central Mexico, in-depth structured interviews, focus groups, participant observation and, finally, a National Workshop in Mexico City with over 50 stakeholders (including smallholder producers) that Carro-Ripalda and Astier attempted to get a better sense of what the actual voices of peasants in the GM controversy were trying to convey.55 However, particularly the final workshop, which aimed to create conditions under which Mexican smallholder producers could speak on their own terms about GM maize cultivation, “unwittingly reproduced the conditions of exclusive, techno-scientific and regulatory spaces”. 56 The public discourse that centres on questions of safety, science, possibilities of regulation and problems of potential contamination, and which is upheld by both GM maize proponents and antiGMO activists, dominated the workshop debate. Even when present smallholders raised different concerns, the discussion always returned to the previous, main ones, as if those who had spoken differently “had not spoken at all”. The way that smallholders could articulate “their perceptions, ideas, and desires” was thereby “severely limited”. 57 Carro-Ripalda and Astier are focused on the dominance of one particular (techno-scientific, regulatory) discourse that, they maintain, disabled smallholder voices engaged in different discourses from speaking up or, when speaking, from being heard. In other words, smallholders were unable to adequately represent their own understanding of what is at stake in the GM maize controversy in Mexico. Considering what I have pointed out in the previous section, based on Rojas, difference is thereby transformed into an epistemological, rather than an ontological one: Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s argument is implicitly based on the assumption that, under the right conditions, difference can be translated into something that can be communicated to, and discussed with, other stakeholders. But the term “ontological incompatibility” that the authors themselves use indicates there is something else at play, which cannot easily be translated: the nature of the relation of smallholder producers to their “land, seed, crop, climate … as told and understood by themselves”; the “central place” that Maize continues to occupy in Mesoamerican pre-Hispanic cosmology, and “the social and cultural significance” that goes along with that.58 Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s emphasis on the problem of the dominant discourse, and the overarching Mexican structures of domination this discourse is related to (such as the “neoliberal vision of the Mexican agricultural future”59), makes it occasionally difficult to understand what the problem of “ontological incompatibility” really is about. At the end of the article, the place of the smallholder producers whom they have engaged seems once again clearly delineated and knowable: at stake for smallholders are, Carro-Ripalda and Astier argue, “their lives as maize cultivators, their pride in their craft and knowledge, and their ceremonially demanded right to information, choice and access to their ‘own resources’”. It is not just about “retaining ‘traditional’ ways of agriculture”, as the anti-GMO movement maintains, but also about claiming “political, economic and socio-cultural rights.”60 Though this certainly adds a significant dimension to the debate, it indeed simply seems to add to, rather than radically challenge, the frameworks that are conventionally used in the anti-GMO debate, as well as the frameworks that focus on how to bring out and represent other people’s “voices” in a better way. Is this simply unavoidable when it comes to the production of academic knowledge through/in academic writing? As already indicated in the previous section, academic writing pursues by definition the objective of enhancing knowledge and providing improved insight into a certain situation. In its very structure, an academic piece of work aims to resolve and settle, rather than to dislocate, to destabilise, or to provide discomfort. Carro-Ripalda and Astier’s article is meant to render legible their own encounter of ontological difference for an academic audience. Is it possible for the reader to dig below these representational strategies, and to relate more directly to their encounter of what they themselves call ontological incompatibility? And which has led them to brand their final workshop, in a quite un-academic way, as a “failure”? There are a few places in the article in which their inability to put into words and arguments all of “the complexity of experiences, relations and reasons that bind people to maize”61 is more obvious. Becoming attuned to this complexity is linked to the authors having to become at least “partially connected”—to yet again use de la Cadena’s phrase—to the relations they attempt to trace. It is interesting, for example, that Carro-Ripalda and Astier talk about “voices” as going beyond the semantic level, as conveying something acoustically, and as requiring a form of listening that shies away from asking pre-given questions. It is also interesting that some of that took place when they literally walked together with their interlocutors; precisely as it is emphasised by Blaney and Tickner:62 Despite the shortcomings of the workshop … we felt that that, through our research on the ground, we had engaged with male and female farmers, heard about their perspectives on GM and their visions of a rural future, and accompanied them to work in milpas and markets. So, what do smallholder farmers’ voices sound like? What meanings did they convey to us? We will provide here but a few of those sounds and meanings … 63 Despite returning to the idea of voices as conveying “meaning” in this quote, meaning is related to sounds, to walking together, to particular places with their own sounds, smells, and colours. The sample of actual “voices” Carro-Ripalda and Astier then choose to present yet again invoke an intricate sense of the relationality of farmers and nonhumans: It is a joy to plant, getting hold of the maize, of a beautiful cob which is pleasant, to go to the harvest, to look at pretty cobs, all regular. Because this is what sustains me. You can see the difference in the seeds straight away … You need to look at the cob and as soon as I grab it I see the difference. It is the person who knows the seed the one who chooses it [for replanting the following year].64 By contrast, GM maize is associated by the smallholders whom Carro-Ripalda and Astier cite with feelings of “artificiality, estrangement and distrust towards the created object (the GMO) in itself, not only because of deep ontological considerations … but because of the political and economic motives which are ‘assembled’ into it.”65 Although the authors make a distinction between ontology and politics/ economics here, their invoking of the “assemblage” precisely shows how the latter becomes part of ontology itself, and then (as in the case of Hetherington) impacts on the sensual, bodily connection with the maize. Understanding the relation between “things” in this way allows for an analysis of power and domination that has at least the potential of moving beyond pre-given frameworks; strategically suspending them in order to “sharpen [the] analysis of exactly how power operates, how relations are made and undermined, and with what consequences”. 66 Genetically modified maize is a problem because it is part of particular Mexican neoliberal visions and strategies, but in the context outlined by Carro-Ripalda and Astier, that vision is not only (and not even primarily) made sense of through given frames of knowledge, such as Marxist theories of the exploitation of labour, but sensually, through the way it disrupts the (physical) pleasure and joy that has sustained the farmer-maize-assemblage so far.67 GM technology externalises the maize from farmers and estrange them from their ways of life; and it is only through this externalisation that GM maize becomes perceivable as a potential source of “contamination”, as a danger against which farmers need to “defend” their seeds.68 Now, some might counter that the previous paragraph in practice only provides a fancy repackaging of the two well-rehearsed arguments brought forward by many anti-GMO activists: (a) that the problem of GMOs is an intrinsic property that makes it “unsafe” (which activists try to scientifically prove), and/or (b) that the fundamental problem of agricultural biotechnology is that it estranges farmers from their traditional, ancestral way of life, that it allows for their exploitation, and that it provides a further foothold for neoliberal visions of how the world should be ordered. Both arguments are grounded in modern ontology: the first goes down the route of science (contesting “facts” about the “nature” of GMOs on the basis of science itself), while the second goes down the “social” route by either making a case for the need to respect cultural multiplicity, or for the need to prevent economic exploitation. Some activists make use of all of these routes and arguments. Famous environmental activist and intellectual Vandana Shiva, for example, determines the alienating character of the GMO to be an intrinsic property, while at the same time depicting smallholder producers as intrinsic “‘reservoirs’ of local or indigenous knowledge or as ‘natural’ conservators of biodiversity through their traditional practices”. 69 According to Carro-Ripalda and Astier, this “unwittingly reinforce[es] images of smallholder producers as passive, timeless and voiceless.”70 This leads to precisely the sort of romanticised reification of “difference” that I have critiqued in the previous section of this article—paradoxically, in this case, on the basis of an ontology that is deeply modern, as it regards both “things” and “people” as ontologically stable and classifiable. By contrast, the authors of the two texts I have analysed in this section trace ontological encounters that cannot be contained by the nature/culture dichotomy. There is no pre-given (social) theory of neoliberalism and global power relations that dictates how the “voice” of the farmer needs to be made sense of. There is also no pregiven understanding of the “factual” (scientific) nature of GMOs. The notion of radical difference that comes up in these two texts emerged from precisely the “misunderstandings” that the encounter of ethnographers with “other people” and their relations brought to the fore; but importantly, it did not make any clearer to the ethnographer what the “stuff” that grounded the misunderstandings is actually composed of.71 Yet, somewhat paradoxically, despite all this emphasis on misunderstandings, incompatibility, grappling, failure, and critical self-reflection of one’s own assumptions—at the end of the day what is left for the readers (at least if they do not explicitly focus on the “ethnographic excess” found in the writings) is the impression that they know more about “stuff” than they did before: that they understand the situation better, that new knowledge has been produced, that the object of analysis is more transparent than it has been before. How can this subjugation of the encountered ontologically difference to academic strategies of comprehensive sense-making avoided (if at all)? This article itself is now coming up to what would normally be a conclusion—i.e. the treacherous waters of nailing its contribution to knowledge. Given that this article is yet again another “third-level” engagement with questions of ontology and decoloniality, the question is whether there is any way to avoid this pull of hegemonic modes of academic knowledge production. Rather than providing a conclusion and reiterate the core argument that the article has made, I will attempt to finish this piece by raising even more questions, and by providing some further reflections. 4. Turtles all the Way Down: (Further) Reflections on What Questions to Ask The pull of hegemonic systems of academic knowledge production is difficult to avoid. This is the case even in writings that are directly based on ontological encounters and controversies, and that reflect on the displacement that encountering different ontologies has entailed. But as I have indicated, this problem is even more pronounced in writings—like my own—that provide what I have previously called “third-level” sense-making of ontological encounters. The contribution of third-level analysis is usually a conceptual one, which makes it by definition veer towards the general and abstract rather than the concrete. In relation to the literature on decolonial thought and the ontological turn, this becomes manifest in three different (yet interrelated) ways: first, in the desire to provide an understanding of ontology that enables a conceptualisation of the former as multiple. Drawing on the work of Mario Blaser and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro respectively, Rojas and Blaney and Tickner argue that ontology can be thought of as multiple if reality is understood as always being “enacted” or “performed”. 72 This is what Blaser calls an understanding of ontology as “materialsemiotic”: one that defines reality as “always in the making through the dynamic relations of hybrid assemblages”. 73 Pinpointing it like this is inevitably geared towards answering the question of what reality as such, in general is about. Secondly, there is an ambition to coin the general normative-political project that arises out of this understanding with a singular concept, such as the pluriverse. Thirdly, arguments about ontological multiplicity and the emancipatory-decolonial political projects that arise out of its recognition are written for an audience of a particular discipline, such as IR: the aim is to provide a wholesale, general rethinking, or, indeed, “reconstruction” of the latter.74 What sort of questions drive conceptual work into that direction, and what desire “to know” underlies the questions? According to Cherokee philosopher Brian Yazzie Burkhart, for Native Americans “the questions we choose to ask are more important than any truths we might hope to discover in asking such questions”. 75 By contrast, Western knowledge is always (at least in the mainstream) propositional knowledge: “knowledge of the form ‘that something is so’”. Here, knowledge cannot be verified by referring to direct experiences: “there must be something underlying them and justifying them”. 76 Burkhart gives the example of the “routine response” given by “Western people” to Indigenous accounts of creation: “In [one] account, the earth rests on the back of a turtle. The Western response to this account is simply the question, ‘What holds the turtle?’” This question makes no sense to the Native storyteller, because the truth of the story lies in the paths to rightful action that it outlines, rather than what it has to say about the “reality” of the world. But when the Westerner insists on the question, the answer finally is: “‘Well, then there must be turtles all the way down’.”77 Equating Rojas’ and Blaney and Tickner’s work with European mainstream (hence analytic) philosophy seems, at first glance, incredibly unfair. After all, those authors precisely advocate the cultivating of knowledge by direct awareness or acquaintance in exactly the way that Burkhart identifies as typical for Native Americans. But on the other hand, the framework that circumscribes their emphasis on the need for “concreteness” is still an abstract one that wants to answer the question of how things really are and should be: enacted, performed, pluriversal, … The point is not whether this argument about reality and politics is right or wrong. The point is to recognise that it is driven by particular questions that might make no sense in the context of other intelligence systems, but that need to be addressed in an academic article in order to make a conceptual argument compelling, convincing and original for an audience that primarily sits (whether it likes it or not) within a Western, colonial, hegemonic system of knowledge production.78 And even when the contribution to knowledge production is not primarily conceptual, as in the “second-level” work that I have analysed in the previous section in relation to the GMO controversy, the final argument that is made (e.g. about peasants’ economic and cultural rights) is yet again lucid and comprehensible to an audience that seeks to comprehend “stuff” within modern parameters. Where to go from here (particularly as a white, European scholar)? As suggested by Tucker, one way might be to engage in much more direct, ethnographic research, which would enable more direct experience of ontological encounters. Despite previously-mentioned problems of even that research not going far enough, there is without doubt more space for providing a sense of grappling and dislocation if the originality of a piece of work is not purely grounded in the conceptual contribution it aims to make. However, not every scholar is able— body-, context- or funding-wise—to spend extensive periods of time in different places, and the ethical and political pitfalls of researching “radical difference” through fieldwork with—but often rather on—others have been pointed out by Indigenous scholars numerous times.79 But even for those unable or unwilling to do more primary, empirical research, there is space to push the boundaries of what can and should be written about (and how). For decades there have been attempts to provide “innovative” platforms, for example at conferences, to talk about “stuff” in different ways (e.g. through storytelling or artistic practices; not at least by e.g. Indigenous peoples themselves80). However, these “innovations” are still at the margins, and they will most likely never be able to compete with acknowledged knowledge production outlets such as journal articles and scholarly books. But even within the latter, there is always at least some space to push for more open-endedness, more reflection on the author’s embodied positionality, more auto-critique, more uncertainty and grappling (even if this is based on reading about the ontological encounters of others). Although this sort of embodied self-reflection on a writer’s “situatedness” (which in my own case means being “on the colonising side of a divide”81) has obviously been advanced by many critical scholars for decades (including feminists and post- as well as decolonial scholars), this article has hopefully shown that there is still (always) a need to go further, in order to more fundamentally challenge hegemonic, modern/colonial modes of knowledge production. The sense of unease that I have outlined in section two was particularly strong when reading conclusions that were geared towards making recommendations for the discipline of IR, or for “international politics”, as such. Aiming to make generic conclusions for entire disciplines, political fields, or global “issues” pushes the generality and abstraction of a contribution even further away from an advocacy of the concrete. Why, and to whom, does it matter whether IR, as a discipline, or international politics, as object of study, becomes more pluriversal or not? What are the actual benefits of the concept of the pluriverse in the first place? Or to pick up the theme of this special issue: why does it matter whether IR is, or should move into, a mode of affirmation rather than critique?82 Why is this a good question to ask—and for whom? This is not just a theoretical problem, but it has real-life consequences for actually-existing decolonial struggles. The desire for making a generic argument about relational ontologies and a pluriversal politics harbours the danger of making a huge variety of demands and struggles that often exist in tension and contradiction with each other commensurable. Indigenous demands for the repatriation of “their” land might be at odds with the social justice demands for redistribution and “the commons”. 83 For Blaney and Tickner, decolonial thought is commensurable with not just the ontological turn literature, but also feminist and other critical interventions.84 Mignolo and Arturo Escobar advocate a transnational fight for global justice and are enthusiastic about the potential of global movements to achieve that aim together.85 Like Mignolo, Rojas explicitly draws on the World Social Forum slogan “Another world is possible” as well as the Zapatistas slogan of “a world where many words fit” to make her case about the need for a pluriversal understanding of emancipatory-decolonial politics.86 While it can be argued that this problem of seeing all these struggles and demands as commensurable goes back to a lack of actual engagement with particular decolonial practices and battles, what I have argued in this article is that it is also related to the problem of how and what sort of knowledge is produced and valued in the Western academy: knowledge that is abstract, generic, and applicable beyond a specific context. Knowledge that is driven by the desire to know what is. Knowledge that desires to know what holds the turtle—all the way down.

#### Liberal democracy is self-reflexive and good

Youngs, Director-General FRIDE, ’11 [February 2011, Richard- Professor Politics University of Warwick, “Misunderstanding The Maladies Of Liberal Democracy Promotion” <http://www.eurasiareview.com/misunderstanding-the-maladies-of-liberal-democracy-promotion-18022011/>] //Don Markos

Reflections on liberalism’s future Current international political trends are complex and still in flux. History shows that there are no iron laws of democratisation, and dominant political dynamics can prove strikingly changeable. The easy triumphalism of the liberal democracy agenda in the 1990s was misplaced. However, much criticism now risks over-shooting.18 The Bush administration provided an easy dog to kick. But its excessive awfulness skewered the nature of conceptual debate: critical theory has become as lacking in self-reflexivity as the ‘liberal imperialism’ it everywhere sees and excoriates. A nuanced view is warranted of the ‘democracy backlash’.19 We should be attentive to a lack of flexibility in the conceptualisation of democracy. The consideration of a variety of models is necessary and desirable. However, the evidence does not sustain the suggestion that the most serious problem with democracy promotion today is an excess of the ‘liberal’ in liberal democracy. Indeed, in many places quite the reverse is true. The most worrying problem is not practitioners’ lack of willingness to consider varieties of democratic institutions, but the lack of priority attached to advancing core liberal rights. As Western powers decline, this trend is likely to deepen in the future. Liberalism will increasingly be on the back foot. In this sense, those that assume that liberalism is dominant risk lagging behind the policy curve. Dahl’s definition of democracy may be partial and narrow, but can we really not say with confidence that it is better than the authoritarianism that the West is still propping up under the guise of respect for ‘local values’? Moreover, the ‘liberal overdose’ argument is curious to the extent that since the end of the 1990s a central thrust of debate common to development, security and governance circles has been ‘the rediscovery of the state’. The stress on core liberal political norms is today under- not over-played. It continues to be the centrally important area where local reformers look to the international community for support – most commonly, in vain. Deliberations over precise institutional configurations and second-generation reforms are of a lesser order of importance. Michael McFaul observes that some debates about the intricate sequencing of reform and different varieties of institutional pathways look incongruous, as the US can today do little to influence such details, but rather simply back core democratic values.20 Yet it still hesitates to do so, for all the standard commentary on US ‘liberal imperialism’. Liberal internationalism is still de-legitimised by the pervasive assumption that it is concerned primarily with mobilising military force in support of democratic values; it must be made clearer that military power is simply anathema to the standard day-to-day agenda of democracy support. There are different levels of critique, which risk elision. One thing is to argue that Western powers should support core liberal democratic principles, then from this base work to build into their policies a concern with social equality, participation, deliberation and religious identity. It would be entirely convincing to argue that, while democracy promoters have advanced, they could and should be doing more in this direction. But it is quite another thing to suggest that such aims should be supported against or instead of core liberal norms. In practice, what many critics appear to advocate is not a cumulative combination, but a dilution of the liberal component in favour of other forms. They betray a core inconsistency: they dislike democracy promotion for being overly intrusive, but then advocate modifications that would make it more, not less, intrusive. This is because most suggested ‘alternative forms of democracy’ breach the line between process and substantive policy outputs – they advocate particular ends, not just a type of policy-making means. The concrete examples of European policies demonstrate that it is hardly credible to ‘accuse’ Brussels of being an unthinking citadel of blinkered liberalism. Indeed, in this author’s experience, conversations with policy-makers reveal this to be akin to an almost unmentionable L-word. When so much doubt and ambivalence now suffuses democracy support strategies, it is unconvincing to admonish the latter for being uniformly, heavily prescriptive. Donors’ tendency to see democracy through the prism of their own political systems still often surfaces. But in terms of the way that the ‘democracy’ in democracy support is defined conceptually it would seem somewhat redundant now to warn donors of the dangers of heavily-prescriptive institutional templates. There is some evidence of the self-reflexive policy-learning on the part of democracy promotion practitioners that many critics assume is entirely lacking. Indeed, genuine doubt over the most suitable paths forward has reached the point where some actors’ policies are reduced to immobilism. The problem is that while policy-relevant knowledge has accumulated, it has done so in an ad hoc fashion and has not been systematised into common or comprehensive new approaches.21 The influences on democracy strategy of academic traditions are eclectic. If we were to trace the philosophical roots of European good governance and democracy support policies, it is simply not the case that Locke prevails over all else. The breadth of democracy assistance programmes goes way beyond the Schumpeterian. The stress on the role of the state and the existential identity-value of the political community found in many current policy initiatives finds resonance (if unconsciously) in thinking that historically stood as the antithesis to political liberalism. Such a line can be traced from Aristotle’s view of the political community as a biological organism; to Rousseau’s insistence that the general will embodies a mystical, spiritual collective identity of the political community above and beyond the will of the majority; through to Hegel’s system centred on the state as the organic embodiment of collective interests and identity, the ‘absolute’ within which the individual finds his very meaning. This is not to say any such strand of thinking would capture entirely the ideas that inform today’s foreign policies. However, the pertinent point is that the underpinnings of these policies can be seen in writers who were in combat with Lockean liberalism. The standard European discourse on equality being more important than formal political democracy has a direct echo in (politically) anti-liberal Rousseau. Concerns over the ‘tyranny of the majority’ that inform power-sharing strategies in post-conflict situations have a long line of antecedent philosophers who inveighed strongly against the will of the majority, from Aristotle through even to Kant (who was concerned with the republican separation of executive and legislation but certainly not with augmenting popular power against the aristocracy). Even Benthamite radical utilitarianism shines through, in its concern with a strong rule of law to restrain individual freedoms and ensure greater equality in the furtherance of collective interests. If any modern philosopher is the thinker of choice for today’s discerning Eurocrat it is Habermas, not the classic liberals. In general, deliberative democracy has been most widely advocated as a means of situating abstract cosmopolitan universalism within concrete and varied social settings.22 And all this is quite apart from the more obvious cases of cynical realpolitik that take their cue from the more violent illiberalism of Machiavelli and Hobbes.23 It is self-evident that liberal democracy now shares the conceptual field with rivals in a way that it did not in the 1990s. This may provide for vibrant debate and much-needed selfexamination. But it does not necessarily mean that alternatives have superior legitimacy. Allowing analytic space for a wider variety of forms and definitions of democracy does not mean that sovereign democracy, Islamic democracy, tribal democracy or Bolivarian democracy are necessarily superior or more in tune with local demands. With the West accused of being overly-prescriptive of a liberal form of democracy, it would be subversive of the critique to jump straight into advocating other pre-cooked forms. It should be remembered that a form such as social democracy is just as ‘Western’ in it origins as liberal democracy: there is no reason a priori to assume that it corresponds more closely to ‘local demands’ in the way that is routinely and rather uncritically suggested (however one may oneself desire socially democratic outcomes). If the ascendance of conceptual competitors can add usefully to the parameters of desirable political reform, it is not incompatible with this that they should at the same time sharpen the West’s defence of core liberalism. Critical theorists skate a thin line: they issue pleas for a rethinking of democracy, but scratch beneath the surface and what they really lionise is undemocratic state-led development; theirs is in fact not a genuine concern with reconceptualising democracy so much as a pretty wholesale questioning of the democracy agenda, dressed up in softened discourse. A central pivot of many such critiques is the criticism of liberalism’s teleological arrogance. But this centres too much on one influential book published at one rather distinctive moment in time24; liberalism more broadly and properly understood is not teleology. Moreover, many writers argue against teleology and prescription but then in the next breath confidently assert that social democracy must be a superior and more acceptable form of democracy outside the West and one which has a more sustainable long-term future. This may be the case, but they have no philosophical justification for saying so without replicating the very same methodological features they profess to dislike in ‘liberal’ tenets – and thus contradicting themselves. Clearly, more debate about different forms of political representation would be healthy. Allowing space for a plurality of routes to and types of political reform would sit well with the core spirit of democracy. However, while more flexibility and open mindedness are still required in democracy promotion, there is a risk of being unduly defensive about the virtues of liberal democracy’s core tenets. The problem in many places of the world is the absence of liberalism’s core values, not their excess. Vigilance in the need for democracy’s reconceptualisation is indeed merited. But it would be a muddled reasoning that took this to provide a case for the wholesale pull back from the (already anaemic) support for liberal democracy’s notion of fundamental political rights. We need more fully to understand local demands. But there is an automatic assumption routinely made that such demands are for more diverse, anti-liberal political forms. This may in many places be the case, but the evidence must be assembled. One cannot simply assert this as if it were axiomatic to the emerging world order; there is no reason for supposing a priori that this is a natural outcome of the rebalancing of international order. The evidence that exists points, again, to a more nuanced conclusion: a demand for the essential tenets of liberal universalism, made relevant to and expressed through the language and concepts of local cultures and histories. A growing focus within political philosophy has been on ‘capabilities’: negative liberal freedoms need to be deepened but also combined with the locally-rooted capabilities that ensure their effective realisation.25 The central thrust of Locke’s liberalism was anti-dogmatism and prudence. The irony – and, for anyone concerned over democracy’s health, the tragedy – is that international support for a supposedly liberal democratic agenda is today associated with exactly the opposite of these values. It is the non-dogmatic spirit that liberalism must work to recover: liberal democracy as a system that (simply) creates space for a variety of different local choices. Advocates and opponents of liberalism are trapped in a circular debate over this matter: while core liberal freedoms are required to make such local choices, critics insist that those very liberal rights are themselves a corruption of local autonomy. The imperative is not for liberalism to cede to other creeds, but to work towards squaring the circle that has always existed at its heart: that is, liberalism is in its very essence the rejection of utopian political design, yet, if not pursued with care, it can appear as an unbending utopia. This defines its challenge: can liberalism stand convincingly as an anti-utopian creed whose own propulsion requires courageous normative conviction? Can it strike the Rawlsian balance of deepening a plurality of values without descent into relativism?

### State Good

#### Their understanding of the state as unified, immutable, and inevitably dangerous to Indigenous actors creates a pessimism trap that stifles Indigenous agency and activism.

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Pessimism Trap 2: The State is Unified, Deliberate and Unchanging in Its Desire to Dispossess Indigenous Peoples and Gain Unfettered Access to Indigenous Lands and Resources

In other words, colonialism by settler states is a constant, not a variable, in both outcome and intent. Further, the state is not only intentionally colonial, but it is also unifed in its desire to co-opt Indigenous peoples as a method and means of control.

In 2005’s Wasase, Alfred presents the state as unitary, intentional and unchanging in its desire to colonise and oppress Indigenous peoples noting, ‘I think that the only thing that has changed since our ancestors first declared war on the invaders is that some of us have lost heart’.22 Referring to current state policies as a ‘self-termination movement’, Alfred states, ‘It is senseless to advocate for an accord with imperialism while there is a steady and intense ongoing attack by the Settler society on everything meaningful to us: our cultures, our communities, and our deep attachments to land’.23

Alfred’s Peace, Power, Righteousness (2009) also argues that the state is deliberate and unchanging, stating quite plainly that ‘it is still the objective of the Canadian and US governments to remove Indians, or, failing that, to prevent them from benefitting, from their ancestral territories’.24 Contemporary states do this, he argues, not through outright violent control but ‘by insidiously promoting a form of neo-colonial self-government in our communities and forcing our integration into the legal mainstream’.25 According to Alfred, the state ‘relegates indigenous peoples’ rights to the past, and constrains the development of their societies by allowing only those activities that support its own necessary illusion: that indigenous peoples today do not present a serious challenge to its legitimacy’.26

Linking back to the aim of co-option, Alfred argues that while the state’s desire to control Indigenous peoples and lands has never changed, the techniques for doing so have become subtler over time. ‘Recognizing the power of the indigenous challenge and unable to deny it a voice’, due to successful Indigenous resistance over the years, ‘the state has (now) attempted to pull indigenous people closer to it’.27 According to Alfred, the state has outwitted Indigenous leaders and ‘encouraged them to reframe and moderate their nationhood demands to accept the fait accompli of colonization, (and) to collaborate in the development of a “solution” that does not challenge the fundamental imperial lie’.28

In a similar vein, Coulthard’s central argument is centred on his understanding of the dual structure of colonialism. Drawing directly from Fanon, Coulthard finds that colonialism relies on both objective and subjective elements. The objective components involve domination through the political, economic and legal structures of the colonial state. The subjective elements of colonialism involve the creation of ‘colonized subjects’, including a process of internalisation by which colonised subjects come to not only accept the limited forms of ‘misrecognition’ granted through the state but can even come to identify with it.29 Through this dual structure, colonial power now works through the inclusion of Indigenous peoples, actively shaping their perspectives in line with state discourses, rather than merely excluding them, as in years past. Therefore, any attempt to seek ‘the reconciliation of Indigenous nationhood with state sovereignty is still colonial insofar as it remains structurally committed to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of our lands and self-determining authority’.30

Concerning the state in relation to Indigenous peoples on the international level, Corntassel argues that states and global organisations, for years, have been consistently framing Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims in ways that ‘jeopardize the futures of indigenous communities’.31 He claims that states frst compartmentalise Indigenous self-determination by separating lands and resources from political and legal recognition of a limited autonomy. Second, he notes, states sometimes deny the existence of Indigenous peoples living within their borders. Thirdly, a political and legal entitlement framing by states deemphasises other responsibilities. Finally, he claims that states, through the rights discourse, limit the frameworks through which Indigenous peoples can seek self-determination. Like Alfred and Coulthard, Corntassel has concluded that states are deliberate and never changing in their behaviour. With this move, Corntassel limits and actually demeans Indigenous agency, overlooking the reality that Indigenous organisations themselves chose the human rights framework and rights discourse as a target sphere of action precisely because, as was evident in earlier struggles like slavery, civil rights or women’s rights, these were tools available to them that had a proven track record of opening up new possibilities and shifting previous state positions and behaviour. Indigenous advocates also cleverly realised, by the 1970s, that the anti-discrimination and decolonisation frames could be used together against states. States did, in no way, nefariously impose a rights framework on Indigenous peoples. Rather, Indigenous organisations and savvy Indigenous political actors deliberately chose to frame their self-determination struggles within the human rights framework in order to bring states into a double bind where they could not credibly claim to adhere to human rights and claim that they uphold equality while simultaneously denying Indigenous peoples’ human rights and leaving them with a diminished and unequal right of self-determination. But, because he is caught in the pessimism trap of seeing the state only as unified, deliberate and unchanging, Corntassel overlooks and diminishes the clear story of Indigenous agency and the potential for positive change in advancing self-determination in a multitude of ways.

Pessimism Trap 3: Engagement with the Settler State is Futile, if Not Counter-Productive

Since the state always intends to maintain, if not expand, colonial control, and is seeking to co-opt as many Indigenous peoples as possible in order to maintain or expand its dispossession and control, it is therefore futile, at best, and actually dangerous to Indigenous existence to engage with the state. Furthermore, all patterns of engagement will lead to co-optation as the state is cunning and unrelenting in its desire to co-opt Indigenous leaders, academics and professionals in order to gain or maintain control of Indigenous peoples.

Alfred argues, in both his 2005 and 2009 books, that any Indigenous engagement with the state, including agreements and negotiations, is not only futile but fundamentally dangerous, as such pathways do not directly challenge the existing colonial structure and ‘to argue on behalf of indigenous nationhood within the dominant Western paradigm is self-defeating’.32 Alfred states that a ‘notion of nationhood or self-government rooted in state institutions and framed within the context of state sovereignty can never satisfy the imperatives of Native American political traditions’33 because the possibility for a true expression of Indigenous self-determination is ‘precluded by the state’s insistence on dominion and its exclusionary notion of sovereignty’.34 Worst of all, according to Alfred, when Indigenous communities frame their struggles in terms of asserting Aboriginal rights and title, but do so within a state framework, rather than resisting the state itself, it ‘represents the culmination of white society’s efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples’.35

Because it is impossible to advance Indigenous self-determination through any sort of engagement with the state, Coulthard also advocates for an Indigenous resurgence paradigm that follows both his mentor Taiaiake Alfred but also Anishinaabe feminist theorist Leanne Simpson.36 As Coulthard writes, ‘both Alfred and Simpson start from a position that calls on Indigenous peoples and communities to “turn away” from the assimilative reformism of the liberal recognition approach and to instead build our national liberation efforts on the revitalization of “traditional” political values and practices’.37 Drawing upon the prescriptive approach of these theorists, Coulthard proposes, in his concluding chapter, five theses from his analysis that are intended to build and solidify Indigenous resurgence into the future:

1. On the necessity of direct action, meaning that physical forms of Indigenous resistance, like protest and blockades, are very important not only as a reaction to the state but also as a means of protecting the lands that are central to Indigenous peoples’ existence;

2. Capitalism, No More!, meaning the rejection of capitalist forms of economic development in Indigenous communities in favour of land-based Indigenous political-economic alternative approaches;

3. Dispossession and Indigenous Sovereignty in the City, meaning the need for Indigenous resurgence movements ‘to address the interrelated systems of dispossession that shape Indigenous peoples’ experiences in both urban and land-based settings’38;

4. Gender Justice and Decolonisation, meaning that decolonisation must also include a shift away from patriarchy and an embrace of gender relations that are non-violent and refective of the centrality of women in traditional forms of Indigenous governance and society; and

5. Beyond the Nation-State. While Coulthard denies that he advocates complete rejection of engagement with the state’s political and legal system, he does assert that ‘our efforts to engage these discursive and institutional spaces to secure recognition of our rights have not only failed, but have instead served to subtly reproduce the forms of racist, sexist, economic, and political confgurations of power that we initially sought…to challenge’.39 He therefore advocates expressly for ‘critical self-refection, skepticism, and caution’ in a ‘resurgent politics of recognition that seeks to practice decolonial, gender-emancipatory, and economically nonexploitative alternative structures of law and sovereign authority grounded on a critical refashioning of the best of Indigenous legal and political traditions’.40

Corntassel also demonstrates the third pessimism trap, that all engagement with the state is ultimately futile. For the most part, however, Corntassel’s observation is that the UN system operates like a reverse Keck and Sikkink ‘boomerang model’ and ‘channels the energies of transnational Indigenous networks into the institutional fiefdoms of member countries’, by which an ‘illusion of inclusion’ is created.41 He argues that, in order to be included or their views listened to, Indigenous delegates at the UN must mimic the strategies, language, norms and modes of behaviour of member states and international institutions. Corntassel fnds that ‘what results is a cadre of professionalized Indigenous delegates who demonstrate more allegiance to the UN system than to their own communities’.42 In his final analysis, he charges that the co-optation of international Indigenous political actors is highly ‘effective in challenging the unity of the global Indigenous rights movement and hindering genuine dialogue regarding Indigenous self-determination and justice’.43

Finding that states deliberately co-opt and provide ‘illusions of inclusion’ to Indigenous political actors in UN settings, Corntassel comes to the same conclusion as Alfred concerning the futility of engagement, arguing that because transnational Indigenous networks are ‘channeled’ and ‘blunted’ by colonial state actors, ‘it is a critical time for Indigenous peoples to rethink their approaches to bringing Indigenous rights concerns to global forums’.44

Imagining a Post-Colonial Future: Pessimistic ‘Resurgence’ Versus the Optimism and Tenacity of Indigenous Movements on the Ground

All of these writers advocate Indigenous resurgence, through a combination of rejecting the current reconciliation politics of settler colonial states, coupled with a return to land-based Indigenous expressions of governance as the only viable, ‘authentic’ and legitimate path to a better future for Indigenous peoples, which they refer to as decolonisation. While inherently critical in their orientation, these three approaches do make some positive and productive contributions to Indigenous movements. They help shed light on the various and subtle ways that Indigenous leaders and communities can become co-opted into a colonial system. They help us to hold leadership accountable. They also help us keep a strong focus on our traditional, cultural and spiritual values as well as our traditional forms of governance which then also helps us imagine future possibilities.

As I have pointed out here, however, all three theorists are also caught in the same three pessimism traps: authenticity versus co-option; a vision of the state as unified, deliberate and never changing in its desire to colonise and control; and a view of engagement with the state as futile, if not dangerous, to Indigenous sovereignty and existence. When combined, these three pessimism traps aim to inhibit Indigenous peoples’ engagement with the state in any process that could potentially re-imagine and re-formulate their current relationship into one that could be transformative and post-colonial, as envisioned by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The pessimism traps together work to foreclose any possibility that there could be credible openings of opportunity to negotiate a fairer and just relationship of co-existence with even the most progressive state government.

This pessimistic approach is not innocuous. By overemphasising structure and granting the state an enormous degree of agency as a unitary actor, this pessimistic approach does a remarkable disservice to Indigenous resistance movements by proscribing, from academia, an extremely narrow view of what Indigenous self-determination can and should mean in practice. By overlooking and/or discounting Indigenous agency and not even considering the possibility that Indigenous peoples could themselves be calculating, strategic political actors in their own right, and vis-à-vis states, the pessimistic lens of the resurgence school unnecessarily, unproductively and unjustly limits the field of possibility for Indigenous peoples’ decision-making, thus actually countering and inhibiting expressions of Indigenous self-determination. By condemning—writ large—all Indigenous peoples and organisations that wish to seek peaceful co-existence with the state, negotiate mutually beneficial agreements with the state, and/or who have advocated on the international level for a set of standards that can provide a positive guiding framework for Indigenous-state relations, the pessimistic lens of resurgence forecloses much potential for new and improved relations, in any form, and is very likely to lead to deeper conflicts between states and Indigenous peoples, and potentially, even violent action, which Fanon indicated was the necessary outcome. The pessimism traps of the resurgence school are therefore, likely self-defeating for all but the most remote and isolated Indigenous communities. Further, this approach is quite out of step with the actions and vision of many Indigenous resistance movements on the ground who have been working for decades to advance Indigenous self-determination, both domestically and globally, in ways that transform the colonial state into something more just and may eventually present creative alternatives to the Westphalian state form in ways that could respect and accommodate Indigenous nations. Rather, it aims to shame and blame those who wish to explore creative and innovative post-colonial resolutions to the colonial condition.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration or UN Declaration) was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 after 25 years of development. The Declaration is ground-breaking, given the key leadership roles Indigenous peoples played in negotiating and achieving this agreement.45 Additionally, for the first time in UN history, the rights holders, Indigenous peoples, worked with states to develop an instrument that would serve to promote, protect and affirm Indigenous rights, both globally and in individual domestic contexts.46

Many Indigenous organisations and movements, from dozens of countries around the world, were involved in drafting and negotiating the UN Declaration and are now advocating for its full implementation, both internationally and in domestic and regional contexts. In Canada, some of the key organisational players—the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee), the Assembly of First Nations, and the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, or their predecessor organisations—were involved in the drafting and lengthy negotiations of the UN Declaration during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In the United States, organisations like the American Indian Law Alliance and the Native American Rights Fund have been involved as well as the Navajo Nation and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, who represent themselves as Indigenous peoples’ governing institutions. From Scandinavia, the Saami Council and the Sami Parliaments all play a key role in advancing Indigenous rights. In Latin America, organisations like the Confederación de Nationalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA) advocate for implementation of the UN Declaration. The three, major transnational Indigenous organisations— the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the International Indian Treaty Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council—were all key members of the drafting and negotiating team for the UN Declaration, and the latter two, which are still in existence, continue their strong advocacy for its full implementation.

Implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires fundamental and significant change, on both the international and domestic levels. Because implementation of Indigenous rights essentially calls for a complete and fundamental restructuring of Indigenous-state relationships, it expects states to enact and implement a signifcant body of legal, constitutional, legislative and policy changes that can accommodate such things as Indigenous land rights, free, prior and informed consent, redress and a variety of self-government, autonomy and other such arrangements. States are not going to implement this multifaceted and complex set of changes on their own, however. They will require significant political and moral pressure to hold them accountable to the rhetorical commitments they have made to support this level of change. They will also require ongoing conversation and negotiation with Indigenous peoples along the way, lest the process becomes problematically one-sided. Such processes ultimately require sustained political will, commitment and engagement over the long term, to reach the end result of radical systemic change and Indigenous state relationships grounded in mutual respect, co-existence and reciprocity. This type of fundamental change requires creative thinking, careful diplomacy, tenacity, and above all, optimistic vision, on the part of Indigenous peoples. The pessimistic approaches of the resurgence school are ultimately of little use in these efforts, other than as a cautionary tale against state power, of which the organisational players are already keenly aware. Further, by dismissing and discouraging all efforts at engagement with states, and especially with the blanket accusations that all who engage in such efforts are ‘co-opted’ and not ‘authentically’ Indigenous, the resurgence school actually creates unnecessary negative feelings and divisions amongst Indigenous movements who should be pooling limited resources and working together towards better futures.

#### The state is inevitable—engaging the state doesn’t necesarilly mean endorsing it—they devolves politics into a dogmatic void that the right will fill

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The anarchist critique of Marxist organisational forms is unconvincing, then, because it does not acknowledge the diversity of Marxist approaches and it tends towards a theoreticism that sees a linear, causal, and continuous line from theory to practice. Nonetheless, there are significant differences of strategy between anarchism and Marxism: it is just that these are less to do with organisation as such, and are much more broadly to do with differing attitudes toward politics and the state. Although **some** (though by no means all) **anarchists** have supported formal political organisations, with rules, membership criteria, and even internal discipline (Schmidt and van der Walt 2009: 247-263), they **have** traditionally **rejected any engagement with the state – whether it be voting, demanding legal rights or protections, forming political parties, or attempting the revolutionary seizure of government – on the basis that such engagement can only end up replicating the oppressive hierarchies that they are fighting: either it will lead to new forms of dictatorship and bureaucracy** (such as developed in the Soviet Union); **or** it will lead to parliamentary **reformism and** hence **merely reinforce existing structures and relations of power. If Marxists support** (qualified) **engagement with the state and even the formation of political parties**, however, **it is not because they think that centralised hierarchies are desirable or inevitable, but because they begin from a different understanding of politics**. They argue that **the** **anarchist** **abstention from state politics denies us the most effective means of political action: we disempower ourselves rather than the state when we refuse to engage with it. Making demands on the state does not necessarily entail an endorsement of the state, any more than the demands that are made by employees during a strike are an endorsement of the employer or of the system of wage-labour** (Marx 1988). Anarchists themselves have at least implicitly recognised the efficacy of political engagement by occasionally supporting the policies of certain governments and even participating in elections (Engels 1988; Franks 2012: 216). More than this, **abstention from state politics is not a genuine option: whether we like it or not, we are all already involved in state politics, because we are all always already submitted to state power, control, and oppression.** Anarchists are concerned that participation in conventional politics will lead to parliamentary reformism. But this concern is itself ultimately premised on a tacit acceptance of the liberal-parliamentary understanding of politics: to claim that we can safely repudiate state politics simply by refusing ever to enter a polling booth is to assume that ‘the state’ stops at the door of Parliament. Marxists, in contrast, have argued that the state apparatus includes educational institutions, the media, churches, the family, and so on (e.g. Althusser 1971): simply in going about our daily lives we are all therefore implicated in state politics. Given our necessary involvement within politics, the question is not whether we engage with it, but how we do so; even libertarian Marxists like Holloway argue that engagement with the state is inevitable (Holloway 2005: 40). In contrast, the anarchist recommendation of disengagement from the state risks a politics of withdrawal and isolation. There are two related reasons why under our current conditions in particular the Marxist willingness to engage in state politics is preferable to an anarchist position. The first is the dominance of neoliberalism today. Given the strength of neoliberalism since the crisis that it created, there is a strong case for a certain pragmatism in our response. A danger of the prefigurative politics favoured by anarchists is that it dogmatically dictates an a priori exclusion of certain forms of political action. For Marxists, on the other hand, **political strategies must be decided according to particular conditions and within a certain context**. In a context in which private companies are increasingly undertaking tasks previously performed by the state, **the active defence of state services and institutions** can be viewed as a radical position to adopt: defending welfare provision, public pensions, universal healthcare, and free higher education **should be seen not as a reformist compromise with the existing order but as safeguarding the gains of class struggle against capitalist processes of accumulation by dispossession.** This leads to the second reason for doubting the refusal of state politics as a viable tactic under current conditions, which concerns the specific role of the state under neoliberalism. The anti-state politics of anarchism may have made sense during eras in which the state could plausibly be presented as the main threat to freedom and equality: during the period of nation-building and imperialistic expansion in the mid- to late-19th century, of the rise of fascism in the early-20th century, or even of the development of welfare capitalism after WWII. But it has far less purchase in an era in which neoliberalism, as both the official ideology and a form of everyday common sense, is anti-statist. Put simply, the attack on state power too easily echoes the rhetoric of neoliberalism itself (Taylor 2013: 735). When government actors themselves are explicitly endorsing the retreat of the state, then anarchist attacks on state power have limited efficacy either as a tactical call to arms or as a convincing analysis of our present conjuncture. In practice, of course, it is true that neoliberalism has not dissolved state power. But nor has the relation between state and capital remained the same under neoliberalism, such that our analyses, strategies, or rhetoric need not alter. The nature of this relationship between state and capital will be examined in the next section.

### Perm

#### Perm solves- only working through jurisdiction solves decolonization

Buchanan 17 (Brenton, Society and Space Organization, “Lumpy Space, Colonial Place: Jurisdiction As Infrastructure And (Post)Colonial Place Making In The Marshall Islands”, https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/lumpy-space-colonial-place-jurisdiction-as-infrastructure-and-post-colonial-place-making-in-the-marshall-islands)

In their work, both Lauren Benton and Shiri Pasternak examine the fluidity of legal relationships through conceptions of jurisdiction which overlap, entangle, and shift over time. As Pasternak explains, seeing “jurisdiction as a spatial category… [allows] for the examination of the production of colonial space through the work of jurisdiction” (emphasis mine. 2014: 147) Pasternak’s geographic lens positions law and space as political, as contested categories that come together in constituting colonial claims to authority; to colonial jurisdiction over others. As a result, layers of colonial and imperial authority “become thicker or thinner as peoples’ movements through space produce new arrangements and negotiations of power,” (Pasternak, 2014: 149) bringing with them further systems of domination. As unevenly asserted and applied across space and time, jurisdiction-as-infrastructure opens up a refutation of the completeness of the colonial project. Infrastructure, in this sense, is understood not only as a ‘structure,’ but also as ‘process’; one that works to produce other systems and relations. This perspective highlights the productive aspects of jurisdiction, rather than accepting legal authority and law as removed from the space they claim. Instead, when framed as infrastructure, jurisdiction is shown to be a process of “overlapping authority claims between Indigenous, state, regional, and private interests, and it can help parse the ways in which these jurisdictional encounters produce colonial space” (Pasternak, 2014: 146). The importance of this emphasis on process and production is that, even as laws are instituted and legal systems established, jurisdiction forms its necessary and underlying infrastructure; “the power to speak the law” (Pasternak, 2014: 148). Jurisdiction-as-infrastructure highlights this claim-making, opening up law and legal authority as a contested category. Mentioned above, this approach refuses an acceptance of “law” as a pre-spatial category, positioning instead not only the content of the law but its claim to applicability over a given space as something that must be established, and therefore maintained. As such, law is produced through claims to jurisdiction, and by situating it as such in the colonial process reveals uneven and contested geographies of power. Law, legal systems, and the authority to impose them become highly historicized objects, ones that are spatially and relationally contingent in their production, enactment, and perpetuation. Through examining jurisdiction as infrastructure then, colonial and imperial authority not only become, but already are, contested and contestable claims. By asserting that legal authority is continually produced, the voices of Indigenous claims and contestations become themselves jurisdictional “lumps that betray patterns of partial and uneven state sovereignty” (Pasternak, 2014: 148). The singular authority that colonial powers claim is instead unsettled and made to compete. This framework importantly resists the perspective of the fatal impact theory, wherein the colonial encounter produces a terminal “historical descent into a state of nothingness and hopelessness” (Smith, 1999: 88) of Indigenous cultures and peoples, as well as reduction of the colonized to “the concept of “bare lives” … [withdrawing] all form of agency from the bodies targeted by this violence” (Lambert, 2017: 13). Its spatial qualities belie the finality of colonial authority, as the emphasis on the power “to speak” the law, rather than the law itself, allows for non-colonial and non-state forms of authority to be recognized. Jurisdiction works as a process over time to establish and claim authority over space. As necessarily contingent, relational, and historical, for this short intervention an examination of the long imperial/colonial history of the Marshall Islands reveals some of the ways that jurisdiction takes on “a quality of lumpiness” (Benton, 2005: 701). At the same time the contemporary work of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal (NCT), established under the Compact of Free Association (COFA), opens up space to discuss both the possibilities of resistance through jurisdictional claims and the incompleteness of the postcolonial project. Moving from infrequent economic exchange with Spain (established through the Treaty of Tordesillas, 1594), German interests in the islands were recognized in 1885. However, their relationship with the islands was primarily established in 1878 through a treaty with one local chief, granting them exclusive use of a Jaluit Atoll harbor and trading privileges. The combination of inter-imperial and German-indigenous relations positions, even tacitly, indigenous jurisdiction over access and use of island harbors and resources on a relatively even plane with imperial claims. Yet, in 1914, when the Japanese seized the Marshall Islands from Germany during WWI, it was not a renegotiation of a treaty between the new imperial power and local chiefs, but rather seizure of one empire’s land and transference of control to another. Viewed as a German protectorate, the shifted context meant that since “a state of war existed between… nations… therefore the takings were legal” (emphasis mine. Benton, 2005: 705). As inter-imperial conflict, the transfer from German to Japanese possession overlapped with German-Indigenous treaties. As the former did not require a reconsideration of the latter, it implicitly arranges them in a hierarchical legal relationship. Centering jurisdiction as infrastructure, Japanese claims over Germany’s imperial relation to the Marshall Islands is temporarily troubled. If this “transfer” is something necessarily produced, then by what authority does Japan claim possession of the Marshall Islands, especially considering the German-Marshall relationship was negotiated directly with local Islander authority? Rather, these transfers should be seen less as a shifting of powers but a cementing of certain legal relationships that works to produce a privileging of imperial and colonial claims over those of indigenous peoples. This did not equate in a complete erasure, as much as the imperial/colonial project might desire, but rather a layering on of different dominating relations. This fungibility of (imperial) authority shifted not necessarily under the auspices of a single imperial power, but rather across powers through imperial jurisdictional understandings and transitions through conquest. In this way, “territory… was constructed not just for empire but also in empire, and at its margins” (Benton, 2005: 701). Divesting the Marshallese of authority was not a foregone conclusion, but one produced out of the very practice of empire. When the United States defeated Japan in the islands in 1944, assertion of authority over the Islands in 1945 was in this sense a claim less in relation to the Marshallese peoples, but rather against the Japanese empire. Perhaps an irony of this shifting web of jurisdiction between imperial powers is found in a statement from the UN in 1947 (itself newly established and working to assert its own claims to authority) made to declare the Marshalls a trust territory of the U.S. Not only was this the only trusteeship “designated as a “strategic” territory,” granting greater latitude over the securitization of the region, but the UN declared the responsibility of the U.S. to “protect the inhabitants… against the loss of their lands and resources” (emphasis mine. Barker, 2013: 22). This language implies a form of ownership by the Marshallese over the islands, yet positions it as a subordinate claim to the paternalistic oversight of the U.S. This reflexive maneuvering of possession and authority constitutes a “cynical grounds for recognition” that “also entrenched the subordination of Indigenous societies” (Pasternak, 2014: 159). Through representing Marshallese possession of their islands, U.S. (and UN) authority is asserted, structured, and simultaneously folds Marshallese claims under this oversight. Though a shifting terrain, this post-World War II legal relationship is predicated on preceding imperial ones, and their own claims to “speak the law” in Marshallese lands. The infrastructure of inter-imperial jurisdiction becomes productive of US claims to the islands, as seized from Imperial Japan, as well as the UN’s claim to be able to designate a certain kind of authority over them. The long historical process started with infrequent Spanish trading, when understood though conceptions of jurisdiction over the islands reveals the long production of the islands as colonial space, privileging (primarily) Western imperial authority over Indigenous claims over their land. This imperial history of the Marshalls forms the centuries long preamble and pretext that established a legal context wherein the United States could be “granted” the Islands as a strategic territory under their trusteeship; pursuing sixty-six nuclear tests between 1946-1963 and ongoing ballistic missile testing in the islands. As the Cold War continued, the Marshallese of various communities sent petitions through both US and UN channels to protest and improve their position under US “strategic” oversight. Understanding these within the productive infrastructure of jurisdiction, American legal authority and aspects of the colonial dynamic are brought into question through both an invocation of UN authority, and the very voices of the Islanders who petition, protest, and contest. Within a broader framework of Cold War decolonial movements, the basis of and imperial power to “speak the law” became increasingly troubled. In addition to gaining periodic concessions, tensions between indigenous movements and continued US investment in the Marshall Islands as a military (test) site culminated in the 1980s with negotiations for the COFA. As a victory for indigenous sovereignty this nominally recognizes Marshallese self-government even as it simultaneously perpetuates US military and colonial interests. Following jurisdiction through the COFA, the establishment of the NCT was to provide “jurisdiction to render final determination upon all claims past, present, and future” (Pevec, 2005) regarding the nuclear testing program. Given $150 million for these ends, Smith-Norris (2016: 40) notes how the “finality” of this agreement also resulted in the dismissal of all claims pending in the United States, as courts in the US were divested of jurisdictional authority over these matters. Although woefully underfunded, and the possibility of pursuing legal cases within US courts being denied, the findings of the NCT function as an avenue for pressuring the United States for further redress for the legacy of its testing program. It is noted (Smith-Norris, 2016: 41) that having awarded $341,049,311 in damages to the Enewetakese alone in 2000, the findings of the NCT are not immediately actionable (though payments are made as much as is possible). Instead, assessment of damages, processing of claims, and the power to speak the law in cases of redress for nuclear testing, contamination, and devastation has become a new lump in the US-Marshallese relationship. Though quickly running up against a limited budget, this shifting jurisdictional geography opens up a site of resistance as well as a look into the incomplete nature of decolonization. After an independent review of the NCT by former US Attorney General Richard Thornburgh in 2003 and a 2012 UN investigation into impacts of the testing program, the findings of the NCT comprise a mechanism of knowledge production about the legacies of nuclear contamination independent from US oversight. As the Marshallese continue to argue for adequate compensation through the NCT, examining jurisdiction as infrastructural process through which colonial and imperial authority can be asserted, its “return” through decolonization belies the uneven power dynamics and systems that continue to pervade colonizer/colonized relations. However, through the NCT and its claim to jurisdiction over damages due to the Marshallese people as a result of the United States’ nuclear testing and colonial domination, these contestations might be seen as more than an uneven power dynamic. These claims to authority by the NCT, and by extension the Marshallese people, are not simply petitions to US or UN law. They are themselves claims to sovereignty that are one part of a larger decolonial struggle, where the NCT’s jurisdiction produces a new vision and future for the Republic of the Marshall Islands. It seems true that the “decolonization” promised through the COFA and the establishment of the NCT is not a recognition of an originary, total jurisdiction, but a modified and contingent one that maintains other structures of domination. Just as jurisdiction opens a recognition of the process and contested nature of coloniality, as part of the postcolonial project it reveals its own incompleteness. The ability of the US to deny responsibility for the ongoing impacts of its nuclear colonialism and payment of damages concluded by the NCT makes clear that jurisdictional authority is but one of the necessary components for a true decolonization of the Marshall Islands. Yet employing it as a point of intervention can help reveal the contours of domination that make up the lumpiness of imperial and (post)colonial dynamics. For a historical approach, consideration of jurisdiction as infrastructure can help to make clear the long duration, and process, of imperial and colonial imposition and assertions of authority. Important to this is that jurisdiction as productive of the colonial context and relationship helps to set the stage for other forms and systems of power; jurisdiction does not travel alone. For the decolonizing process then, understanding it as infrastructure can reveal other forms of colonial persistence. Even as jurisdiction is “returned” or recognized in purportedly (de)colonized peoples, unequal power dynamics and neo-colonial systems persist through other forms. Being productive of colonial and imperial claims to authority, a site of contestation that “actively works to produce something” (Dorsett and McVeigh quoted in Pasternak, 2014: 151) it is also a process of multiple “things” in the making. Perhaps as an ethical statement, this framework also insists on hopeful potential and possibilities for decolonial struggles, even as it provides a valuable critical approach to understanding the complexities of colonial domination. Centering debates and claims worked out through jurisdiction can reveal both the production and persistence of colonialism, but also competing systems and visions of post- or de-colonial futures.

### Materiality Good

#### Material action paves the way for a post-colonial future which breaks down the settler-native binary and gives natives autonomy in policy

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Theorising Decolonisation For all its attached redemptive prospects and radical possibilities, it is important to emphasise that the meanings of decolonisation as both a concept and political project are not just broad, but also multifaceted and highly contested. What it means to ‘undo’ colonialism is deeply contextual (Jansen and Osterhammel, 2017). While colonialism can be defined broadly as a relationship of domination in which a people or territory is politically and economically subjugated to a foreign power, actual colonial situations vary quite widely from each other, depending on, among others, the particular political systems instituted to maintain control, types of exploitation and expropriation (resources, labour, plantations), relationship between the metropole and colony and patterns of migration they compel (slavery, settlement). Projects of decolonisation accordingly take different forms even if they are united by the common concern of ending or overturning structures of domination instituted by colonialism, which has historically taken place mostly through the withdrawal of colonial powers and achievement of independence for the colonised (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation speaks to the aspiration of self-rule and its concomitant critique of colonialism as the ‘systematic denial of freedom’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 6) and is therefore entangled with a variety of concerns, namely, self-determination, justice, equality, freedom and solidarity against colonialism and imperialism. As Todd Shepherd (2006: 3–4) writes, decolonisation is ‘a much wider concept than the mere “winning of Independence” or “transfer of power”… It entails the exploration of dreams, the analysis of struggles, compromises, pledges and achievements, and the rethinking of fundamentals’. Traditional literature on decolonisation approached it in terms of the historical process that began in the immediate aftermath of World War Two in which countries previously under (typically European) foreign rule transitioned to constitutional independence (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation was one of the most significant developments of the twentieth century, radically changing the face of the globe from one in which a small number of empires had dominion over some 80% of the earth’s surface to an international order based on the principle of self-determination and made up of ostensibly independent states (Hopkins, 2008). Scholars in this tradition have done much to illuminate the wide-reaching structural transformations that accompanied decolonisation, including the emergence of anti-colonial and national liberation struggles at the turn of the century, shifts in world economy that made the maintenance of traditional forms of Empire increasingly difficult, the development of a ‘Third World’ political project and the institutionalisation of human and civic rights principles that rendered systems based on ideas of racial and ethnic superiority less viable (Hopkins, 2008: 216). Yet, the focus on transition has been critiqued for its narrowness insofar as it seems to take for granted the meanings of self-determination and temporally restricts decolonisation to the moment of national liberation. Postcolonial scholars, among others, have been at the forefront of this charge, arguing that decolonisation did not produce a postcolonial world per se, but rather one that continues to be shaped in significant ways by the legacies of European colonialism (e.g. Spivak, 1999). As Ella Shohat (1992) has argued, there is no way of turning back from the world colonialism set in play nor did colonial modes of domination end with the formal period of decolonisation. From this broadened perspective, decolonisation is the difficult task of tracing the economic, political, social, cultural, relational and linguistic consequences of colonialism and is therefore also an ongoing imaginative project seeking ‘a new form of consciousness and way of life’ (Pieterse and Parekh, 1995: 3) beyond the coloniality of modern modes of culture, identity and knowledge more generally. While the transitional focus of conventional scholarship is quite illuminating in the contexts of Africa and Asia, for example, it furthermore excludes a great many decolonisation efforts that have taken place and continue to take place in other regions. This includes countries that remained dependent or only achieved semi-independence as dominions, decolonising projects carried out in territories never formally under colonial rule (the Iranian Revolution, for instance) and – as is particularly important to our discussion here – settler colonies that only partially decolonised, whether by way of loosening ties with the Motherland or achieving independence, but which continue to dominate substantial indigenous populations (Hopkins, 2008). There is a significant lacuna in the decolonisation literature when it comes to settler colonialism, which has increasingly been recognised as a distinct form of colonial practice – and one that is particularly resistant to decolonisation (Veracini, 2007). As the transfer of an exogenous population to a territory they intend to claim as their permanent home, settler colonialism establishes quite a different structural relationship to ‘traditional’ forms of colonialism, especially when settler colonial projects succeed in creating a state (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011). Rather than governing native peoples in order to extract resources for economic gain, settler colonisers instead aim to ‘seize their land and push them beyond an ever-expanding frontier of settlement’ (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 2). For Patrick Wolfe (2006), what distinguishes settler colonialism is thus that it is guided by a logic of elimination as opposed to a logic of exploitation, wherein the eradication of indigenous presence is essential to the success of settler colonial projects. The primacy of national liberation in the literature makes it especially difficult to imagine, let alone theorise, decolonisation in many settler colonial contexts. Whereas some settler colonial projects like Algeria and Kenya saw decolonisation by way of a mass settler exodus, paving the way for the establishment of independent states, the more successful ones established permanent settler communities (e.g. Northern Ireland) or their own states (e.g. Australia, Canada, the United States) which preclude a simple transition from foreign rule to sovereign status (Veracini, 2007). This is of course not to say that self-determination of the type aspired to by anti-colonial national movements was an easy or even necessarily achievable task. As Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest, in pursuing the dream of self-rule, anti-colonial thinkers had to reckon with the difficulties of articulating alternative political foundations that would make for a genuinely self-determining polity, an enormous task which **demands decolonising of minds as much institutions and territory** (see Fanon, 2001[1963]). Decolonisation must pursue a convincing ‘break’ between a colonial past and a postcolonial future ‘through decisive action in the present’; it must also ‘seek to reinterpret the past in such a way that it may help in the present and future struggle for self-rule’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 19). While these pursuits are invariably contingent, partial and commonly symbolic, national liberation struggles very often provide the fodder for a reinterpreted past that is robustly positive and the establishment of an independent state serves as that aspired for ‘break’. Settler colonial contexts, especially those where indigenous peoples live as minorities in settler states, make these types of symbolic transitions challenging, as they do the imagining of postcolonial alternatives. If the narrative structure of colonialism is circular (leave, stay, return), making that symbolic break possible, settler colonial narratives are linear insofar as the settler comes to stay and the line continues on unbroken (Veracini, 2007). As Ann Curthoys (1999: 288) writes, **settler colonial spaces are simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising, which makes decolonisation temporally ambivalent at best.** Lorenzo Veracini (2007) suggests that there are only two alternatives to settler evacuation for decolonising settler colonial forms and it is dubious whether one of these counts as decolonisation at all: the decolonisation of relationships through ‘the promotion of various processes of Indigenous reconciliation’ or the maintenance of the status quo ‘with the explicit rejection of the possibility of reforming the settler body politic’. Again, **what the former might mean is often vague, and historically it is the decolonisation of relationships that is hardest to come by considering the psychological consequences of colonialism for coloniser and colonised alike** (Memmi, 1965). Like traditional forms of colonialism, settler colonialism was legitimated by a belief in the colonised’s racial and cultural inferiority. However, the specific settler colonial pursuit of land seizure compels additional stereotypes of native peoples or unique applications of existing colonial ones, wherein their supposed inferiority makes them ill-equipped to develop that land (pre-modern, nomadic, barbaric) or, alternatively, voids any claims to ownership (terra nullius). In other words, settler colonialism is as much premised on the denial of indigenous peoples as a political constituency with rights to land as it is their purported inferiority, which is typically enshrined in their status as second-class citizens with all the economic, cultural and social disadvantage this entails (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011: 3). Given that settler societies are marked by ‘pervasive inequalities, usually codified in law, between native and settler populations’ which preserve political and economic privileges for the latter (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 4), **decolonising relationships demands structural changes that often encounter significant resistance from settler constituencies.** Likewise, it requires a reckoning with historical injustice – specifically violence and conflict at the colonial frontier – that is challenging for settler states and populations because it opens questions of settler identity, privileges, legitimacy and reparations and expressly seeks to scrutinise disavowed and long suppressed histories. Settler colonial decolonisation is thus complicated by a multitude of hurdles, which bring the postcolonial caution of the impossibility of a ‘break’ into stark relief. Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest that **decisive action in the present is essential to decolonisation**, but in settler colonial contexts **this is hindered by power discrepancies between settler and native constituencies, a general lack of settler political will** to enter into difficult processes of historical introspection **as well as the constraining of Indigenous claims within the settler state**. Indeed, even a commitment to a postcolonial polity as expressed through processes of historical reconciliation often encounters strong resistance when it comes to judicial, constitutional or legislative change genuinely decolonised relationships would demand. Nevertheless, even if it remains difficult to comprehensively imagine the decolonisation of ‘settler societies vis-à-vis Indigenous constituencies’ (Veracini, 2007), the central question must be how to construct political foundations which simultaneously acknowledge ‘the practices of racism, violence and subordination’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 18) that preceded them while also **paving the way for a postcolonial future in which natives and settlers are equal parties and share the right to narrate the polity.** Equality, freedom and justice may come from legally enshrining Indigenous rights to self-determination or, alternatively, doing away with the categories of ‘settler’ and ‘native’ altogether (Mamdani, 2001). What shape such efforts are likely to take depends, among others, on the ‘size and tenacity’ of Indigenous populations as well as the power of the settler constituency (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 3, 6). But we would suggest that the measure to which they may be thought of as decolonising rests on the robustness of the relationship they envision and the space they carve for equal membership in and to a postcolonial polity.